

...a validated, useable system of human values, values that we can believe in and devote ourselves to because they are true rather than because we are *exhorted* to “believe and have faith.”<sup>730</sup>

Humanistic psychology, Maslow believed, for the first time in history, was able to derive such a system of values from an empirically confirmed theory of human nature “without recourse to authority outside the human being himself...”<sup>731</sup> Issues that had been the exclusive jurisdiction of organized religion had become the “property” of scientists.<sup>732</sup> Maslow believed that the Humanistic theory and system of values were supracultural, and he likened them to “a religion—that can bind human beings together...”<sup>733</sup> and solve at least some of the growing social ills.

In several statements about culture, Maslow echoed the previous Authors in stating the importance of a person being as independent of cultural values as is possible. This is not the differentiation of Jung (although he doesn’t seem to disagree with those notions) so much as the need for a non-culturally-bound perspective that might approach something universal. Maslow felt that the “clear impulse voices”<sup>734</sup> of self-actualizers do not speak in the language of cultural values but in that of universal values. Consequently, Maslow believed that education should not be for localized citizenship, but for world citizenship. In this, he was extremely anti-Deweyan, feeling that education is not for the inculcation of societal values, but for the discovery (by looking within<sup>735</sup>) of values that transcend the individual’s society.

Maslow seems to have had very little to say about freedom that had not been stated by the previous Authors. He implied its importance in his many comments about the non-interference or Taoist approach to therapy. He also implied that humans can be trusted to be free, citing homeostasis in several books as support for humans (and animals in general) being able to intuitively find what is in their own best interests.<sup>736</sup> Linking freedom to values and homeostasis, Maslow felt that psychologically “healthy people,” when left to choose freely, choose B-values<sup>737</sup> (extending the notions of ‘own best interest’ to include that which is pro-social and ethical); and that having the freedom to discover one’s identity is part of becoming a psychologically healthy person.

Maslow’s contribution to notions of meta-learning lies principally in his linking it directly to self-knowledge and Ultimacy. He felt that “the logically prior need, before knowing, [is] to be a good knower”<sup>738</sup> which is part of approaching self-knowledge and Ultimacy. Knowing

oneself becomes, then, not a nice extra, but the basis for all other knowledge.

In effect what I am implying is that honest knowing of oneself is logically and psychologically prior to knowing the extrapsychic world. Experiential knowledge is prior to spectator knowledge. ...The injunction might read, then: make yourself into a good instrument of knowledge. ...Become as fearless as you can, as honest, authentic and ego-transcending as you can.<sup>739</sup>

### *Social-ability for Maslow*

Maslow presented an interesting perspective on Rousseau's old admonition of making a man rather than a citizen. Maslow believed that the interpersonal is simply a reflection of the intrapersonal.

My general thesis is that many of the communication difficulties between persons are the by-product of communication barriers *within* the person; and that communication between the person and the world, to and fro, depends largely on their isomorphism (i.e., similarity of structure and form [to communication within])...<sup>740</sup>

As a consequence, Maslow was able to explain in simple terms that developing the intrapersonal (towards self-actualization) is the only way of making good social beings. He claimed that it is an "empirical fact" that "self-actualizing people" are the "most compassionate" and are the "great improvers and social reformers of society."<sup>741</sup> The old dichotomy of "the self" versus "the social" disappears with Maslow's hierarchy of values<sup>742</sup> but, in keeping with the previous Authors, the good citizen stems from the good individual.

Maslow saw the necessity of turning away from the social world in order to discover the inner world of the self in quite different terms from Jung. For Maslow, it was a matter of a person deriving their picture of reality from themselves rather than from the outside world. For example, he would question: Does a person think they have done something well because of the approbation they receive, or from seeing it as good themselves? This distinction was important for Maslow because,

...only by such differentiation can we leave a theoretical place for meditation, contemplation and for all other forms of going into the Self, of turning away from the outer world in order to listen to the

inner voices. This includes all the processes of all the insight therapies, in which turning away from the world is a *sine qua non*, in which the path to health is via turning into fantasies, the primary processes, that is, via the recovery of the intrapsychic in general.<sup>743</sup>

Maslow and Rogers placed less emphasis on sequencing these developments than the earlier Authors. While Rousseau has Emile develop first as a person in isolation from society, Maslow and Rogers claimed that social and personal developments can not occur separately.<sup>744</sup> This does not mean that the intrapersonal does not have primacy as the basic building block of the interpersonal, it simply means that the developments must take place simultaneously. Maslow quoted Rogers to illustrate his point.

As Carl Rogers has phrased it: "How does it happen that the deeper we go into ourselves as particular and unique, seeking for our own individual identity, the more we find the whole human species?" Doesn't that remind you of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the New England Transcendentalists? Discovering your specieshood, at a deep enough level, merges with discovering your selfhood. Becoming (learning how to be) fully human means *both* enterprises carried on simultaneously.<sup>745</sup>

It is not surprising that the New England Transcendentalists who affected education (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau, William Ellery Channing, George Ripley, A. Bronson Alcott, and others) are frequently credited as founding thinkers in America of holistic education.<sup>746</sup>

## ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR MASLOW

For Maslow, the inherent learning process that facilitates the needed learning is related to his hierarchy of needs and his notions of homeostasis.

The healthy spontaneous child, in his spontaneity, from within out, in response to his own inner Being, reaches out to the environment in wonder and interest, and expresses whatever skills he has...to the extent that he is not crippled by fear, to the extent that he feels safe enough to dare.<sup>747</sup>

Maslow believed that, in this process, a child encounters “the delight-experience”<sup>748</sup> in that something is pleasurable or it satisfies needs in the hierarchy. At the base of the hierarchy is the need for safety. If a child feels safe, this need no longer cries out to be satisfied and a child will naturally move to higher level needs, which are growth promoting. A child will naturally make choices that produce the “delight-experience” and growth.

In order to be able to choose in accord with his own nature and to develop it, the child must be permitted to retain the subjective experiences of delight and boredom, as *the* criteria of the correct choice for him. The alternative criterion is making the choice in terms of the wishes of another person. The Self is lost when this happens. If the choice is really a free one, and if the child is not crippled, then we may expect him ordinarily to choose progression forward. In this way the psychology of Being and the psychology of Becoming can be reconciled, and the child, simply being himself, can yet move forward and grow.<sup>749</sup>

Maslow was especially concerned with what he believed occurred when choices are made according to “the wishes of another person” and “the Self is lost,” as he felt that the very process necessary to acquire the needed learning is damaged. He felt that in such circumstances a person learns to distrust his delight-experience, and to ignore the inner voice; often out of fear of losing the love or approval of the person whose wishes the child feels compelled to accept. This results in a person being stuck in substantive ways at a low level on the hierarchy of needs—the belonging level—and the very processes that facilitate the needed learning cannot develop. Maslow, like Rogers, felt that human nature is inherently positive, pro-social, and not only could be trusted to determine its own development—it must be trusted. “They thought that only when the inner core of human nature was released from internal and external controls and allowed full expression would one become fully functioning and self-actualizing.”<sup>750</sup>

As Maslow felt this process that facilitates the needed learning required listening to the inner voice, being spontaneous, etc, and that these same qualities seemed to be part of creativeness; he believed that

...the concept of creativeness and the concept of the healthy, self-actualizing, fully human person seem to be coming closer and closer together, and may perhaps turn out to be the same thing.

Another conclusion I seem to be impelled toward, ...is that

creative art education, or better said, Education-Through-Art, may be especially important not so much for turning out artists or art products, as for turning out better people.<sup>751</sup>

### *Maslow's View of Inherent Motivation*

Maslow's notions of motivation as a facilitator of the needed learning come from his notions of the hierarchy of needs and homeostasis. Maslow sounded, at times, like the early Authors who saw meaning in the earliest motions of infants, with Pestalozzi and Froebel developing this into their "spontaneous-activity" and "self-activity." For Maslow, all of the needs in the hierarchy are present at all times, but it is only as the lower ones become satisfied that the higher ones can move forward to dominate. However, even when the lower ones are predominating, the higher ones are exerting some form of latent force that still has some influence. Therefore, even though an infant must, of necessity, be primarily concerned with subsistence needs, Being (or higher level) needs can still make themselves felt and these should be allowed to act.<sup>752</sup> These higher level needs exist because they correspond with capacities, and all capacities, even incipient ones, are always "wanting" to express and fulfill themselves.<sup>753</sup> Maslow felt his hierarchy of needs encompassed a motivational theory that could and should be used for all aspects of a child's development.

The single holistic principle that binds together the multiplicity of human motives is the tendency for a new and higher need to emerge as the lower need fulfills itself by being sufficiently gratified. The child who is fortunate enough to grow normally and well gets satiated and *bored* with the delights that he has savored sufficiently, and *eagerly* (without pushing) goes on to higher more complex delights as they become available to him without danger or threat.

This principle can be seen exemplified not only in the deeper motivational dynamics of the child but also in microcosm in the development of any of his more modest activities, e.g., in learning to read, or skate, or paint, or dance.<sup>754</sup>

As discussed previously, the very highest need in the hierarchy is for Ultimacy (self-actualization in Maslow's terms),<sup>755</sup> and this is because "man has a higher and transcendent nature, and this is part of his essence, i.e., his biological nature as a member of a species which has evolved."<sup>756</sup> For Maslow, who trained as and claimed to be an empirical psychologist, this was as evident and unarguable to anyone who

cared to look at the evidence as describing people's faces as having two eyes as part of their biological nature. For Maslow, it follows that people who are responding to the higher needs, seek (and can therefore be said to be rewarded by or motivated by) "metagratisfactions," which is why he and Rogers felt that certain values can be said to be universal or biological, and one of the reasons they felt that the old dichotomy between "what is" and "what ought to be" is a false one.<sup>757</sup>

People who are fully evolved tend to take as their greatest rewards the *metagratisfactions*, that is, the *B-values* or *intrinsic values*. Such men and women are most happy when they are advancing beauty, excellence, justice, or truth.<sup>758</sup>

This, as Maslow frequently pointed out, is in clear contradiction to the views of people such as Freud and Sartre who held that anything like benevolence or generosity, can only be sublimated self-defense or self-interest.

Maslow used his taxonomy to resolve the differences between his notions of man's higher motivation and the classical Eastern view that higher consciousness is "the transcendence of striving or desiring or wanting...."<sup>759</sup> Maslow claimed that only the lower level needs were traditionally recognized as needs (often labeled as instinctive), so that anything more subtle and refined was thought to be beyond need. According to Maslow, however, people naturally need self-transcendence, seeking the "far" rather than the "near," the "great" rather than the "small."

## ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR MASLOW

### *Teachers' Understanding of Students and their Needs for Maslow*

Neither Maslow nor Rogers had much new to contribute to this issue other than to stress that education has as a central aim the development of identity, which must always be an individual matter. Maslow also emphasized that for human development, it "is the 'horticulture' rather than the 'sculpture' model"<sup>760</sup> that is most appropriate as each person has within themselves an inherent blueprint of their own unique design they will grow into if allowed. This is a sentiment that Pestalozzi

and Froebel certainly agreed to as demonstrated by their frequent use of horticulture metaphors.

### *Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process for Maslow*

Maslow's approach to the correct pedagogical process stems principally from his notion of the hierarchy of needs and self-actualization. Like the other Authors, Maslow believed that humans are inherently good and each has a unique nature that needs to be discovered and actualized. Maslow's contribution is in employing language that is more currently accessible in saying that everyone needs

to be true to his own nature, to trust himself, to be authentic, spontaneous, honestly expressive, to look for the sources of his actions in his own deep inner nature.<sup>761</sup>

Education should, Maslow believed, be based on this need and be part of a person's learning to meet this need. "Since this inner nature is good...it is best to bring it out..." because "if it is permitted to guide our life, we grow healthy, fruitful, and happy";<sup>762</sup> and, for Maslow, these are worthy secondary goals of education, second, of course, to his notion of Ultimacy.<sup>763</sup>

For a young person to learn to be "true to his own nature," Maslow believed that an educational system had to reflect the value of that fidelity. If schools reflect distrust of students (which Maslow felt most schools inadvertently do by wanting to change the students' natures or suppressing their spontaneity), then children learn to see themselves in the school's light. This can only bring about the opposite of the needed learning. Maslow believed that, "all this implies another *kind* of education..."<sup>764</sup> and not the same kind of education applied in new ways or with new subject matter, which is how Maslow saw the nature of most educational reform. He believed that what is needed is a pedagogic process that accepts students, and helps them learn what kind of people they are; what for each student are "his good raw materials, his good potentials"<sup>765</sup> that can be built upon. This requires, as mentioned in the discussion of experiential knowledge (beginning on page 160), what Maslow called a "Taoistic" approach; a non-interfering "letting-be"<sup>766</sup> which contradicts what Maslow variously described as the molding, lecturing, conditioning, reinforcing, intrusive, authoritative process in mainstream education.<sup>767</sup> Maslow insisted that "growth can emerge only from safety," and the correct pedagogic process must produce that

first and foremost.<sup>768</sup> Maslow described the correct pedagogic process as “permissive, admiring, praising, accepting, safe, gratifying, reassuring, supporting, unthreatening, non-valuing, non-comparing...”<sup>769</sup>

We would be nonthreatening and would supply an atmosphere of acceptance of the child's nature which reduces fear, anxiety, and defense to the minimum possible.<sup>770</sup>

One of the difficult but indispensable tasks in providing this safety and atmosphere of acceptance is for the teacher to understand “the naturalness of defensive and regressive forces”<sup>771</sup> and that “lesser delights, e.g., hostility, neurotic dependency”<sup>772</sup> must be expressed and worked out (rather than suppressed or denied) so that they can be “sufficiently catharted”<sup>773</sup> and the child can move on to higher and more socially approbated gratification.

It is worth noting that Maslow was not an advocate of *laissez-faire* child rearing. He claimed that

Children, especially younger ones, essentially need, want, and desire external controls, decisiveness, discipline, and firmness. They seek firm limits in order to avoid the anxiety of being on their own and of being expected to be adultlike because they actually mistrust their own immature powers.<sup>774</sup>

This does not detract from his insistence that the child's nature be respected. On the contrary, it recognizes as part of the child's nature a need for safety that adults must provide and not confuse with lack of freedom.

Maslow believed he saw empirical evidence that the supportive pedagogy described above works partly by generating a feeling of safety that is necessary in order to experiment and explore (components he felt were part of learning). It also works by changing the student through changing the awareness children have of themselves as positive, good, and valued persons. It further works, Maslow felt, by allowing a person to be creative and aware of his inner nature and therefore to “become aware of the fact that peak-experiences go on inside himself.”<sup>775</sup> As discussed previously, it is during conscious peak-experiences that a person experientially perceives Being-values and Being-knowledge.

Because of the link Maslow felt exists between creativeness and peak-experiences, he gave special attention to the nature of creativity and to teaching creativity. He claimed to agree with Freud that there is



“primary creativeness” and “secondary creativeness”; by which he meant, “the inspiration phase of creativeness” and “the working-out phase of creativeness...”<sup>776</sup> Maslow claimed that mainstream schools (for reasons identifiable with performance based pedagogy) give far more attention to secondary creativeness. Yet, for Maslow (again claiming to agree with Freud), it is primary creativeness that is far more important for the development of the person and therefore should be far more important in education. Consequently, he claimed to “consider nonverbal education so important, e.g., through art, through music, through dancing...” as these can be a way of discovering primary creativeness and therefore to

fostering the new kind of human being that we need, the process person, the creative person, the improvising person, the self-trusting, courageous person, the autonomous person.<sup>777</sup>

Maslow claimed to have slowly found himself using a form of communication in his most effective teaching that seems to resemble Rousseau’s and Pestalozzi’s wish to “make the language of the mind pass through the heart.”<sup>778</sup> Maslow called it “rhapsodic communication” and defined it as “a kind of emotional contagion in isomorphic parallel” which “are often more apt to ‘click,’ to touch off an echoing experience, a parallel, isomorphic vibration, than are sober, cool, carefully descriptive phrases.”<sup>779</sup> This amounts to giving someone else an experience rather than giving them information, and has an understandable importance for Holistic Education in view of its emphasis on experiential learning.

### *Teacher’s Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Relationship for Maslow*

Maslow and Rogers both saw relationships as pre-eminent in education<sup>780</sup> as they felt that in almost all

professional work involving relationships with people...it is the *quality* of the interpersonal encounter...which is the most significant element in determining effectiveness.<sup>781</sup>

For Maslow this was most easily characterized as B-love, which he felt the teacher must have for the student,<sup>782</sup> while for Rogers the correct pedagogic relationship had the more complex elements of prizing, realness, and empathy.

*Teachers' Self-Development for Maslow*

It is clear from all that has been discussed that Maslow felt that until a person reached the pinnacle of the hierarchy of needs (self-actualization) he was still in need of development. At a certain point in becoming mature, a person takes direct responsibility for their continual growth and engages in deliberate self-development. For this, a mature person must study themselves. While Maslow believed that such conscious and deliberate self-development is needed by all mature adults, it is especially required of teachers who must understand themselves in order to understand others; "knowledge of one's own deep nature is also simultaneously knowledge of human nature in general."<sup>783</sup>

*Carl Ransom Rogers*

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF  
CARL RANSOM ROGERS  
(8 JANUARY 1902 – 4 FEBRUARY 1987)

*B*orn in Oak Park, Illinois, Carl Rogers was the fourth of six children. He could read before the age of five, and when he was finally old enough to go to school, he started in the second grade. His family moved to Chicago for awhile, but when Carl was twelve they moved to a farm thirty miles to the west. This was his home until he went away to university. By his own accounts, his upbringing was strict, even harsh, and certainly isolated. His parents were Christian fundamentalists and very demanding; they filled his days with farm chores, devotion, and study.

His first area of tertiary study was agriculture at the University of Wisconsin. This did not last very long, however, and he soon switched to become a theology student. In the course of that study he was selected for a prestigious six-month study program at The Christian Federation Conference in Beijing. Being in China opened his eyes to the cultural straightjacket in which he had been living, and opened his mind to new ways of thinking. This experience caused Rogers to question the certainties of his religious beliefs.

Immediately after graduating, and against his parents' wishes, he married Helen Elliot. They moved to New York City so that Rogers could continue his theological training at the Union Theological Seminary. For a short while Rogers was the pastor of a small church in rural Vermont. However, his metaphysical doubts only increased, and after two years he felt he could no longer continue that vocation. At the seminary he had been introduced to the study of clinical psychology, and he transferred to Columbia University's Teachers College where he eventually earned both an MA and a PhD. in psychology.

Early in his studies at Columbia he became inspired by the work of John Dewey through W.H. Kilpatrick, a former student of Dewey's. He was especially interested in the value Dewey placed on using experience as the basis of theorizing, on taking the human being as a whole, and on Dewey's optimistic view of humanity.

To support his doctoral studies, Rogers worked on a research project for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Rochester, New York. He was immensely committed to the Society's goals and became its director in 1930, before finishing his doctorate. During this time he came into contact with Otto Rank, whom he claimed greatly effected his own thinking about psychology.

Rogers continued to work and write about children's difficulties and lectured at the University of Rochester from 1935 to 1940. During this time he wrote *The Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child* which was highly acclaimed and brought him a full professorship at Ohio State University.

In the middle of his four years at OSU (in 1942) Rogers published *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, which enunciated his client-centered approach to therapy. He proposed that it is the relationship of the client to the therapist that is the key to a client's regaining mental health. This book solidified his reputation, and he was offered a professorship at The University of Chicago where he taught from 1945 to 1957. During this time Rogers set up a counseling center and became President of the American Psychologists Association. In the counseling center, Rogers developed the practice of transcribing verbatim his therapeutic sessions which he would subsequently analyze for indicators of possible later outcomes. This technique he pioneered has since become a standard practice. In 1951 Rogers published *Client-Centered Therapy* presenting studies confirming his theories and the efficacy of his treatments.

From 1957 to 1963 Rogers worked at the University of Wisconsin at Madison holding two professorships; psychology and psychiatry. He

took this on because he wanted to integrate the study of both of these with social work, which he felt could have an enormous impact. However, the entrenched camps in all three fields frustrated his efforts, and he recalled this time as the “most painful and anguished” time in his career. Despite his difficulties he continued to write a great deal, publishing many papers as well as *On Becoming a Person* (1961).

Disillusioned with academia and its possibilities to have the impact he felt it should, he moved to La Jolla, California, to join The Western Behavioral Studies Institute founded by Richard Farson, a former student of his. After five years, however, Rogers could not resolve a difference he had with the structure of the organization which he felt had too many of the same limitations as universities.

In 1968 Rogers founded The Center for the Studies of the Person, which he claimed was a “nonorganization” run by a “non-director.” There he was able to be more active in social work, concentrating on everything from racial to socio-economic difficulties. Rogers expanded his notion of psychological social work to include trying to resolve conflicts endemic in cultures. He brought together opponents in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Cold War.

Rogers’s work in education and with many schools brought him to the conclusion that, like client-centered therapy, the best form of education was student-centered, and in this the student should determine the content, pacing, structure, and duration of learning. In 1969, at the height of the counter-culture movement in the United States, Rogers published *Freedom to Learn*. Like Maslow, Rogers became an icon for young intellectuals. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Humanistic Psychology that he promoted with Maslow was often called “third force psychology”—behaviorism and neurosis/psychosis psychology being the first two. Rogers’s work showed the value of emotional development, interpersonal skills, and goal-setting/goal-striving techniques. He eventually went on to become an early developer, along with Maslow, of Transpersonal Psychology.

Rogers’s search for understanding of the most pressing issues of his day brought him into renowned discussions with many contemporary intellects including Paul Tillich, Gregory Bateson, Rollo May, Martin Buber, and of course his good friend Abraham Maslow.

In 1987, Rogers died from a heart attack after being hospitalized for a broken hip.

## ROGERS'S NOTION OF ULTIMACY

As recognized pioneers of humanistic psychology, Rogers and Maslow broadly agreed and acknowledged each other's work,<sup>784</sup> yet they used different terminology, and pursued different aspects of their shared concerns. For Rogers, the ultimate state was the "fully functioning person,"<sup>785</sup> but he felt that "it is a process, a direction, not some static achievement."<sup>786</sup> He described this state in a number of different ways, depending on what he wished to emphasize, but the general thrust is that *all* of a person's capacities (which stretch to include what might be thought of as spiritual) are functioning in harmony and to their fullest extent.

### *The Importance Given to Ultimacy by Rogers*

Rogers didn't differ from Maslow in his reasons for the importance of Ultimacy, but was more emphatic in enunciating that despite the universal human imperative of having a sense of Ultimacy, unfortunately

traditional ethics have failed...because their validation, sought in supernatural concepts, sacred books, or a ruling class, was *a priori* authoritarian thinking. ...Not surprisingly, the modern person questions whether there are universal or cross-cultural values.<sup>787</sup>

Rogers and Maslow felt that modern rootlessness and meaninglessness can only be solved by finding objective, universal and cross-cultural values "based squarely upon knowledge of the nature of man."<sup>788</sup>

### *Ultimacy in Relation to Rogers's View of Human Nature*

Everything that has been said of Maslow in the previous chapter on this topic is also valid for Rogers. However, Rogers lay greater stress on the role of listening or sensing within. He felt that there is a wisdom in our total reacting organism, and that our distrust and underestimation of that wisdom "prevents us from living as unified, whole human beings."<sup>789</sup>

There is an interesting analysis of Rogers's work that deserves not-

ing; Donald Walker demonstrated how Freud “inherits the tradition of Augustine in belief that man is basically and fundamentally hostile, anti-social, and carnal,” whereas Rogers “in the same sense, is the successor to Rousseau.”<sup>790</sup> Rogers, in answer to this comparison, agreed that his thinking is closer to Rousseau than most traditional Christian writers, yet insisted he was not influenced by Rousseau (curiously, despite admitting that he had read *Emile* as part of his doctoral work).<sup>791</sup>

### *Ultimacy as an Aspect of Religiousness for Rogers*

Rogers added little explicitly to the other Authors’ various notions of the religiousness of Ultimacy, preferring to eschew such terminology. His remarks on religion were almost purely negative; e.g., religions can no longer fill the one function they used to have, which was to act as a basis for a value system.

Rogers did, however, promote notions of balance, wholeness, and an esoteric but unreachable ideal. In answering his own question, “Can we permit ourselves to be whole men and women?”<sup>792</sup> Rogers stated that while we can be aware of what we think and feel, what is needed is a unification of these. Like Jung and Maslow, he saw the prevailing problem of our times as overemphasis on the rational with a corresponding under-valuation of the non-rational (not the irrational).<sup>793</sup> For Rogers, the non-rational includes feelings and wisdom, or insight, that comes from sensitivity to “our total reacting organism.”<sup>794</sup>

Unlike Buddhist enlightenment, Christian sainthood or states of grace (which are at least reachable by a few), or Maslow’s self-actualization (which is theoretically reachable by everyone); Rogers claimed that his model of Ultimacy had not been reached by anyone. Whether it is, in fact, unreachable is not clear. Rogers’s model of the fully functioning, unified, whole human being only establishes the trajectory of intended development by showing what it is aiming toward; and this trajectory is best served by “the best of experiences of education, ...therapy, ...family and group relations.”<sup>795</sup>

## WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED FOR ROGERS

### *Rogers’s View of Experiential Knowledge*

Carl Rogers made few pronouncements about knowledge itself that were not made by the previous Authors, other than that “...we

will never have certain knowledge.”<sup>796</sup> He said this in a way that goes beyond Jung’s notion that the intellect can never know all of a thing. Rogers held that people cannot have complete non-intellectual knowledge either, which results in people never even being able to have certainty. Like Rousseau, Rogers felt that the value of knowledge is its usefulness (regardless of its partialness) and believed that, fundamentally, this is a sentiment shared by most educators.<sup>797</sup>

Rogers was, however, more vehement than any of the previous Authors (perhaps with the exception of Rousseau) in his attack on the meaningless learning that, he believed, occurred in most classrooms. Because, he believed, most of the material that children are compelled to learn is without any personal meaning to them (usually because their “background provides no context for the material”),<sup>798</sup> he likened it to some psychology tasks in which people are asked to memorize nonsense syllables.

Such learning involves the mind only: It is learning that takes place “from the neck up.” It does not involve feelings or personal meanings; it has no relevance for the whole person. In contrast, there is such a thing as significant, meaningful, experiential learning.<sup>799</sup>

What Rogers called “significant learning” necessarily involves: 1) personal involvement, 2) self-initiation, 3) an impact on behavior, and 4) meaning for the learner. “Significant learning combines the logical and the intuitive, the intellect and the feelings, the concept and the experience, the idea and the meaning.”<sup>800</sup>

### *Competence for Rogers*

As noted earlier, Rogers did not differ significantly from Maslow on questions of judgment and values, but he made unique contributions to considerations of freedom for holistic educators. Rogers had trained as a behavioral scientist,<sup>801</sup> and was acutely aware of the behaviorist position which claims that man is not free, and any views that he is free are only illusions. He thoroughly rejected this behaviorist position (as he felt many others in psychology had also done), but the behaviorist paradigm dominated education.

While behaviorism has diminished in its importance for most psychologists, it continues to rule the educational system in this country. The examples are numerous. From the way students are



disciplined to the way teachers are evaluated, the method is one of control, reward, and punishment.<sup>802</sup>

Rogers believed that freedom is essential for development. It is only by giving a child freedom that the child can feel that he and his choices are respected, and through this he learns that he is worthy of respect. For Rogers, a system that seeks to control children teaches them that they can not be trusted; that they do not have the mechanisms, aptitudes or understanding to do what is right and must, therefore, depend on others to know and do what is right. Rogers felt that when many young people leave home and go to work or to university where they have a newfound freedom, they demonstrate just how well they have learned this lesson of being irresponsible. This is a clear example of education producing the opposite of what it intends.

Rogers also believed that, as experience is the best teacher, a person can only learn about freedom, and the responsibilities that are a necessary part of freedom, by experiencing them. Schools, which he felt resembled totalitarian regimes more than any other institution in the United States (matched only by prisons and the armed services), are therefore not environments in which a person can learn *of* democracy and freedom even though they might learn *about* them. It was not just the conformity and restriction of action that Rogers lamented, but the absence of freedom for attitudes and for thinking.

Like his predecessors, Rogers promoted a form of freedom that is "essentially an inner thing," which is not dependent on outward circumstances, and which he equates with the freedom "that Viktor Frankl vividly describes in his experience of the concentration camp."<sup>803</sup> Rogers wrote long descriptions of inner and outer freedom,<sup>804</sup> but for our purposes, two of the more interesting characteristics are "...the discovery of meaning from within oneself, meaning that comes from listening sensitively and openly to the complexities of what one is experiencing" and "...being responsible for the self one chooses to be."<sup>805</sup> These highlight one of the paradoxes in Rogers's work concerning freedom; freedom is needed for inner sensing and being who one wants to be, yet it is such sensing and being which generates freedom. The paradox seems to be resolved for Rogers by his contention that these are not sequential phenomena, but different aspects of a single process that he felt was "a central process or central aspect of psychotherapy."<sup>806</sup> This is freedom as Buddhist liberation; freedom as part of an approach to Ultimacy.

As Rogers felt that his approach to psychotherapy is conducive to

Ultimacy, and as the goal of education is Ultimacy (in the form of the “fully functioning person”), then, for Rogers, it followed that, “the *best* of education would produce a person very similar to one produced by the *best* of therapy.”<sup>807</sup> Therefore, Rogers promoted educational programs and processes (from elementary to college levels) that reflect his discoveries in therapy, with due emphasis on freedom. “It seems at least a possibility that in our schools and colleges, in our professional schools and universities, individuals could learn to be free.”<sup>808</sup>

Rogers felt educational institutions should have meta-learning as another primary goal, and not traditional knowledge. This seems to follow partly from his view of knowledge (i.e., that there is no absolute, final knowledge, or security in knowledge), and partly from his observations of the nature of the modern world in which an emphasis on “process” is a key to successful adaptation.

We are, in my view, faced with an entirely new situation in education where the goal of education, if we are to survive, is the *facilitation of change and learning*. The only man who is educated is the man who has learned how to learn; the man who has learned how to adopt and change; the man who has realized that no knowledge is secure, that only the process of *seeking* knowledge gives a basis for security. Changingness, a reliance on *process* rather than upon static knowledge, is the only thing that makes sense as a goal for education in the modern world.<sup>809</sup>

Rogers went on to equate “the way in which we might develop the learner” (an educational goal) with “the way in which we can learn to live as individuals in process” (a life goal and a therapeutic goal), and in so doing he reiterated that education and psychotherapy have the same goal—Ultimacy. It is worth noting that there is now a substantial and growing body of research on the different consequences of process orientation and outcomes orientation that seems to support Rogers.<sup>810</sup>

## ASPECTS OF STUDENTS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR ROGERS

Rogers frequently called the inherent process that facilitates the needed learning “organismic wisdom,” as he felt that it is a facility of the entire human organism and not just consciousness. He felt that “conscious thought is full of fixed constructs” that interfere with per-

ception and that a person needs to use “*all* his avenues of knowing: unconscious, intuitive, and conscious.”<sup>811</sup> To access these avenues, a person needs to “lay aside rigidly held preconceptions” and make use of “the pregnant void, the fertile state of no-mind.”<sup>812</sup> Rogers believed that “all the capacities of the organism,” some of which are “prelogical” and “intuitive” can sense a “gestalt: a hidden reality” long before consciousness can formulate a pattern.<sup>813</sup> The more such an apprehension is “free from cultural values” and preconceptions, “the more adequate it is likely to be.”<sup>814</sup> Rogers claimed that a child does this automatically (as consciousness has not developed fully enough to give the impression that it can be trusted), but that also

the psychologically mature adult trusts and uses the wisdom of her organism, with the difference that she is able to do so knowingly. She realizes that if she can trust all of herself, her feelings and intuitions may be wiser than her mind, that as a total person she can be more sensitive and accurate than her thoughts alone. Hence she is not afraid to say, “I feel that this experience (or this thing, or this direction) is good. Later I will probably know *why* I feel it is good.” She trusts the totality of herself.<sup>815</sup>

For Rogers, the human organism as a whole also provides the basis for discovering universal values. It is important to see this as forming part of a process that facilitates the needed learning and not as a form of knowledge or ethical construction as these are normally understood. Rogers called it “the valuing process” and although it operates as an ethical structure, it is seen as part of the same inherent process that tends towards becoming a “fully functioning human” and, therefore, Ultimacy. Maslow and Rogers both argued that the choices made by people approaching Ultimacy “embody the species-wide intrinsic values of human nature conducive to psychological health” which “ought to be the basis for a universal and naturalistic system of ethics.”<sup>816</sup> However, the “organismic base for an organized valuing process within the human individual” is only effective “to the degree that the individual is open to the experiencing that is going on within,”<sup>817</sup> which means that if a person is not sensitive to inner experiences, he cannot act ethically.

For Rogers the process of “becoming” (which was often his shorthand expression for becoming a fully functioning person) and the “valuing process” frequently seem to be synonymous; the natural, the normative, and the ultimate all seem to merge.<sup>818</sup> In a section of his book *Freedom to Learn* he lists at length some of the value directions he felt people universally move towards,<sup>819</sup> and these value directions are strik-

ingly similar to the qualities he described, more than thirty years previously, in people who were “becoming.”<sup>820</sup> At the end of this second list Rogers stated that the most important question a person can ask themselves is: “Am I living in a way which is deeply satisfying to me, and which truly expresses me?”<sup>821</sup> Since people are naturally good, and inherently pursue values that are pro-social, Rogers felt a person can safely ask himself this question if they are sensitive to inner listening, without the risk of being selfish.

Rogers’ notion of “significant learning” allowed him to juxtapose the processes he felt facilitated needed learning with what he believed normally passes for learning. He decried “the lifeless, sterile, futile, quickly forgotten stuff that is crammed into the mind of the poor helpless individual tied into his seat by ironclad bonds of conformity,”<sup>822</sup> and insisted that, unlike the learning in mainstream education, “significant learning” was “more than the accumulation of facts” and the “accretion of knowledge, but [learning] which interpenetrates every portion of [the learner’s] existence.”<sup>823</sup> “Significant learning” was seen by Rogers as having “the quality of personal involvement, being self initiated...pervasive...evaluated by the learner”<sup>824</sup> and therefore affecting behavior, attitudes and personality, because it increased the sense of meaning and consequently the person’s relationship with reality. Rogers felt that “significant learning” involved the whole of the person as well as making that person whole.

Significant learning combines the logical *and* the intuitive, the intellect *and* the feelings, the concept *and* the experience, the idea *and* the meaning. When we learn in that way, we are *whole*, utilizing all our masculine and feminine capacities.<sup>825</sup> [*Italics in the original*]

As a consequence, Rogers felt that schools in which students are compelled to learn specified subjects that are not meaningful to the student are not just a waste of the student’s time, they inculcate a false learning that usually involves ignoring or silencing the “organismic wisdom” to which people should be learning to pay attention. In fact, the very relationship between teaching and learning was one that Rogers questioned.

It seems to me that anything that can be taught to another is relatively inconsequential, and has little or no significant influence on behavior.

...I have come to feel that the only learning which significantly

influences behavior is self-discovered, self-appropriated learning. Such self-discovered learning, truth that has been personally appropriated and assimilated in experience, cannot be directly communicated to another.

...Hence I have come to feel that the outcomes of teaching are either unimportant or hurtful.<sup>826</sup>

Hence, Rogers referred to what some of the Authors called “teaching” as “facilitating,” and it is in the Rogerian sense that the term has been used throughout this book. The distinctions of facilitating versus teaching are discussed further in the next section.

## ASPECTS OF TEACHERS THAT FACILITATE THE NEEDED LEARNING FOR ROGERS

### *Teachers' Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Process for Rogers*

Rogers held that people 1) are innately good, 2) have an inherent capacity to penetrate their own complexities and arrive at their core nature (given the right conditions), 3) can release an inner wisdom through contact with their core nature, 4) have the ability to understand and reorganize their psyches, 5) have an inherent tendency towards Ultimacy, and 6) naturally want to become more expert at dealing with their world (i.e., want to learn). This led Rogers to establish what he called “client centered therapy” which held that clients are the greatest expert in their own inner lives and outer circumstances, and that (given the right psychological conditions) patients have the capacity to explore and know their own inner natures thus becoming more fully functioning human beings. The therapist’s role is merely to become an ally with these inherent capacities and help the patients remove the inner and outer barriers to their natural growth. The therapist does not generate the growth, does not determine how the patient should be at the end of development, and has no plan through which the patient is to progress. This is essentially also Rogers’s notion of the correct pedagogic process.

Rogers and Maslow (and several commentators) credit the principal difference between humanistic education and mainstream education to the latter being a captive of behaviorist psychology, while the humanistic psychology model of education is a total rejection of behaviorism. This was examined in the previous discussions on intrinsic

and extrinsic learning. With a behaviorist paradigm (in which everything that a person learns comes in from the outside and what he becomes is determined by external positive or negative reinforcement), the educator feels “the need to control, to shape the educated,” whereas with a paradigm like that of humanistic psychology, the educator is “to give to the educated the care and responsibility of his own education.”<sup>827</sup>

The conclusion for Rogers was that

...it is most unfortunate that educators and the public think about, and focus on, *teaching*. It leads them into a host of questions that are either irrelevant or absurd so far as real education is concerned.

I have said that if we focused on the facilitation of *learning*—how, why, and when the student learns, and how learning seems and feels from the inside—we might be on a much more profitable track.<sup>828</sup>

Rogers therefore called for the adults in schools to be “facilitators” and not “teachers.” This is not just a change of name. Rogers felt that even with a very good teacher (in the traditional sense) the correct pedagogic process can not be engaged in because the problems the teacher is trying to solve are fundamentally different to those a facilitator is trying to solve. Essentially, for Rogers, the good traditional teacher wants to know what the student needs to learn at a particular stage in life, discover the best way to encourage the student to learn it, and finally evaluate what has been learned. However, the facilitator wants to discover the students’ own questions or the problems the students want to solve, thinks of what resources can be brought in to assist the students, and finally helps the students assess their own progress.<sup>829</sup>

Rogers claimed alliance with Heidegger in seeing the teaching role as facilitating as well as insisting that education had to be concerned with meta-learning.

The primary task of the teacher is to *permit* the student to learn, to feel his or her own curiosity. Merely to absorb facts is of only slight value in the present, and usually of even less value in the future. Learning *how* to learn is the element that is always of value, now and in the future.<sup>830</sup>

As a result Rogers would frequently insist that the primary focus of the correct pedagogic process must be “on fostering the continuing process of learning...,” on the individual’s relationship with learning per se, and could not be on “the content of learning.”<sup>831</sup> Rogers felt that a course could be said to be satisfactorily concluded not when an

amount of knowledge is acquired, but when the student “has made significant progress in learning *how to learn* what she wants to know.”<sup>832</sup>

The facilitation or “permission” to learn that Rogers spoke of has several aspects which mirror the correct pedagogic processes of the preceding Authors. Rogers felt that what students learn must be concerned with issues that “have meaning and relevance for them,”<sup>833</sup> echoing Rousseau’s insistence on the “utility” of what students learn. Also like Rousseau, Rogers encouraged educators to create situations in which students are confronted with problems they then need to solve, and in this way guide learning. Also like the previous Authors, Rogers felt that students must not only be involved in the direction of their learning, they must feel they are involved. One contribution of Rogers to this issue is that he tied the students’ being an active agent in determining their own learning to satisfying the inherent wish to be in control of as many facets of life as possible (which, for Rogers, is related to notions of freedom). He also tied such active involvement to engendering responsibility in students, especially responsibility for life-long learning. Rogers felt that mainstream education (which he believed deprives students of responsibility for what is learned, when it is learned, and evaluation of learning) acts as a disincentive to developing life-long learning which he saw as indispensable in the modern world.

The problems of evaluation in mainstream education, for Rogers, are especially insidious.

I believe that the testing of the student’s achievements in order to see if he meets some criterion held by the teacher, is directly contrary to the implications of...significant learning.<sup>834</sup>

Rogers felt that it is the learner who should decide what criteria are valid for the learning that is meaningful and what goals should be achieved. Such “self-evaluation may be influenced and enriched by caring feedback from other members of the group and from the facilitator,”<sup>835</sup> but essentially remains the responsibility of the learner. For this reason Rogers recommended to “do away with examinations” as “they measure only the inconsequential type of learning,” and it followed for him that grades, credits and degrees “as a measure of competence”<sup>836</sup> should also be dispensed with.

One of the human aspects that Rogers believed was ignored by mainstream education (and as a consequence, underdeveloped) was the “feeling life.” Rogers claimed that people “must develop a feeling

life as well as a cognitive life,” and supports his contention by citing Thomas Hanna who spoke of the value of “*soma*—body *and* mind, feelings *and* intellect.”<sup>837</sup>

Rogers insisted that he was not “talking about a method or a technique,” but rather “a way of being in an educational situation.”<sup>838</sup> This does not preclude a facilitator developing his own methodology or expertise, because personal methodology reflects the personality of the facilitator, the context, and the students. Rogers seemed to feel that received methodology is like received truth or received meaning—it is, at best, second hand, and a far cry from ‘revealed’ truth and meaning.

Rogers felt that his approach places “emphasis on the dignity of the individual, the importance of personal choice, the significance of responsibility, the joy of creativity” and that the results were the “empowering [of] each individual.”<sup>839</sup> Rogers believed that his success with therapy proved the importance of such empowerment for psychological health, and he was convinced that such empowerment was crucial to the social and common weal.

Rogers was able to see his educational ideas put into practice in several cities, at different educational levels, in different contexts and in different countries. He was able to examine some of the empirical studies conducted on these practices. It was only after his death that a full review of the research was published in the third edition of *Freedom to Learn*, which was co-authored by H. Jerome Freiberg. In the third edition the research is shown to support the case that, not only is the approach to education Rogers advocated psychologically more healthy than mainstream education, but also that students learn conventional subjects more quickly and thoroughly.

### *Teachers’ Understanding of the Correct Pedagogic Relationship for Rogers*

What Rogers called both “prizing” and “unconditional positive regard,” he described as a non-judgmental, non-possessive caring of the other person’s individuality, feelings, and opinions; “an acceptance of the other individual as a separate person who has worth in her own right.”<sup>840</sup> Rogers claimed that his empirical experience is that such prizing, or “acceptance of the most complete sort...is the strongest factor making for change that I know.”<sup>841</sup> Rogers believed that when a person found himself prized, the normal defensive barriers that the person



uses are no longer needed and “then what takes over are the forward moving processes of life itself” with the result that a person “can’t help but change.”<sup>842</sup>

“Realness” was a quality that Rogers felt the facilitator has to have. Rogers also called this quality “congruence” and described it as the facilitator (or therapist) being

...unified, or integrated, ...What is meant is that within the relationship he is exactly what he *is*—not a façade, or a role, or a pretence. ...It is when the therapist [or facilitator] is fully and accurately aware of what he is experiencing at this moment in the relationship, that he is fully congruent. Unless this congruence is present to a considerable degree it is unlikely that significant learning can occur.<sup>843</sup>

When a facilitator is “real” he is aware of his feelings and has a “willingness to be and to express” in words and behavior “the various feelings and attitudes which exist,” and “it is only in this way that the relationship can have *reality*....”<sup>844</sup> A relationship which has “*reality*” was felt by Rogers to have its own effect. Rogers believed that such “realness” in relationship

is sharply in contrast with the tendency of most teachers to show themselves to their pupils simply as roles. It is quite customary for teachers rather consciously to put on the mask, the role, the façade of being a teacher and to wear this façade all day removing it only when they have left the school at night.<sup>845</sup>

For Rogers, the “quality of being” of the facilitator has an effect on the “quality of being” of the student, and a recognition of this is fundamental in the correct pedagogic relationship.

The third characteristic of the correct pedagogic relationship for Rogers is “empathy.” He described this as understanding the other person’s “world as seen from the inside,” of feeling the other person’s “anger, fear, or confusion as if it were your own, yet without your own anger, fear, or confusion getting bound up in it....”<sup>846</sup> Rogers felt such empathy is important in many spheres in life, but in education it is critical since the facilitator must have “a sensitive awareness of the way the process of education and learning seems *to the student*....”<sup>847</sup>

Rogers felt that the pedagogic relationship is one of the raw materials that the facilitator presents for each student’s possible use. Like all educational materials, the pedagogic relationship is not to be inter-

jected into the student's life to create a specific predetermined effect. Rogers believed that the good facilitator asks, "How can I provide a relationship which [the student] may use for his own personal growth?"<sup>848</sup> feeling confident that "the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, change, and personal development..."<sup>849</sup> At the same time, there is something of a calculated effect (though perhaps not specific) that Rogers sought and which he felt the correct pedagogic relationship helps generate. Rogers believed that there is a "reciprocal"<sup>850</sup> mechanism by which the correct relationship with a person alters that person's relationship with himself. Altering the way a person looks at and, consequently, sees himself can contribute to the process of becoming a "fully functioning person."

If I can create a relationship characterized on my part:  
by genuineness and transparency, in which I am my real feelings;  
by a warm acceptance of and prizing of the other person as a  
separate individual;  
by a sensitivity to see his world and himself as he sees them.  
Then the other individual in the relationship:  
will experience and understand aspects of himself which  
previously he has repressed;  
will find himself becoming better integrated, more able to function  
effectively;  
will become more similar to the person he would like to be;  
will be more self-directing and self-confident;  
will become more of a person, more unique and more self-  
expressive;  
will be more understanding, more accepting of others;  
will be able to cope with the problems of life more adequately  
and more comfortably.<sup>851</sup>

In its most subtle form, Rogers believed that such a correct relationship resembles Martin Buber's 'I-Thou' relationship.<sup>852</sup> In its simplest form, Rogers believed such a correct relationship resembles the best of the parent-child relationships as studied by Baldwin and others<sup>853</sup> in which the "acceptant-democratic" relationships were seen as increasing the intellectual, social, and emotional development of the child while, on the other end of the spectrum, the "actively rejectant" relationship had the opposite effect. Rogers believed the research of parent-child relationships reflects his findings for the correct pedagogic relationship. This picture fits nicely with Maslow's notion of hierarchy

of needs in which the lower needs of safety and belonging need to be satisfied to liberate higher order activities. Rogers also quoted Paulo Freire and drew parallels between the correct pedagogic relationship he proposed and Freire's transformation of the teacher-of-students and students-of-teachers into teacher-students and student-teachers respectively.<sup>854</sup>

Rogers said that prizing, realness, and empathy are an "operational expression" of trust in the inherent goodness of human nature,<sup>855</sup> and he felt that a distrust of human nature is built into mainstream schooling.

...[no] one can hold the three attitudes I have described [realness, prizing, empathy], or could commit herself to being a facilitator of learning unless she has come to have a profound trust in the human organism and its potentialities. If I distrust the human being, then I *must* cram her with information of my own choosing lest she go her own mistaken way. But if I trust the capacity of the human individual for developing her own potentiality, then I can provide her with many opportunities and permit her to choose her own way and her own direction in her learning. ...The teacher is attempting to develop a quality of climate in the classroom and a quality of personal relationship with students that will permit these natural tendencies to come to their fruition.<sup>856</sup>

### *Teachers' Self-Development for Rogers*

For Rogers the question of the need for self-development is largely bound up with his notions of the correct pedagogic relationship.

...the optimal helping relationship is the kind of relationship created by a person who is psychologically mature. Or to put it another way, the degree to which I can create relationships which facilitate the growth of others as separate persons is a measure of the growth I have achieved myself.<sup>857</sup>

SECTION III

*What Holistic Education  
Does: A Sociological Analysis*

# Competence Based Models of Pedagogy

The task of this section is to describe what holistic education *does* with a view to showing this as a reflection of what it *thinks*, which has been elaborated in the previous two sections. It is also the task of this section to locate holistic education within the entire field of education. It is worth reiterating that identifying holistic education requires distinguishing what Wittgenstein called “family resemblances” with their “complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing...”<sup>858</sup>

It would be possible to use many categorizations, dimensions or polarities to describe what holistic education does. Some people, for instance, may think of it as ‘progressive’ as opposed to ‘formal’ or ‘traditional’. Other people think of holistic education as concerned with the education of ‘persons’ rather than the teaching of ‘subjects’; etc. Having considered some possible categories and models, I have found that the last work of Basil Bernstein offers the most sophisticated tool for examining holistic education, and I shall use this as the starting-point.

In *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control and Identity: Theory, Research, Critique*<sup>859</sup> and a subsequent lecture Bernstein compares what he calls ‘competence based pedagogic models’ and ‘performance based pedagogic models,’ analyses the different modes contained in each of the two models, and describes the identities projected by each mode. Bernstein feels that competence as a “...knowledge concept...traveled across

the major social sciences in one form or another...’’<sup>860</sup> in the 1960s and 1970s and can be found in linguistics, psychology, social anthropology, sociology, and socio-linguistics. Bernstein’s analysis is valuable as a framework for examining the whole field of pedagogy and, hence, for describing the nature of holistic education and locating it within that whole field.

I shall make the case that holistic education fits within Bernstein’s analysis of competence based pedagogy by going through the major categories which Bernstein uses to distinguish competence based pedagogy from performance based pedagogy, and showing how holistic education fits into Bernstein’s competence model. However, holistic education is differentiated from other forms of competence based pedagogy as it does not belong to any of Bernstein’s three modes of competence based pedagogy. The case will be made that holistic education should be considered as a fourth mode.

Bernstein also details the identity constructions inherent in different modes of performance based and competence based pedagogy. In its identity constructions, holistic education again shows itself to be a distinct form of competence based pedagogy, further meriting its description as a fourth mode.

Bernstein’s use of the word ‘competence’ is undoubtedly confusing for some people as he uses it in a way that is not common. The reader of this book (or Bernstein’s later work) needs to abandon the common notions of ‘competence’. What is commonly seen as ‘competence’ is, for Bernstein, merely “generic performance,” (performance based knowledge of a generic form).<sup>861</sup>

Bernstein claims that the concept of ‘competence’ as a kind of knowledge has its origin in the work of Chomsky, Piaget, Lévi-Strauss, Garfinkle, Dell Hymes, and Wittgenstein.

The concept refers to procedures for engaging with, and constructing, the world. Competences are intrinsically creative and tacitly acquired in informal interactions. They are practical accomplishments. The acquisition of these procedures are [sic] beyond the reach of power relations and their differential unequal positionings, although the form the realizations may take are clearly not beyond power relations. From this point of view the procedures which constitute a given competence may be regarded as social: the negotiation of social order as a practice, cognitive structuring, language acquisition and new cultural assemblies on the basis of the old. These procedures are not the gift of any one culture, in the sense they are culture free.<sup>862</sup>

By contrast, Bernstein discusses performance models of pedagogy as follows:

Briefly, a performance model of pedagogic practice and context places the emphasis upon a specific output of the acquirer, upon a particular text the acquirer is expected to construct, and upon the specialized skills necessary to the production of this specific output, text or product.<sup>863</sup>

It is worth noting the difference between Bernstein's 'procedures' and 'performance'. He says that competences may require mastering several procedures (e.g., one may have to know how to form sentences as part of a competence in human relations), while performances are seen as a final product or at least a goal in themselves.

The two pedagogic models do not necessarily promote mastery of different procedures (both a competence based pedagogy and a performance based pedagogy may want students to know how to form sentences), but they engage in different pedagogic approaches. The performance model has performance as a goal, even if this goal is acknowledged as only a way station towards some larger goal. Few, if any, mathematics teachers feel that learning to do algebraic equations is a goal in and of itself. It is seen as developing a larger understanding of mathematics. However, performing the numeric manipulations taught is an accomplishment that can be taught, learned, and examined apart from any other considerations, and it is this disconnection that distinguishes performance based pedagogy.

Bernstein contrasts the school activity of woodworking (an "imaginary discourse") which is "inside pedagogy" with what he calls the "real discourse" of carpentry, which is "outside pedagogy." This recalls the discussions in previous chapters on 'real' and 'unreal' knowledge. Clearly the Authors felt that knowledge cannot be extracted from the lives the students live and the genuine questions they have if the knowledge is to be 'real' or meaningful. In Bernstein's terms, even if a student can perform excellently the procedures of school woodworking, it is not the equivalent of acquiring those same procedures in the "real discourse" of carpentry. A discussion of whether, and if so, how an imaginary discourse can become a real discourse is one that many in holistic education would feel is close to their concerns.

That the procedures in a competence are not the gift of any one culture makes them at least multi-cultural if not pan-cultural or even supra-cultural. It would probably make most sense to think of them as

supra-cultural if they do not have their origin or impetus in culture but in an inherent meaning-making capacity that humans and possibly other mammals possess. For the Authors and holistic education the procedures in what we have called sagacious competence have their origin in the nature of humans, most specifically in the inherent learning processes and the development that is seen as approaching Ultimacy. As such, the procedures are supra-cultural. This is important for holistic education which is very concerned with the pluralism of modern existence, and which sees being culturally bound as a hindrance to development. Any competence that is culture or era bound is as useful as proficiency in mediaeval chivalric courtly conduct—it may still be used in some rarefied social strata, but in most others it is just strange behavior.

Remembering Rousseau's notions of 'natural man', Pestalozzi's promotion of people "who have been brought up by life itself, and not by lessons"<sup>864</sup> and therefore not ruined by *civis*, and both Jung's and Maslow's fascination with indigenous cultures, it is not surprising there is also substantial interest in indigenous cultures amongst supporters of holistic education. Many people have a sense that less complicated cultures have simpler and more authentic procedures that have relevance because they are more universal. Discovering such procedures is valued as a key to understanding other people, to liberation from the confines of one's own culture, and possibly to understanding something inherent and essential about ourselves. (The appearance of this in holistic education is discussed in more detail on page 261.)

## THE SOCIAL LOGIC OF COMPETENCE MODELS

Bernstein claims that there is a social logic for the concept of competence which has five parts. What would strike anyone familiar with different approaches to holistic education is how closely Bernstein's social logic of competence mirrors the reasons many people give for some aspects of holistic education. Bernstein's five-part social logic and its applications to holistic education are as follows:

The first social logic:

...an announcement of a universal democracy of acquisition. All are inherently competent and all possess common procedures... There are no deficits.<sup>865</sup>



In holistic education (as with the Authors), students are usually seen as possessing inherent learning processes and motivation and even latent wisdom. Without performances that children are expected to accomplish, schools can allow children to naturally ‘flower’, each in his own equally valid way. This contrasts with many of the development theories based on presumptions of deficits (e.g., personality deficit,<sup>866</sup> motivational deficit,<sup>867</sup> intellectual deficit,<sup>868</sup> moral deficit,<sup>869</sup> social skills deficit,<sup>870</sup> socio-cognitive deficit<sup>871</sup>). If there are no deficits, only differences, then the principles of evaluation in mainstream education lose coherence.

The second social logic:

...the subject [here read student] is active and creative in the construction of a valid world of meaning and practice.... Consider creativity in language production (Chomsky), creativity in the process of accommodation (Piaget), the *bricoleur* in Lévi-Strauss, a member’s practical accomplishments (Garfinkle).<sup>872</sup>

This fits with a tendency towards heuristic learning present in most approaches to holistic education, and runs counter to the convention of pedagogic authorities deciding what and when learning occurs.<sup>873</sup> Some holistic education advocates seek support for heuristic learning in some post-modern philosophers (like Richard Rorty), but the distinction between individually constructing meaning and finding meaning often gets lost. There is little in holistic education writing to suggest the relativism in much post-modernism; recalling instead Maslow’s criticism of relativism (see page 185). Much holistic education is concerned with finding meaning (or ‘truth’) or constructing individual *approaches* to meaning, but this is not the same as inventing meaning or arbitrarily deciding on things being true. Some would have it that ‘truth’ exists but we cannot do more than see aspects of it. Others feel that what is true can be perceived, but the limitations of language prevent it from ever being fully expressed.<sup>874</sup> What does seem frequent in holistic education is the view that meaning has to be found or discovered by each person; meaning cannot be ‘meaningfully’ received. People can receive the meaning of another—and in fact it is important for many reasons that we do in order to live with others (the communitarians have much to say on this point that would be in sympathy with much in holistic education)—but received meaning is not ‘meaningful’ until we see it as meaningful for ourselves.<sup>875</sup>

Some of the problems with found and accepted meaning may be

elucidated by the following example. Suppose we have the task of deciding which of several lights is brightest if we have no scientific instruments. A person can look at the lights and see that one is brighter than the others, and that person may try to confirm the assessment by asking several other people. If other people feel that some light other than the one our subject chose is the brightest, then our subject can re-evaluate his judgment or conclude that 1) the viewing angles that he and other people used effected the perception of brightness (therefore both 'meanings' can be correct), 2) there is something wrong with the other people (only his 'meaning' is correct), or 3) something is wrong with him (received 'meaning' is more reliable). However, we would find the character, integrity, or at least the judgment of our subject suspect if he consistently went along with the assessment of the others, denying the evidence of his own eyes. We would also find it suspect if our subject stridently dismissed the evaluations of others and insisted that he was invariably right. We are uncomfortable with the view that a collection of subjectivities constitutes objectivity, and we are equally uncomfortable with ignoring or dismissing the subjectivity of others when subjectivity is all there is.

Holistic education usually acknowledges and tries to address these issues in both governance and group meaning-finding. Sometimes it is addressed through notions of consensus building<sup>876</sup> (related to regulative discourse criteria—see page 246), at other times through notions of tolerance and accommodation, and at still other times by constructing convergent meaning through dialogue.<sup>877</sup> What is central to our discussion is that holistic education emphasizes the importance of each student having an individual network of meaning, and yet, because of its very subjective nature, this network cannot be discovered in isolation. Rather, the meaning should be shared and scrutinized by others, and revisions should be made as necessary in the light of this process. The importance of this in holistic education has usually generated an equal importance given to the capacity to work co-operatively as a primary skill in itself.

The importance that holistic education usually gives to finding meaning (as opposed to accepting meaning) follows the epistemology of Rousseau and Pestalozzi. Seeing the relations or connections between things is how ideas are formed, and it is the forming of ideas rather than the holding of ideas that is important. Although 'meaning' was not part of the language most of the Authors used, they used related terminology (e.g., 'real' and 'unreal' knowledge) to indicate similar or identical concepts. Consequently, Rousseau and Pestalozzi were in-

terested in developing this ability. The later Authors were also interested in this phenomenon as they saw the finding of 'meaning' as the agent that transforms consciousness, and their work is rich in terms that point to this process (e.g., insight, B-cognition, veridical perception, significant-learning processes, etc). At the extreme of such meaning-finding are terms that describe epiphanies or transcendence of a religious nature; a seeing of connections that reveals the greatest possible unity. (This topic is discussed in more detail beginning on page 259.) While the connections that people make are necessarily unique (following from everyone's unique experiences and perceptions), there is the sense that these connections or meaning structures should be at least partly communicable to others; and if they are not, then they may be delusional or, at worst, psychotic.

Finding meaning is often equated in holistic education with understanding, and simply having knowledge is equated with received meaning; echoing the arguments in the previous chapters distinguishing knowledge from experience and knowledge from representations. Holistic education sometimes speaks of 'book bright and life dumb', which underscores many of their criticisms of mainstream education.

The third social logic:

...an emphasis on the subject [student] as self-regulating, a benign development. Further this development or expansion is not advanced by formal instruction. Official socializers are suspect, for acquisition of these procedures is a tacit, invisible act not subject to public regulation.<sup>878</sup>

If finding meaning is equated with understanding, and finding meaning is an individual endeavor, it follows that finding meaning cannot be regulated. With this view of understanding, holistic education advocates often claim that since understanding cannot be regulated, to be primarily concerned with learning that can be regulated is to be primarily concerned with learning that, by its very nature, cannot be based on the individual making his own meaning. At best, regulation must be concerned with seeing validity in received meaning. Such seeing of the validity of received meaning may be the necessary goal of some disciplines (like those typified by Maslow's 'inductive knowledge,' e.g., abstract mathematics). However, a distinction is made between a thing being meaningful within a socially accepted system and meaningful in the student's life. One might liken this to the fantasy games which are popular today—games with very developed characters, histories,

terrain, and time frames—where things are said to be ‘virtually real’, to have a reality within a fiction. Knowledge that is without connections or meaning is similar; it has an ‘abstracted-from-the-life-lived’ quality even if it is coherent and connected with other things within the same domain. It is frequently suggested that sex education, AIDS education and drugs education have this ‘abstracted-from-the-life-lived’ quality so students are able to pass exams on the subjects, yet fail to make any connection to their life as it is lived. Perhaps this is related to Plato’s *episteme*—knowledge that is real knowledge is knowledge that affects behavior.

For many advocates of holistic education this marks a central difference between the ways in which they see the nature of what it means to be human and the way they feel it is seen in mainstream education. As stated by the Authors, children are not seen as needing to be shaped by older, more knowing adults into forms that the adults feel are right. Consequently, the child’s meaning structures do not need shaping, which is seen as the main purpose of the regulation that Bernstein describes. ‘Public regulation’ is a hindrance to the correct developmental process as all public regulation implies a predetermined outcome fixed by the public (otherwise how could it be regulated), and so violates the central tenets of self-regulation, individual meaning finding, and being true to one’s nature.

In holistic education, self-regulation is often seen both as a means and an end.<sup>879</sup> It is felt that one can’t learn to be self-regulating through being regulated by others. Self-regulation needs practice if it is to be learned and, although certain guidance is needed for the safety of infants, such guidance should be withdrawn as soon as physical safety is not imperiled. Not all danger should be removed, as a certain amount of physical peril provides a healthy arena in which to grow. In this the arguments of Rousseau and Pestalozzi to allow children to make mistakes is heard. Such self-regulation is seen as possible because of all that was previously discussed about the nature of humans being basically good, and the notion of homeostasis. This is not just seen as a moral virtue, but as the only way to learn about the kind of regulation that is needed in subtle circumstances that are part of life. Imagine the example of riding a bicycle: even the most skilled bicyclist could not give instruction fast enough, subtle enough, or complete enough to keep another person they were instructing from falling off their bicycle. New riders must be able to regulate their own balance, not for some moral reason, but because that is the only way in which it can

work. Similarly, the regulations that one needs in one's own life are too complex, too fast, and too subtle to rely on regulation from outside. Consequently, while some regulation from the outside may be necessary in some circumstances or for some initial limited period (like holding a person up when they first get on a bicycle) there must be an early release from such support as a tendency to rely on outside regulation is counter-developmental.

The fourth social logic:

...a critical, sceptical view of hierarchical relations. This follows from (3) as in some theories the socializer's [here read teacher's] function should not go beyond facilitation, accommodation, and context management. Competence theories have an emancipatory flavour. Indeed in Chomsky and Piaget creativity is placed outside culture.<sup>880</sup>

This enunciates one of the most obvious characteristics of holistic education, the relationships between the teachers and students, and reflects much in the previous sections on authority and the correct pedagogic relationship. To avoid what is commonly seen as the danger of hierarchy and the implication that one group (the teachers) is in some way deliberately and formatively acting upon another group (those being taught), many holistic schools have different names for the adults in the learning environment, such as facilitators, guardians or staff members. In many holistic schools the wish to avoid what is seen as the damage of positional power has resulted in students having a determining role in the hiring and firing of the adults who work in the school. It is interesting to see that this is now being used in at least two British state-run secondary schools.<sup>881</sup> Some of the activities of the adults in the holistic school are discussed in the section on the economic implications of competence models that begins on page 254, so it will suffice for our present purposes to say that the adult's role is to support the individual learning processes of the students and not to determine them. In some holistic schools this may involve doing nothing until the student asks for something (even then possibly refusing if it doesn't interest the adult, thus reinforcing everyone's rights), while in less radical holistic models the role of adults is to ensure that certain intellectual skills (like numeracy and literacy) and certain non-intellectual skills (like social and emotional skills) are acquired, but the adult is not there to determine the way in which such learning occurs.<sup>882</sup>

Bernstein points to one interesting implication for the teachers of the two models.

The explicitness of the transmission makes such modes [in performance models] less dependent upon personal attributes of the teacher and so their supply is less restricted [than competence models].<sup>883</sup>

In previous chapters it was shown that the aspects of teachers (or Bernstein's "personal attributes") which the Authors feel facilitate the needed learning are primarily concerned with understanding (the students and their needs, the correct pedagogic process, the correct pedagogic relationship, and the importance of their own development). Such understanding is resonant with the understanding advocated for the students (i.e., the understanding has to do with meaning and self, either alone or in relationship). The meaningful understanding of the teachers is, therefore, also not subject to public regulation and is also hindered by hierarchical relations. Teachers in holistic education must also be "active and creative in the construction of a valid world of meaning and practice" just like students. This militates against performance based pedagogic models for holistic teacher training, which in turn makes it impossible to have publicly regulated and mass produced holistic education teachers. Hence, their restricted supply.

Keeping in mind the importance of experiential learning, many holistic educators would want to include objects, events, and even environments that are experienced as part of what facilitate the needed learning, thus reinforcing Bernstein's description of the teachers' role as "facilitation" and "context management." In many traditional cultures there are formative events like rituals, rites of passage or ceremonies of transition, and formative places. These have varying degrees of deliberate construction, but they often do not have a determined content. A person undergoing such an event or experiencing such a place may be expected, for example, to know more about themselves at the end, but just what the content of that knowledge is can not be known or regulated by another. There are several groups who construct modern rites of passage because of the importance they feel such 'instructorless instruction' has for development.<sup>884</sup> Similar views are held by many who are involved in presenting 'formative experiences', such as Outward Bound or various schools that involve extended periods of travel. In some indigenous cultures (and the holistic educational approaches that take a lead from them) there is also learning from animals, and time is spent observing animals for this purpose. Advocates of this claim the traditional role of animals in fables shows how common such learning from animals was in all cultures. When the en-

vironment is the instructor it may appear that there is 'instructorless instruction', but such a view dis-animates nature and runs counter to Jung's notion of the psychoid unconscious and most of the Author's views of unity, both of which are held (in some form) by most holistic educators.

The fifth social logic:

a shift in temporal perspective to the present tense. The relevant time arises out of the point of realization of the competence, for it is this point which reveals the past and adumbrates the future.<sup>885</sup>

'Realizations' arising out of 'the now' has become such a common theme as to have become a cliché, but it is not necessarily any less true because of that. 'The now' is perceived as when the connections that lie at the heart of finding meaning are made, and when the connections always need to be remade if something is to remain meaningful. Remembered connections have a second-hand feeling to them. They are like remembering a good meal; there is recollection of a pleasure that was once present, and there is a pleasure in the remembering. However, both pleasures (the recollected one and the one in recollecting) are different from the first hand pleasure of eating the good meal, which can only be experienced in any way resembling the original pleasure by eating a similar meal again. The remembered connections that one has made in the past are better than the recalled connections that one has acquired from someone else, but they are still not as full or meaningful as those that are present during the actual act of making the connections, and these can only exist in the present.

The present tense is also emphasized in the therapeutic uses which Bernstein claims are often made of competence based pedagogic models. In working with students who are characterized as having behavioral difficulties, the therapist often works to help the student attend to what that student is actively doing, or actively thinking when that student is doing or thinking it—"in the present tense".

I would suggest a sixth social logic to competence models, at least as it applies to holistic education. It is that 'being' precedes 'doing' which, in the simplest sense, would support the culturally accepted view that what a person 'is' is of greater importance than what a person 'does'. However, from this it follows that education (seen from the perspective of preparing young people for adulthood) should primarily be about developing the nature of a young person's 'being'. This echoes the notion of the greater encompassing the lesser discussed in

Chapter Two, with 'doing' holding the lesser position. In this thinking, 'doing' either comes of its own consequent to the development of 'being', or doing is acquired more easily subsequent to the development of 'being'. At the very least, 'being' gives 'doing' its necessary context without which learning how to 'do' certain things can be meaningless or even dangerous (e.g., learning how to handle a gun without first developing judgment or maturity). This logic also has it that the future is unknowable, and preparing for that future primarily by learning to 'do' things which, at the time of learning, are seen as needed is often learning things which will be obsolete by the time they will supposedly be needed. Learning 'to be' fully (which entails certain qualities dependent on the nature of the competence proposed) is the safest way to prepare for a world which cannot be anticipated.

Philip Wexler claims that the culture emerging in the modern Western world supports this sixth logic. He claims that it is becoming a given that "cultural and social transformation occurs first evidently as the 'transformation from within', at the site of the self" and is concerned with what he variously calls "optimal being," "delineated being," etc.<sup>886</sup>

Another aspect of this sixth logic has to do with avoiding what could be called the 'becoming trap'. This is a complex topic which deserves much more attention than is needed in this book, especially as it has long and respected traditions attached to it. Briefly put, the dangers of living in the future rather than in the present, of engaging with life on the basis of what one *hopes will be* instead of on the basis of *that which is*, of focusing on an imagined good in some future condition rather than focusing on the perception of good in the present, has been the subject of many writings in religion and psychology. In this sense, 'becoming' is a form of 'doing', and the primacy of 'being' avoids the trap.

A final aspect of the sixth logic holds that when 'doing' is seen as preceding 'being' they often become conflated. Very often, in a person's thinking of who they are there is a response concerned with what they do. From this it often follows that the value of what people are is determined by the value of what they do. Despite this being clearly contradicted in all the world's major religions (e.g., Christianity holds that charity is not determined by what is given but by the quality of 'being' in the giving), this conflation seems to continue in all the world's major cultures based on these religions.

For holistic education, a seventh social logic of competence models is that everyone engaged in the learning process must be actively



learning; the adults do not stand outside the learning process to effect the process for others. All the students and adults (and the parents in their interaction with the school) are learning even if they focus on different contents or with different sophistication. In the practices of holistic education, the correct pedagogic relationship implies reciprocity in the activities of both students and adults. Often in holistic schools, even adults who give most of their time to cooking or cleaning are thought of as engaged in the learning process; not just in terms of learning to do their jobs better, but in terms of learning how their presence, their interaction with the students and staff, and the way they engage in their activities can have an effect on the learning of everyone else. Usually in holistic schools there is a great deal of discussion amongst the adults about their learning and constant analysis of it.<sup>887</sup>

## ISSUES OF SOCIAL POWER IN COMPETENCE MODELS

Bernstein's long-standing interest in the distribution of social power and the mechanisms for this inherent in different educational models has him conclude that "this idealism of competence"<sup>888</sup> does not take into consideration the structure of social power and what an individual needs to learn in order to engage as an active agent in the struggle with that structure. While this statement may be correct for many instances of competence based pedagogy (e.g., some therapeutic schools where the intent is simply to produce more or less normal socially acceptable behavior—on which Bernstein based much of his thinking of competence based pedagogy) and even some instances of the holistic education mode, Bernstein's analysis is not correct for all or even most instances of holistic education. This indicates one of the ways in which holistic education differs from other examples of competence based pedagogy.

In holistic education there is "a celebration of what we are," but it is not in contrast to what a person has become so much as in contrast to what a person *will* become: a rejection of the future as a focal point as indicated in the discussion of the 'becoming trap'. The present, as expressed by what a person has become, is embraced for its indications of what that person *essentially is*, echoing the Authors' notions of self-discovery.

Holistic education also does not necessarily pay the price that Bernstein indicates, which is to remove the person from specialized

learning required for some high-power careers. Holistic education often prepares people to enter universities, and so it sends people into “selective specializations” even though it does not have such preparation as its goal. Holistic education does not preclude student engagement in procedures which are similar to those of performance based pedagogy, it only precludes the dominance of procedures (their acquisition and performance) which is the hallmark of performance based pedagogy. Hence, for holistic education procedures fit within and are a subset of the characteristics of competence. Just as many mainstream schools see music, art, religious, social or personal education as ‘add-ons’ beyond the necessary curriculum, so many holistic educators see the procedures of performance based education as ‘add-ons’. Thus, mastering the knowledge to do well on the college entrance mathematics exam can be acceptable in holistic education, but is not seen as central to sagacious competence. Hence, the ideal of competence need not necessarily “point away from such selective specialisations”<sup>889</sup> so much as change the place these specializations have in the life of a student and the school.

There is support for the perspective that “such selective specialisations” are given more importance in education than they have in real life, supporting the notion that education points too insistently toward them. In *The London Sunday Times* on 5<sup>th</sup> January 1997, James Tooley wrote, “Numerous recent surveys reveal that employers are not necessarily particularly interested in the skills and knowledge that A-levels and GCSEs bring...” and said that other reports show that for university graduates “60% were ‘underemployed’ in their work, with employers not utilizing the skills and knowledge learnt in their degrees.”

The relationship of students to the distributions of power in holistic education merits discussion as a distinguishing element of such education. In most approaches to holistic education (due to notions of hierarchy discussed earlier) power in the school and in society is candidly discussed and analyzed. Often, the students are given a great deal of power and encouraged to be politically active (on at least a local level). There may indeed be elements of control that are invisible to the students, but usually they are invisible to the adults as well. Societal power exists, as do principles of control within the different academic disciplines, as Bernstein so eloquently shows. But it is the learner’s relationship to that power and control that is essential. In this there are echoes of the Authors’ notions of being *in* society but not *of* it, and differentiation. A student needs to learn about the nature of power, when it is right to go along with it and when it is right to engage in civil

disobedience. Consequently, holistic schools are often hot beds of breaking the social codes, if not legal ones; confronting power structures within the school and outside it often makes the schools difficult to manage. Some holistic education modeling itself on 'the pedagogy of liberation' of Paulo Freire<sup>890</sup> and others<sup>891</sup> have local power structures as a prime focus. Contrary to Bernstein, the problem is usually not a 'macro blot' because it is frequently made explicit in holistic education, not obfuscated.

## FEATURES OF EDUCATION USED BY BERNSTEIN FOR ANALYSIS

Bernstein's work is usually described as brilliant but difficult. His conceptualisations of the elements and processes of education, his analysis, and his methodology (e.g., his coding) are generally seen as ingenious but almost inaccessible. His writing style is seen as extremely dense, which some of his critics claim is an unnecessary difficulty. In Bernstein's defence, it needs to be understood that he often relates (sometimes only implicitly) the elements he is examining to larger theoretical social concerns. For instance, Bernstein calls that which is studied in any form of education the "pedagogic discourse" rather than 'the curriculum'. He does this partly to distance himself from some of the narrower discussions of curriculum, but largely because he is relating his thoughts to social science and philosophical work on the nature of 'discourse'. Consequently, while it would simplify this discussion to translate his terminology, too much would be lost of the deeper implications of his analysis if his terminology were ignored. Therefore, in what follows, Bernstein's language will be mostly used but explained.

Bernstein has eight features of education which he uses as a basis for showing differences between performance based pedagogy and competence based pedagogy. For holistic education, these eight features serve not only to show ways in which holistic education is distinct from performance based pedagogy, but also to distinguish holistic education from other forms of competence based pedagogy.

Bernstein's eight features are:

- 1) *Pedagogic discourse*. This is Bernstein's term for that which is studied in schools—what some people have called the explicit curriculum. While Bernstein is also concerned with implicit curricula (what has been called 'hidden curricula'), with this term Bernstein only includes what is explicit.

2) *Space*. With this term Bernstein refers to the areas either designated for or requisitioned by education, as well as the way in which those areas are controlled and/or constructed.

3) *Time*. This is a complex feature for Bernstein. He includes the following: A) the time in a person's life in which education occurs, B) the way time is used (e.g., time regulated by punctuated intervals or not), and C) the temporal sense. This last aspect of time is more difficult than the first two but is related to them. Bernstein sees some activities as emphasising (by deliberately constructing and therefore drawing attention to) a future and others as emphasising the present, or the past.

4) *Pedagogic Text*. This is what Bernstein calls the work which students produce in the course of their education. He includes non-work which is produced (such as play) as well as work which deliberately isn't produced by a student.

5) *Evaluation*. Bernstein uses this term to indicate the way in which the teacher relates to the students' work. It is closely tied to the following feature.

6) *Control*. For Bernstein 'control' indicates the ways in which order in the pedagogic space is generated, by whom and on what basis.

7) *Autonomy*. Bernstein uses this term to refer to the autonomy each teacher has in the classroom as well as the autonomy each institution has. Both have implications for accountability.

8) *Economy*. Bernstein uses this term to refer to costs of both material and time. He also considers the time costs in training teachers for both competence based pedagogy and performance based pedagogy.

### *I. Pedagogic Discourse*

Comparing what students study (which Bernstein calls the 'pedagogic discourse') in the two pedagogic models highlights a significant difference between holistic and mainstream education. Bernstein claims that in competence based pedagogy, there are no explicit rules for deciding what is a legitimate text to study. Any text that brings out the competences which the students "already possess, or are thought to possess" is legitimate. The differences between students in dealing with text are thought of as simply differences and not a basis for hierarchical ranking.<sup>892</sup> In performance based pedagogy, on the other hand, the rules for deciding what is a legitimate text, as well as the rules for showing that the text has been mastered are explicit. Students have much less control over what is studied, and it is easy to rank hierarchi-

cally students according to their mastery of a text.<sup>893</sup>

It is difficult for holistic education advocates to talk about 'legitimate texts' in isolation from the learning processes. Texts are seen as not more than elements in a process, and it is the process that can be said to have independent legitimacy. The extent to which a text contributes to that process is its measure of legitimacy, with the measuring necessarily done by each learner and his teacher. Here the role of the teacher may simply be to try to incorporate the texts chosen by the student or to assemble texts appropriate to each student or to the class.

The pedagogic resources required by competence models are less likely to be pre-packaged as textbooks or teaching routines. The resources are likely to be constructed by teachers and autonomy is required for such construction.<sup>894</sup>

There may be an element of communitarian legitimizing, with an implicit understanding that something like *The Rights of Man* is more likely to contribute to a student's development than *Mein Kampf*, but a case could be made in holistic education for any text being legitimate depending on the circumstances of the learner.

Texts being legitimate in isolation from the learning process is problematic for advocates of holistic education partly because of principle (e.g., surrendering self-regulation, the relationship to hierarchy, etc.), but also because legitimate texts can be a hindrance to developing the learning process or other qualities such advocates aspire to for their students.<sup>895</sup> This reflects the discussion in the previous sections on inherent motivation, and the importance given by the Authors to what Maslow called 'intrinsic motivation' rather than secondary motivation. Every teacher knows that it is easier for students to learn things that interest them. If, as holistic education advocates claim, it is the learning process itself that needs to be developed so that students can, in principle, learn more easily, quickly, and enjoyably in any domain they choose, then a particular text has no objective importance, only a subjective one inasmuch as it is part of a student's construction of meaning. In this view, learning does not derive its value by what that learning is *about*. Learning about mathematics, football, one's cultural past (history), one's cultural present ('street-smarts'), cooking or chemistry is essentially the same. Different skills are certainly needed for acquiring different kinds of text, but those skills *per se* have no objective value. As discussed previously, for holistic education, knowledge and skills derive

their value from their relationship to Ultimacy and sagacious competence.

Some critics of this perspective claim that it ignores social values and that, by ignoring these values and the power implications of different kinds of knowledge, students can be disempowered (e.g. knowing car mechanics has different social values and generates different power than knowing chemistry because different kinds of knowledge lead to different opportunities in life). They also claim that students choose different kinds of knowledge because of their social background and that if they are to be able to move beyond the limitations of their background, they must be able to acquire the cultural capital that will give them the greatest opportunities in life.

The counter argument from holistic education is that this is simply selling out to a set of values that are wrong and destructive to both the individual and society. Cultural capital may indeed be the way to financial capital, but it is not the way to Ultimacy or the psychological and social changes needed. Social values are seen as needing to be challenged, not perpetuated. In this there are perceptions of cultural imperialism or corrupt cultural power: authorities who decide what is a legitimate text also decide the potential goals of learning and the valid steps toward their attainment. While the validity of this is suspect enough in intellectual areas (Einstein failing mathematics in school is a favorite example), it becomes more dubious in less objective academic subjects like art or history, and positively pernicious in areas like moral education or anything that presumes to deal with the development of 'persons'.

Strong objections are usually raised by holistic educators to those who claim to know what, as persons, students 'should become' and to know how students will become that. The implication is that those who don't become 'that' are less than those who do; from which it follows that those who have not yet become 'that' are less than those who have. This disparity in value justifies disparities in rights, power, and privileges. Hence, children (who have not yet become fully developed persons) are seen as not deserving the rights given to adults. It may be relevant to note in relation to this that in Britain, a fully developed dog has more rights than an early term human fetus, and that certain people (e.g., Down's syndrome people who are often perceived as unable to develop fully) have fewer rights (in practice if not in theory) to national health services.

Other objections to the notions of 'legitimate texts' stem from views about socializing students to questionable social norms which

have destructive, though often indirect, consequences. This may take the rather simple form of studying the history of the country in which the student lives (rather than another country) with the implication that the culture of that country is more important than other countries, or it may be more indirect such as valuing Shakespeare which indirectly supports one set of cultural values and implicitly demeans another set. Every educator knows that no education is 'value free', and even if a student chooses to study another history or another author, values are still being perpetuated. What is important for holistic education is that these values are transparent and open to question, while accepting a text determined by others as legitimate obscures and closes those questions and perpetuates values that might be objectionable.

Bernstein's comments that students in competence models are not stratified may imply to some that there is no assessment possible in competence based pedagogic models. This is not the case as will be seen in the section on assessment beginning on page 243.

## *II. Space*

One of the aspects that immediately strikes an observer of holistic education who is not used to such approaches to education is the pedagogic space. There often does not appear to be anything recognizable as a classroom. Bernstein anticipates this, and says that for competence based pedagogic models,

There are few specially defined pedagogic spaces, although facilitating sites (e.g. sandpits) may be clearly bounded. Acquirers [students] have considerable control over the construction of spaces as pedagogic sites and circulations are facilitated by the absence of regulatory boundaries limiting access and movements.<sup>896</sup>

This contrasts to the use of space in performance models where,

Space and specific pedagogic practices are clearly marked and explicitly regulated...<sup>897</sup>

Consequently, holistic schools easily speak of classes or schools without walls, and that all of life is an arena for learning, both of which are seen to encourage attitudes of life-long learning. With no delineation of the spaces for learning, time boundaries for learning are more difficult to construct on the basis of space; i.e., delineation of time

according to when one is in a learning space. Therefore, as learning cannot be seen as the provenance of any particular place, all places and consequently all times have pedagogic potential. This would certainly be in accord with Rousseau's view that education must come from the life of the child and Pestalozzi's view that "life educates."

As there is no particular learning space, it follows that the space in which learning occurs does not have to be configured in any particular way. Consequently, the space can be altered by the participants in whatever way they feel is appropriate to the content of what is being learned. This can, and frequently does, extend to not using a classroom at all, but using the students' homes or other environments. Dewey was an eloquent proponent of this and schools that he helped found<sup>898</sup> and many holistic schools claim Dewey's ideas on this as their inspiration. Taking the class out of the classroom may be a common idea in mainstream education with field trips to study nature, museums, etc. All too often, however, these opportunities to go outside of the classroom are simply exercises in turning outside environments into pseudo-classrooms, where the students' lives are dominated by worksheets, walking in lines, staying in small groups or otherwise tightly regulated by teachers.

Many holistic educators reject the effects on what is learned as well as the learning process which follow from pedagogic spaces that are "clearly marked and explicitly regulated." They would also often claim there is a hidden agenda (or "invisible pedagogy" in Bernstein's terms) in training people to live with a relationship to space in which their activities and movements are bound, restricted, and ordered by others; and in which it is normal to submit to authority in just about everything from tasks to bodily functions. For many holistic educators the idea that a child needs to get permission or even an institution-granted pass to go to the toilet is very strange. Many holistic educators would point to the difference between a person being a feature of the space in which they exist, or the space as a resource for the people who live in it, an arena of their choosing for their construction of meaning.<sup>899</sup>

It is probably significant in a discussion of space in holistic education to note that many holistic schools (especially day schools, but some boarding schools as well) spend a great deal of time educating the parents in the educational process. If the pedagogic space is not limited to the confines of the school premises, then what goes on in a child's home can be (and some would say should be) part of the educational process with which the adults running the school are necessarily concerned.



### III. Time

The concept of time in pedagogy involves the time in a person's life for pedagogy and the use of time in pedagogy. Bernstein indicates many differences between competence and performance models in their relationship to time. He says that competence models,

...select the present tense as the temporal modality. Time is not explicitly or finely punctuated as a marker of different activities, as a consequence the punctuation of time does not construct a future. The present tense is thus emphasized. Further, the weak and implicit sequencing of different activities (no apparent progression) combines with weak pacing to emphasize the present tense. Inasmuch as the emphasis is upon what each acquirer [student] is revealing *at a particular moment* (known only to the teacher), and that this is a signifier of what should be made available by the teacher, then the time dimension of the pedagogic practice is the present tense from the point of view of the acquirer.<sup>900</sup>

Most holistic education advocates would insist that when pacing and sequencing are determined by the student and/or the contents of the subject studied, pacing and sequencing are strengthened in their contributions to the learning process.

There is no generalizable pacing or sequencing across all individuals in competence models of education, but this is also somewhat accepted in mainstream education. Very few, if any, teachers believe that all students, regardless of their inclinations, backgrounds, capacities, or psychologies should progress in the same tasks at the same pace. What is believed is that there are sufficient similarities amongst the members of groups of students (e.g., highly motivated, white, upper middle class, from a stable family, bright, etc.) with the consequence that each member of that group should progress through certain learning procedures at a similar pace. This, however, does not take into account that even if there are identical students (which some suggest is impossible) the life experiences of the students (e.g., family stress, personal trauma, etc.) has a marked effect on the temporary academic ability of a student, and these experiences reduce any previous affinity. Most teachers will have experienced the destructive effects on students who are bored with a class because they learn much more quickly than their peers, and the equally destructive effects on someone who can't keep up with the class. In both cases there are often behavioral problems which follow such inappropriate pacing. With increased use of optional subjects and

the use of tracking or other devices to delineate inclination and ability in many schools, the groups that comprise a class may have substantial affinity. Nonetheless, in performance based pedagogic models, it is thought possible and preferable for someone other than the students to determine the pacing and sequencing, and to fit this sequencing and pacing into the larger scheme of aspirations of the educational authorities. Holistic educators carry the tracking of mainstream education further by claiming it is to the advantage of every learner to have sequencing and pacing specific to the individual learner in each subject and appropriate for that moment, and probably determined at least partly by each learner. This has implications for assessment, as discussed beginning on page 243.

Holistic educators speak of following the pacing and sequencing inherent in the student's relationship to what is being learned. Any teacher will know that when a student or group of students is interested in a topic, there is not enough time for it; and when the topic is not working well, there is too much time. An externally determined pace dictates the depth of study for a topic, whereas a student-determined pace follows the depth of study. Bernstein seems to use generalizability as the criteria for indicating weakness or strength, but generalizability may be misleading. Holistic educators would want to use the criteria of what allows a student to learn most or best and, as there is no legitimate text or performance goals to dictate what has to be learned, they would suggest that the strongest pacing and sequencing is that which allows the learning process to move with the fewest obstacles or constraints towards that which needs to be learned.

There is the non-holistic view that pacing and sequencing are important to drive the learning process along, because without it the student would do little that constitutes valid learning. Holistic educators reject this view, as seen by all that has been discussed in previous chapters about inherent learning processes and inherent motivation.

In previous discussions about learning for holistic education not being bound by space and the consequences that this has for time and regulation, it is not surprising that time is not "finely punctuated as a marker of different activities" within specific learning activities. There is not a fixed time determined by someone other than the learner for moving from one learning activity to another, any more than there is a time to move out of learning. We can call such time concerns the micro-pacing in pedagogy—the time periods (within a day) given to acquiring a discourse and the frequency of those time periods (within a week or year). If micro-pacing and micro-sequencing restrict the dis-

course, then they can be said to be weak, and if they support the desired range and depth of learning, they can be said to be strong. Consider the example of a student learning botany and studying the growing cycle of a plant. If the sequencing of the approach is determined by society or the institutions of education at large (e.g., having the course start in September—at the end of the seasonal growing cycle) and is to be approached in forty-five minute periods because of the institutional requirements (which isn't enough time to get out tools, work a piece of land and replace the tools), and has to be done three times a week regardless of the season or the weather; then clearly the student can only study the growing cycle academically with not more than periodic reference to the real life phenomena (or the "real discourse" as Bernstein calls it). Likewise in studying cookery, the micro-pacing inherent in the discourse may permit short periods (like forty-five minutes) for initially learning some minor procedures, but learning to cook a complicated dish or meal has an inherent micro-pacing that cannot be confined to forty-five minutes. While this is obviously true for botany and cooking, it is less obviously true (but, holistic educators would insist, just as true) for more traditional academic discourses. In these cases, the micro-pacing of mainstream education, as it does not support the desired range and depth of study, can be said to be weak.

Even if it is generally accepted that forty-five minutes is the *average* attention span, most teachers will have experienced students with much shorter attention spans and those with longer ones, and they will have seen attention spans of individual students vary substantially according to mood or the imperatives in the students' lives. They will also know that students who are able to take an occasional *attention-break* (appropriate to them) from a subject that interests them, are able to work at that subject for many hours. Some activities that are used by most schools, like project work, benefit from sustained application beyond forty-five minutes. When such activities must be artificially truncated to fit into a typical class period, a student confined to that micro-pacing not only cannot engage fully in that activity, he cannot discover what that activity really is any more than he can discover what it means to cook a full meal if he only ever cooks for forty-five minutes at a time. Pacing and sequencing determined by the relationship of the student to a discourse and by the dynamics of the discourse are seen as strong by a criterion of learning as an open-ended activity, and externally determined pacing and sequencing are seen as strong by a criterion of learning as the acquisition of the contents of predetermined procedures.

Bernstein's point that "the punctuation of time does not construct a future" is most appropriate for holistic education because for holistic education the outcome of the learning process is unknown (at least partly if not wholly). In general, the punctuation of time can be preset for a task only when one knows (at least approximately) the conclusion of the task and when that conclusion must be reached. The time a task takes may be punctuated for purely subjective reasons (like attention span, or muscles getting tired), but this is more the student's engagement with the task being punctuated for subjective reasons of relationship (always in the present tense and idiosyncratically) rather than time punctuating a task. The focus in time punctuation is on a future state or goal, while the focus for the student-in-the-relationship-to-the-task punctuation is on the relationship to the task, in which one can be absorbed or "lost" in time.

Time, especially toward predetermined conclusions, is also related to the 'becoming trap' previously discussed (see page 226). Being in the 'becoming trap' is what holistic educators feel is the position of mainstream education. Activities that are onerous or at least boring are engaged in for some ability that is theoretically to accrue in the future. This future ability is then supposed to open the doors (still further in the future) for an opportunity (e.g., higher education or a job); and this opportunity is an important prerequisite for a hypothetical end condition still further ahead in the future which has labels like 'success', 'security' or 'happiness'. Holistic education advocates are concerned that from first entering school, children are too often taught to focus on a future goal toward which there are clearly delineated and ordered steps with only X amount of time to get through those steps. This is not to say that holistic education eschews deferred gratification. On the contrary, there is a great deal of talk by holistic educators about how modern society and our environment suffer from a lack of deferred gratification. Holistic education advocates speak of much mainstream education as deferred meaningful living, and echo Dewey's much quoted phrase, "Education is a process of living, not a preparation," or Krishnamurti,

Our education from childhood is built round this idea of *becoming* somebody, achieving success, and very few of us have ever learnt to love what we are doing.<sup>901</sup>

Holistic education advocates feel that to learn for some future meaningful existence is to learn to live with present meaninglessness,

and that this lesson is usually too well learnt; a sentiment that echoes several of the Authors' views about living in the present. That the processes of planning or projecting are necessary and valid for some things in life (like planting a crop, or constructing a building) is beyond question. However, it is not beyond question that these processes occasionally need to be mediated by reference to the present reality, or that the original goal may need to be changed. What is more difficult to determine are the areas of life for which these are not appropriate processes (such as developing a loving relationship, or understanding oneself), and the possible approaches to learning in those areas. Holistic education feels that such areas in life (for which planning and projecting are not appropriate) far outnumber and are far more important than those for which these processes have relevance.

Avoiding the 'becoming trap' does not mean denying that a person changes, and in some sense goes from being one thing to being another. Nor does it deny that these changes may in some sense be progressive towards some end state. Ultimacy would make little sense without such a notion. What it does claim is that whatever a person is, they are fully; people are not partial or incipient versions of something else, thereby denying the deficit theories of development referred to earlier and supporting some of the current psychological theories that eschew development models.<sup>902</sup>

#### IV. Pedagogic Text

Bernstein calls a student's work (or that which a student produces in the course of his learning) "the pedagogic text." Part of his analysis of the pedagogic text for both the competence and performance model elaborates the topic of time.

Here [in the performance model] the pedagogic text is essentially the text the acquirer produces, that is, the pedagogic text is the acquirer's performance...I have stated previously that performance models relative to competence models emphasize the future. However, with reference to the production of the pedagogic text it can be said that performance models signify the past. The pedagogic practice which produces the text positions the acquirer, *invisibly*, in the past and its rituals which have produced the instructional discourse. Thus in the case of performance models, the future is made visible, but that which has constructed this future is a past invisible to the acquirer. In the case of the competence models it is the *future* which is invisible to the acquirer (only known to the teacher) and the present which is continuously visible.<sup>903</sup>

An important question for holistic educators is: What is the most desirable relationship to the past, present and future for young people to have as they are growing? This may have been a simpler question in previous eras. Consider first the past. It may indeed be advisable or even necessary to “position(s) the acquirer [student]...in the past and its rituals” for cultural transference, but in today’s pluralist world holistic educators ask, ‘whose past?’ In most modern societies there are now too many cultural pasts to include; and if, for example, the answer in America is, ‘the American past’ then too many students will be positioned in a foreign and alienating arena. To say that only one cultural past is legitimate or can be a source of legitimate texts is to make a politically unacceptable and educationally alienating statement, yet because this positioning is “*invisibly*” accomplished, this statement is silently, though nonetheless emphatically, made.

Most holistic educators would feel that a statement that legitimizes one cultural past over another is inaccurate, and if it is done “*invisibly*” it is probably suspect. This is partly from a general distrust of nationalism *per se* (discussed in more detail in the sections on modes and identity construction) and partly from being wary of vested interests. If the past of one group is the source of the pedagogic discourse, the members of that group have an obvious advantage in producing the pedagogic text. There are also the perceived vested interests of those who are the guardians of the discourse. A statement about one cultural past being the only source for legitimate texts may be invisibly made because those making it don’t want it challenged—an excellent reason for many holistic educators to openly challenge it. If no single culture is to be automatically valued above others, then if anything cultural is to be valued, it must be elements in different cultures or aspects found in all cultures (like art, music, myths, ritual, or kinship groups). The criteria for whether a particular expression of a cultural aspect should be valued must be (in keeping with our previous discussion) the role of that particular expression in the student’s finding of meaning. As such, the history of black female slaves can be as important as the history of white male political leaders of the same period. The street poetry of today can be as important as the poetry of World War I. Holistic education does not deny a past, but claims there are a variety of pasts, not the least of which is the student’s own personal past; and that if a student’s learning is to be positioned in any past, it should be done explicitly and that past should be one that has the richest potential for each student in finding meaning.

If “in the case of performance models, the future is made visible,”

then one needs to ask to what extent this visible future is real or illusory. The future can be said to be real within the context of a pedagogic discourse; one may know that after learning addition one learns subtraction, or after studying World War I there is the study of World War II, etc. There may even be procedural futures or future stages that can be known; one will go to secondary education after primary, etc. But as Bernstein correctly points out, the pedagogic discourse is abstracted from the “real discourse”; the activities of pedagogic physics only very loosely resemble the activities of real life physicists. To what extent then is the future made visible in performance models, not just a future that exists only within the pedagogic discourse and divorced from real life? Life in ‘the ivory tower’ has long been lampooned. The divergence of the real world from the world of school and the dichotomies produced have been noticed by many educators and have recently produced fascinating studies in street mathematics versus school mathematics.<sup>904</sup> In these studies, child street vendors are able to do complex mathematical problems in their heads as they relate to the activities that are actual to these children, yet they are unable to do the very same problems on paper when asked to do them in the way these children are learning to do them in school.

Bernstein’s comment that in competence models it is “the present which is continuously visible” has significance with reference to all that has been said previously about living in the present. Holistic educators (and the Authors) would naturally support an approach to pedagogic texts that assists in making the present “continuously visible” because of its effect on being present and therefore on self-knowledge, both of which are seen as related to Ultimacy.

Bernstein’s point at the end of the previous quote about the future in competence models being visible to the teacher alone is only partly true, but this is covered at length in the discussion on assessment.

What Bernstein says of the pedagogic text for competence based pedagogy is largely accurate, but it needs some elaboration to fit holistic education more exactly. Although such elaboration touches on assessment (the following discussion), Bernstein’s concepts of what is visible to the learner and the teacher in the pedagogic text needs discussion here.

Here [in a competence model] the text is less the product of an acquirer for this product indicates something other than itself. It reveals the acquirer’s competence development, be this cognitively affective as social, and these are the foci. The teacher operates with a theory

of reading through the product the acquirer offers (or does not offer) to the teacher. This theory of reading marks the professionalism of the teacher and is recontextualized from the social and psychological sciences which legitimize this pedagogic mode. The consequence is that the meaning of an acquirer's signs is not available to the acquirer, only the teacher.<sup>905</sup>

For holistic education, the teacher, as an outside evaluator with different experiences, reads (potentially) different things into the pedagogic text, not better things. Everyone learns to read indications of their developing competence from infancy, from the time we first try to put something in our mouths or crawl—we can find our mouths or hold ourselves up on our hands and knees, etc. The “meaning” of the student's (or infant's) signs may have a significance to a teacher or caregiver that is different to the student (or infant) because such an adult has perhaps seen such signs before and is able to relate such signs to other signs that make a pattern which is invisible to the student (or infant). However, as the nature of the competence in holistic education concerns meeting the challenges of life in the deepest and broadest sense, and this is based partly on the students' finding of meaning, it is necessarily mistaken to assume that the signs have no meaning or less meaning to the students than they do to the teachers. This could even be argued for performance based pedagogy, though for other reasons. A teacher in mainstream education may, for example, see signs that a student has grasped the essential concepts of fractions and that the student has done this with less or more difficulty than his peers and at a younger or older age than is usual. This may mean something to the teacher about the student's over-all mathematics ability and probable progress, all of which would be invisible to the student. The student in this example, however, may feel that a whole new world has opened up before them and that suddenly so many things that were mysterious before now make sense. The point is that the meaning visible in the pedagogic text is different for the teacher and the student even in performance based pedagogy; and which is better, greater, or more authentic would be a difficult question.

As the holistic education student's ability to see meaningful signs in their own pedagogic text is important, and as some of the meaning will remain beyond the scrutiny of all but the student, part of the skill of the educator is in helping the student learn to read more deeply “through the product” to understand the development of their competence. In fact, developing self-knowledge can imply developing such



ability to read more deeply into one's own text. This is also important in view of the student as self-regulating and the correct pedagogic relationship as non-hierarchical. A holistic educator may even suggest producing pedagogic texts which can only have significance to the student but which the educator feels may be especially revealing. Much of the education that is felt to occur from Outward Bound and other educational programs started by Kurt Hahn is of this nature as are various educational initiatives based on rites of passage.<sup>906</sup>

Even though such "reading through the product" is "recontextualized from the social and psychological sciences which legitimize this [competence based] pedagogic mode," it is a process much older than these disciplines as evidenced in traditions of religious education and child rearing, and as seen in the early Authors.

## *V. Evaluation*

Bernstein uses the term 'evaluation' but holistic education has a distinctly different understanding of this topic, so that another term emphasizing this difference is merited. 'Evaluation' will be taken to mean a judgment to which it is possible to attach a value, which makes stratification possible. 'Assessment' will be taken to mean a judgment that distinguishes the nature of what is assessed, but which implies no value and, therefore, does not generate stratification. Bernstein claimed that there can be no education without evaluation (although he used the term in the way 'assessment' will be used in this discussion).<sup>907</sup> I take Bernstein to mean that intentional learning (i.e., education) cannot occur unless there is something assessed as not yet learned, and cannot consciously be built upon unless such learning is assessed as having occurred. In similar terms, it can be argued that life is impossible without assessment; e.g., a person can't walk home without a myriad of assessments concerned with when it is correct to turn, or safe to cross a street, etc. Consequently, for holistic education assessment is necessary; but holistic education has claimed that what, why, how, and by whom assessments are made require different answers to those found in mainstream education.<sup>908</sup> Assessment for holistic education is not simple. Keeping in mind that for holistic education (as for the Authors) the response to the question, 'what needs to be learned' involves experiential learning, self-knowledge, and sagacious competence, it is not surprising that holistic educators claim that their task is to learn how to assess what is valued rather than the mainstream solution which they feel is simply to value what is easily assessed.

In distinguishing major differences between evaluation for competence and performance based pedagogic models, Bernstein identifies aspects of how assessment is seen by holistic education.

Here [in the competence based pedagogy model] the emphasis is upon what is *present* in the acquirer's product... Criteria of evaluation of instructional discourse are likely to be implicit and diffuse.<sup>909</sup>

Whereas in the performance model:

the emphasis is upon what is *missing* in the product...then criteria will be explicit and specific, and the acquirer will be made aware of how to recognize and realize the legitimate text.<sup>910</sup>

Part of the reason assessment for holistic education is "likely to be implicit and diffuse" is that it cannot be meaningfully abstracted from the overall competence that gives the procedure meaning. This could be seen as analogous to assessing whether one is balanced when riding a bicycle; assessing the procedure of staying balanced is necessary for not falling off, but it cannot sensibly be abstracted from the general activity of bicycle riding and judged on its own merits even though the procedure of balancing needs to be learned (to some extent) prior to riding a bicycle. Being "implicit and diffuse" does not imply the criteria are not discernible. What makes them "implicit and diffuse" yet discernible is that they are inherent in the discourse. We can take art as an example of such a discourse. The criteria for what makes a good picture may be "implicit and diffuse" yet they are discernible, and there may even be some aspects for which the assessment criteria are explicit. To say otherwise is to deny technique and a general consensus on aesthetics.

As the assessment criteria are inherent in the discourse, we can say that it is the experience of what is learned (or 'acquired' in Bernstein's words) that creates the basis for assessing, which is an aspect of experiential learning. Consider again the analogy of riding a bicycle (which is not a competence, but is still useful as an analogy). The initial criterion for assessing what is learned is simply not falling off. This may be implicit, but it is very discernible. The experiential criteria for assessing further learning may be getting from point A to B with speed, safety, ease, or gracefulness. As a discourse becomes regulated, and a competence is transformed into a performance (e.g., Chomsky's language production versus the skill of public speaking), criteria for assessing

elements (like pronunciation) may become “explicit and specific” (as in public speaking), at which time assessment can be turned into evaluation and follows Bernstein’s description for performance based pedagogy.

Some criteria for assessment may be inherent in the everyday understandings of a particular discourse (rather than the discourse itself), and so can be said to be implicit and diffuse even though they are socially constructed and, therefore, externally determined (e.g., ‘this meal tastes good’, ‘he is nicely dressed’, or ‘she is behaving well’). In such cases the extent to which a person has been socialized determines the availability of criteria for assessment.

Many holistic educators feel that communitarianism can contribute to understanding socially derived values, social expectations, boundaries, learning norms, and the social role of a discourse. As the Authors affirmed, and holistic education would agree, none of us are autonomous agents existing outside of social contexts. Consequently, an external assessor (or externally determined assessment) can act as a normative response of the community to a student’s pedagogic text, helping to socialize the student. Critics of this idea wonder how such a process can foster the innovation or creativity that our rapidly changing world requires. Such critics also question the consequences of using the norm as a criterion in a pluralist world, where the norm may disadvantage minority groups.

The nature of assessment or evaluation reflects its purpose. If the purpose of evaluation is to establish the extent to which a text seen as legitimate has been acquired, then that evaluation can be said to be summative—it computes “the aggregate value of conditions, qualities, etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary for *summation*). If the purpose of assessment is to provide feedback that is a necessary part of the learning process, then it can be said to be formative—and, as mentioned earlier, learning cannot occur without it.

For holistic education, the potential formative nature of assessment indicates an important role for external assessors. The role of an external assessor (one role of the teacher) is to aid the student in receiving needed feedback. In cases where the feedback may not have been received by students on their own, the reasons may be:

- 1) It was simply not noticed (e.g., “You have forgotten to carry the two in that multiplication.”).
- 2) The student has not yet learned to receive such information (e.g., “Have you noticed the rhythm scheme of that poem?”).
- 3) The student has dismissed such feedback as being unimportant

(e.g., “If you don’t keep track of your references now you’ll have a terrible time finding them later.”).

The educator who engages in formative assessment acts as an extension of the student’s ability to assess, with the intention of extending the student’s own self-assessment capacity and, therefore, also extending the student’s experience of what is being learned.

## *VI. Control*

Bernstein’s analysis of the differences in control between performance based pedagogy and competence based pedagogy explains why so many observers have labeled the latter as anarchic.

As space, time and discourse do not give rise to explicit structures and classifications [in competence based pedagogy] these cannot serve both to constitute and relay order. The absence of explicit structures and classification makes both the possibility and use of positional control a low priority strategy.

Further, such control [positional control] militates against the concept of the transmitter, as a facilitator and acquirer, as self-regulating.<sup>911</sup>

For holistic schools, this usually translates as a relatively low level of control (or none at all) that is automatically conferred on holders of positions or roles, which means there must be other ways to create the necessary order. While all social organizations necessarily have mechanisms (visible or invisible) which act as controls to maintain a needed order, Bernstein indicates the attention given to create (and often continuously re-create) the necessary order usually found in holistic education. Because the basis for creating and maintaining order (which Bernstein calls the “regulative discourse criteria”) in competence based pedagogy is not implicit in the structure (i.e., not automatically conferred on holders of positions or roles), it needs to be explicit.<sup>912</sup> These processes of making explicit the “regulative discourse criteria” often involve flexible groups of staff and students as well as ad hoc committees. The process of selecting a temporary ‘controller’ through chance (e.g., picking the short straw) usually occurs in activities where everyone is recognized as equally capable of leading, but where a leader is nonetheless needed. This is often the case in mountain climbing teams: the activity requires a leader, but it doesn’t matter (amongst equally qualified climbers) who the leader is. The leader can be chosen by the other climbers, selected by chance, or the position

can rotate through the group. That there is a controller is important; who that controller is, is not important.

For holistic education (and also for the Authors), what is important is unlinking social position, role, and classification from authority. Most control is seen as rightly belonging to each individual (self-control, discipline) or the group (the ideal of democracy) and should not be abdicated even though it can be temporarily lent to another for utilitarian reasons. Knowing when to accept external controls (e.g., following the instructions of a traffic officer) and when not to accept them (e.g., civil disobedience), as well as knowing when to take control of another (e.g., preventing a child from running into a busy street) and when to refuse to do so (when someone wants to put you on a pedestal to follow) are seen as requirements for living a life of integrity. Holistic educators often say (or imply) that these important lessons, which are subtle and complex, are not likely to be learned in an environment where the opposite is practiced any more than one is likely to learn how to be kind from being brutalized. They further claim that the typical mainstream classroom resembles no political structure so much as a totalitarian regime, while simultaneously wanting the children to grow up into responsible democratic citizens.<sup>913</sup> Reducing positional control is important in holistic education for all that has been previously discussed in relation to authority and freedom. Holistic education would recognize Bernstein's claim that in performance models of pedagogy "structures and classifications are resources for positional control which in turn legitimizes the structures and classifications"<sup>914</sup> and, for many holistic education advocates, this smacks of corruption.

The mechanisms by which holistic schools fulfill Bernstein's point that "regulative discourse criteria...are likely to be more explicit"<sup>915</sup> are as varied as the number of schools. What is significant for our purposes is that most holistic educators would say the competence which holistic education aims to achieve includes learning to see 1) what 'regulative discourse criteria' are appropriate, 2) how to agree on them, 3) the reasons for acting in accord with them, and 4) how to support them in the community (even if the community is just the school).

## *VII. Autonomy*

Bernstein's claims about autonomy for competence based pedagogic models would be partly accepted by most holistic educators, but these claims need further elaboration to describe holistic education more completely. He claims that competence models,

require a relatively wide area and range of autonomy, although teachers in any one institution are likely to have reduced autonomy over their pedagogic practice as this mode requires homogeneity of practice.<sup>916</sup>

There are limits to autonomy in any social grouping; individuals cannot arbitrarily decide to have very different meanings for the same words if they want to communicate, or use different chronologies if they want to coordinate their movements. Holistic schools also require a sacrifice of autonomy for some homogeneity of practice if the school is not to send confusing messages to the students (and parents) about the nature of their education. To what extent such homogeneity is greater or lesser than that found in mainstream schools is not clear. There is a *de facto* homogeneity generated when people of one perspective consciously or unconsciously hire others for having a similar perspective, and the hiring practice of most holistic schools involves the deliberation of most, if not all, of the staff and often of the students. In holistic education there also tends to be a great deal of discussion amongst the adults (as mentioned earlier) about the nature of the school and its activities as there are few procedures or structures that are considered givens, and such discussion tends to generate homogeneity. However, a case can also be made for there being less homogeneity in holistic education than mainstream education as there is rarely a coordinated curriculum with its consequent sequencing, usually no standard teaching technique, nor a standardized method of evaluation. Also, because holistic education usually gives great importance to students as individuals, homogeneity in pedagogic practice is hampered. As Bernstein says of competence models in general,

...any particular context and practice will also be dependent upon the particular features of the acquirers [read students] and their contexts.<sup>917</sup>

This may be analogous to parents raising several children. The parents presumably have perspectives that are at least compatible, if not identical, and have compatible if not identical aspirations and child-rearing techniques for all of their children. Nevertheless, because of “the particular features of acquirers [read each child] and their contexts” the particular aspects of each child’s rearing will inevitably be different. In this regard it is worth recalling that on page 231 Bernstein is quoted as saying that in the competence model pre-packaged materials such as textbooks or teaching routines are less likely to be used

and that resources are usually constructed by the teacher. Teachers need a high degree of autonomy in order to do this, again militating against homogeneity.

Almost all mainstream education understands that pedagogy must make some accommodation of the individuality of the student—in most mainstream schools a student can now choose amongst subjects (after a certain age), will sometimes be tracked or otherwise grouped according to perceived ability, and may even go to different kinds of secondary schooling according to their anticipated futures. Holistic education asks the question, “How much accommodation is needed?” It is a question of getting the right fit, analogous in some ways to fitting men’s suits. Suits can simply come in sizes small, medium, and large. However, a person is likely to get a better fit if the suits come in 38, 40, 42, etc.; an even better fit if they come in sizes 38, 39, 40, 41, etc.; and an even better fit still if they come in 38 short, 38 regular, 38 long, 39 short, etc. Yet, generally, nothing will fit as well as a properly made bespoke suit. The general rule being: the more variations there are, the closer one gets to fitting the particular individual (unless a person happens to have exactly the same measurements as one of the categories, like medium). To think anything different is to claim that people only come with three or six, etc. different combinations of dimensions to their bodies, and we know that people’s bodies have tremendous variation. There is no reason to assume that their minds and psyches (interests, capacities, informally acquired knowledge bases) are any less variable than their bodies. Of course one could argue that tailor-made suits are a luxury, perhaps even an immoral opulence; but how much accommodation to the “particular features of acquirers and their contexts” is required before it can be considered a luxury; or, from a holistic education perspective, how much fitting of a student into a pedagogic content that doesn’t fit the student is moral? Holistic educators ask to what extent education authorities (not teachers who generally work hard to do the opposite) are saying, “Only those who are like us (mediums, for instance) can wear the mantle of education. For all of you who are too big or too small or shaped differently, we’re sorry but, you’ll have to wear something else.”

The autonomy of competence models (including holistic education) has implications for accountability and therefore for the protection of students’ welfare. As Bernstein explains,

Competence models are less susceptible to public scrutiny and accountability, relative to performance models, as their products are

more difficult to evaluate objectively. Finally, competence models are not geared to specialized futures and are therefore less dependent and less regulated.<sup>918</sup>

The lack of public scrutiny must be conceded by holistic education, but the reason for this often mirrors the differences previously discussed between evaluation and assessment. Applying the performance criteria of mainstream education to evaluate a holistic school would make as much sense to holistic educators as judging a painting by its weight. Some of the important questions involved for holistic educators would be:

1) Which aspects of a child's development are able to be reliably scrutinised by the public? Performances certainly can be scrutinized by the public, but what is there in the development of competences which lends itself to such scrutiny?

2) How appropriate are the various means of public scrutiny for presenting an over-all picture of any particular child's development? Can one develop a picture of the whole child from an assemblage of snapshots (even if they are completely reliable, which they clearly are not) of different aspects, and if one can't, just what does such an assemblage represent?

3) What is 'scrutinisable' by others who are not the public (parents, teachers, school administrators, students' peers, the student themselves) and what are the merits of such scrutinies in relation to public scrutiny?

4) What is the effect on pedagogy if it is dominated or restricted to that which can be publicly scrutinised? This is often a very strong point of complaint from students or their parents who are coming from a mainstream school and entering a holistic school. A pedagogic system that seems 'evaluation-driven' is often felt to be serving bureaucratic needs more than the students' needs.

5) To whom do different forms of scrutiny make different parties accountable? (e.g., are the teachers accountable to the school administrators, government bureaucracies, or to the students and parents)? This question goes quite far within some holistic schools where students evaluate the teachers and school administrators; in some schools the students can even fire adults whom they feel are not performing adequately. In other schools, the parents have this authority; in others it is the teaching staff as a whole who scrutinize their peers and administrators; while in still others, members of a school (students, teachers, or administrators) are determined by everyone involved in the school



(students, teachers, parents, and administrators). In some pedagogic systems there is talk of 'clients' and 'providers'. For holistic educators, it is interesting that many state-run schools that use this terminology and that see the students and parents as 'clients' and the teachers and administrators as 'providers', rarely give the power to their clients that a market economy is supposed to confer.

6) What is used to calculate the accounts of the different parties who are accountable, i.e., what is the role of that which can be publicly scrutinised in the accountability of teachers, school administrators, and students; and what is the role of that which cannot be publicly scrutinised in this accountability? In Britain today there is the notion of 'value added' benefits. This refers to what has been added to each child's education which is not visible from an evaluation of a school's performance. For example: Child X is socially advantaged and comes from excellent elementary school A and goes to secondary school B. Child Y is socially disadvantaged and comes from a terrible elementary school C and goes to secondary school D. At the end of a school year both children (X and Y) get the same score on comprehensive tests. Can one say that both schools have performed equally well? 'Value added' is not easily measured, and there do not seem to be very clear ways of weighing these factors into an overall balance for public scrutiny.

Most of these questions are recurrent for holistic educators because they revolve around notions of control, authority and the relationship of the individual to society and its different institutions, all of which are central concerns in holistic education.

As holistic education sees the experience of learning as invariably different for everyone, and as it is the experience of learning and the effect it has on the development of each student's competence (rather than the demonstration of learning through performance of some legitimate task) that is most important, the most important elements for accountability are directly available only to the students. Indications of these elements may be available to parents, teachers, a student's peers, and (to a lesser extent) school administrators, but such indications must necessarily be like tracks in the snow—traces of the thing rather than the thing itself. Holistic educators will often say that without knowing the individual student and their context, it is not possible to see even vaguely whether a particular teacher, course or school is really helping a child develop. Furthermore, different indications of development are available to different people or groups of people (a student's peers, teachers, parents, and school administrator), all of whom may see different indications of the development of a student. All

those perspectives need to be assembled in order to give a reasonable account of that child's learning experience. A student's performance in certain academic tasks relative to others of the same age may have something interesting to say, but given the different socio-economic backgrounds, sub-cultural background, innate capacities, life experiences, informal learning, and environments, such measures have little significance in themselves. Holistic educators would say that accountability based on a narrow band of indicators (which is necessarily the case with performance as indicators) must, of necessity, be very partial and therefore makes only a fraction of a student's educational experience susceptible to accountability; a fraction that leaves out almost all that the Authors felt needs to be learned.

What must be acknowledged is that in the holistic model, the student is not publicly protected from a school's indifference, incompetence, or exploitation. If the parents, teachers, and/or school administrators are indifferent, incompetent, or exploitative, then there is no protection for the student. No outside agency is in a position to rescue the child's educational experience, and historically there certainly have been, and no doubt continue to be, cases of this. Holistic educators and the parents of the students attending holistic schools must recognize this and realize that they must assume the responsibility of accountability.

It must be further recognized that the associated responsibilities cannot be imposed on those unwilling or unable to carry them, and that the model does not work on its own. The parents of holistic school students who are unsure of their capacities to assume this responsibility often still prefer this vulnerability to what they see as public scrutiny distorting education to suit the needs of the system of scrutiny. Such parents would also often claim that there is no protection for the child in mainstream education from system-wide indifference and exploitation by those in power, with indifference evidenced by such things as reduced funding, ignoring the long term effects of mainstream teaching on many teachers, and political parties manipulating educational policy for political purposes. What holistic educators might point to about public scrutiny, especially the increasing public scrutiny of mainstream education, is the implication that teachers, school administrators, and parents can't be trusted with the educational welfare of the students in their charge; they would ask for evidence of anyone or any group as being more trustworthy.

To what extent holistic educators would agree with Bernstein's claim that competence models are not geared to specialized futures depends

on what is meant by “geared.” If “geared” means ‘focused on’ and ‘determined by’ a future, then Bernstein is correct. As previously stated, holistic schools are more firmly rooted in the present time frame as a consequence of having Ultimacy as a goal. If, however, “geared” means that they cannot prepare students for specialized futures, then this is clearly wrong. Students do go from holistic schools to become doctors, lawyers, engineers, professional musicians, etc., but there are a number of hurdles put in their way by the tertiary educational establishments that in many countries have performance criteria for entrance. This problem has been overcome in a variety of ways, depending on the country.

Another indication that holistic schools do not preclude their students being “geared to specialized futures” is evidenced by the frequent occurrence of students in such schools finding a special interest which absorbs them for long periods of time (weeks, months, years) encouraged by the frequent use of project work and the importance given to students pursuing their own interests. By allowing students to pursue their interests, and with the notion that education should help students find their vocation (both of which are part of self-discovery as discussed in previous chapters), holistic education could be seen as exceptionally good at gearing students to specialized futures.

### *VIII. Economy*

The costs of holistic education are higher than mainstream education, although those higher costs are often not passed on to the students. This disparity between cost and price is usually accomplished by not paying the adults of holistic schools at the same levels paid to corresponding adults in mainstream schools. Bernstein gives several reasons for the costs of competence models in general being greater than performance models, and these hold true for holistic education.

The transmission costs of these [competence] models are likely to be higher than the costs of performance models. The costs of training the teachers are likely to be high because of the theoretical base of the competency models... Further, there is a range of hidden costs if the competence model is to be successful in its own terms. The hidden costs are time based. The teacher often has to construct the pedagogic resources; evaluation requires time in establishing the profile of each acquirer [student]; and in discussing projects with groups, socializing parents into the practice is another requirement; establishing feedback on the acquirer's development (or lack of it) is

a further time cost. Within the institution extensive interaction between teachers over the practice is required for purposes of planning and of monitoring, as the structure is constructed rather than received.<sup>919</sup>

These higher costs are often given as a reason for the holistic model being impractical for wider implementation. Many holistic education advocates argue that while there may be good reasons for not implementing holistic education more widely (like people simply not wanting it), the argument cannot be made on the basis of costs. It may be true that politicians would not want to spend what is required for publicly funded holistic education, but neither do they appear overly keen on spending the money necessary for the upkeep of the current system or even the maintenance of its buildings—and this is not an argument against having mainstream education.

Holistic educators also point to the way costs are calculated and they use environmental issues as analogies. It is cheaper to pollute the environment than to keep it clean, but the long-term costs (from increased health care costs to people moving away to more pleasant areas) of pollution actually make it more cost effective to not pollute. Similarly, a calculation of the true costs of mainstream education should include:

- 1) All development costs (e.g., curriculum, text materials).
- 2) Enforcement costs (e.g., inspection, examination, enforcement of education laws such as truancy).
- 3) Remedial education costs (i.e., recovery in adulthood of failing to educate people at school age).
- 4) Under-skilled manpower costs (i.e., of a workforce that learned early to shun learning).
- 5) Social costs (e.g., delinquency, or criminal incarceration which currently costs more per annum per prisoner than is earned by a middle class family with two significant wage earners).

Holistic education advocates often see the lack of full human development of a student as a failure of education, because that is what they see education is for. They will claim that no society can afford not to have its population as fully developed as the individual potentials will allow, and this is just on material grounds. The moral grounds for such an aspiration do not need arguing.

Support for some of these extended cost ideas comes from unexpected quarters. Those interested in the nature of successful groups have begun to recognize the importance of paying for some of the

group processes that holistic education has long felt to be necessary, but which are very labor intensive. Peter Senge from MIT was one of the first to demonstrate that group success depended on the group learning together and that this involves individuals flourishing.<sup>920</sup> Taking some of this to heart, the US military now gives time to group consultation and more autonomy to lower levels of command although the initial dollar costs are much greater. Many of these practices in business and the military (with names like, 'group vision building' or 'owning the mission') are recognized as indirectly linked to performance and, in the long run, are cost effective.

While the eight features (pedagogic discourse, space, time, pedagogic text, evaluation, control, autonomy, and costs) that Bernstein uses to distinguish competence based pedagogy from performance based pedagogy demonstrate, in the same process, how holistic education differs from mainstream education, another purpose is also served. These same features distinguish different approaches to holistic education. For pedagogic discourse, approaches vary from some things being deemed worthy of study (e.g., ecology) even if there is no 'legitimate text', to nothing being worthy of study unless the student deems it to be so. The "competences that acquirers already possess or are thought to possess" might be spiritual, psychological or an amalgam of the two (resonating with the emphases of the Authors). Notions of pedagogic spaces vary from thinking that wherever a child is (even if only virtually) is his classroom, to thinking that the pedagogic space must be specially constructed to nourish the child and ensure a feeling of security and respect which learning requires. Approaches to pacing, sequence and development (as a feature of time) range from being entirely determined by the individual student to structures resembling mainstream education with classes and courses that follow a timetable and progress through the years of schooling. Pedagogic text in holistic education varies from specific challenges to be met (e.g., a portfolio) to no expectation of any kind. Assessment varies from explicit (e.g., a portfolio or project demonstrating that criteria have been met) to the view that the learner must assess himself. For control, there are very political structures (e.g. committees and voting), therapeutic structures (e.g. rap groups, counseling), and communitarian structures (e.g., dialogue, consensus building, etc.). The variation in understandings of autonomy is enormous and reflects very different understandings of human nature, society, and actualization. Financial costs differ from almost nothing (e.g., online classes or parent co-operatives) to those

of maintaining very expensive private grounds. Consequently, while these features are valuable for the present purposes of examining the nature of holistic education, they are also useful for distinguishing the different modalities of holistic education.

# *Holistic Education As a Fourth Mode of Competence Model*

## MODES OF COMPETENCE MODELS

*B*ernstein claims that there are three modes or kinds of both the performance based pedagogic model and the competence based pedagogic model. It is not relevant to our purposes to discuss Bernstein's three modes of the performance model. We shall, however, examine in detail the three modes Bernstein feels exist for the competence model, as this will further distinguish the nature of holistic education. Bernstein claims that all competence models focus on commonalities shared within a group. These commonalities may be shared with other groups within a population (e.g., an ethnic, social or gender group), and represent a "similar to" relation that is seen by the group as fundamental to who the individuals are. Differences between individuals are not as significant as the similarities and are not a basis for stratification or ranking. Instead, differences in "similar to" groups are seen as complimentary to the "similar to" relation in that such differences can be an aid to "the actualization of the common potential."<sup>921</sup> This fundamental insight can serve as an organizing principle for what appear to be very diverse educational endeavors in different forms of holistic education. Bernstein goes on to distinguish his three modes by their location of the "similar to" relations.

It is important to understand all three modes suggested by Bernstein in order to understand the case made here: that holistic education rep-

resents a distinct or fourth mode. Holistic education (the fourth mode) uniquely shares some aspects with the other three to an extent that are sufficient to put it into a category of its own; but it also contains elements which are essential to its nature and that do not appear in the other three modes. It is necessary, therefore, to understand Bernstein's three modes and the location of their "similar to" relations in order to make a case for a fourth location, and so a case for holistic education as a distinct mode of the competence model of education.

In the first mode (first historically), 'similar to' relations are located *within* the individual and refer to common procedures that all individuals share. This mode was opposed to what it considered were repressive forms of authority (usually male) in the family and school, and industry, and was emancipatory with respect to the new concept of child to be actualized by appropriate pedagogic practices and controls... Essentially and briefly the focus of this mode was upon intra-individual potential which could be revealed by appropriate pedagogic practice and contexts. The mode could be called liberal/progressive...

The second mode locates 'similar to' relations not within the individual but within a local culture (class, ethnic, region). The reference here is to the validity of communicative competences intrinsic to a local, usually dominated, culture. This second mode presupposes an opposition between a dominating official pedagogic practice and local pedagogic practices and contexts.... The sponsors of this mode show or attempt to show that a group of competences...are generated by local communicative practices, but are ignored, unseen or repressed by members of official pedagogic fields....

The third mode follows from the second in locating competence within a local dominated group or class, but does not focus upon indigenous competences as does the second mode... The third mode focuses upon inter-class/group opportunities, material and symbolic, to redress its objective dominated positioning. The pedagogic practice and contexts created by this mode presuppose an emancipatory potential common to all members of the group. This can be actualized by the members' own exploration of the source of their imposed powerlessness under conditions of pedagogic renewal.<sup>922</sup>

The "similar to" relation for holistic education is located in a multifaceted process that we have called 'approaching Ultimacy'. In modern times such 'approaching Ultimacy' is most often seen as an activity of consciousness, as ever since Jung consciousness is often understood



as incorporating 'soul', 'spirit', '*karma*', and other numina. In this view, consciousness is rarely seen as being confined to the skull or even the body of an individual, not just because its effects are outside, but because it has an operative existence outside the physical person. This may resemble modern depth psychologists who postulate a higher self which extends and acts beyond the individual. The exact nature of the process of approaching Ultimacy as well as the exact nature of the Ultimacy that is approached are described differently by different (what Bernstein calls) modalities of the fourth mode, and may even be disputed amongst them; but there are enough elements which are held in common by a sufficient number of fourth mode advocates to create some coherence.<sup>923</sup>

'Approaching Ultimacy' is seen as a process that lies at least partly within the individual, and often it is seen as mostly within the individual. In this it is like Bernstein's first mode with its emphasis "upon the intra-individual potential," but it is very unlike Bernstein's first mode in what it opposes. Bernstein's first mode "was opposed to what it considered were repressive forms of authority," while the fourth mode is opposed only to not approaching Ultimacy.

By locating the "similar to" relation in the potential for Ultimacy, or even more concretely, in that-which-makes-Ultimacy-possible (TWMUP) which is similar in everyone, important implications are made about 1) the nature of human beings, 2) the purposes of learning (in the largest sense and education in the smallest), 3) an overarching value if not a hierarchy of values, and 4) the relation between the individual and society. Enough has been said about the various understandings of TWMUP in the Authors, and the differences today in holistic education reflect those differences and have multiplied. However, in general it is felt that if or when contact with TWMUP is lost, then people lose touch with something of their essence, and with their profoundest link with others. Consequently, they lose their most fundamental "similar to" relation, a "similar to" relation which is much more fundamental than anything of culture, time, or peer group.

A clear distinction between Bernstein's three modes and the fourth mode is that all three of Bernstein's modes postulate dominance by 'others'—either gender and role (as in his first mode), another culture (as in his second mode), or other classes or groups within the culture (as in his third mode)—with the intention of the competence focusing on emancipation from those others. The "similar to" relations of the fourth mode tend not to have such 'them and us' constructions, although that kind of language is sometimes used. Part of the reason for

the lack of 'them and us' constructions lies in the nature of the "similar to" relation itself: the only individual or group that could possibly not be 'one of us' would have to be those who do not have available TWMUP; which usually turns into an unacceptable 'chosen people' syndrome. For the fourth mode, emancipation is not from another person or group of persons, it is from states of being that are in themselves 'non-liberated'. In this they echo enlightenment philosophies, or the emancipatory elements in many religions which feel the common state is one shackled to lower elements (often of forces, desires, or nature), and that transformation to a higher state of being is a freedom from such shackles. Emancipation is not gained from opposition to others who are in fact "similar to" us, and is not a consequence of any social restructuring such as the redressing of power arrangements in a culture.

The fourth mode is not, however, indifferent to political and cultural circumstances. On the contrary, there is often a view that the 'outer' situation both reflects and influences the 'inner', and the line between the two is blurred in many approaches to holistic education. This reflects some social representation theory in which an 'outer' cultural perspective can be "ontogenic"<sup>924</sup> in shaping the nature of a person's being, as the 'outer' becomes part of the fabric of a person's inner world. Fourth mode advocates are often politically active in order to redress imbalances that are perceived as affecting people's consciousness (it is hard to talk to a starving man about Ultimacy) or to affect some other social aspect that is seen as adversely impinging on the nature of consciousness (e.g., protecting the environment or reducing the amount of violence in the media), but these concerns are usually of a second order. The *raison d'être* of social action for fourth mode advocates is affecting contact with TWMUP, not to counter injustice or power imbalances in and of themselves.

All major cultures (though not all subcultures) postulate, and often formalize, a means of contacting TWMUP; so that, as members of at least one culture, we are all similar in having such postulations and formalizations (e.g., dogma, rituals, symbols, etc.) as part of our cultural understandings (even if we have rejected their verity). Paradoxically, as the exact postulations and formalizations of different cultures differ from one another and are even mutually exclusive, this very prominent potential "similar to" basis destroys the feeling of itself and creates a 'different from' sense. Fourth mode advocates are uncomfortable with such sources of 'different from' feelings, especially as they stem from what should produce its opposite. They tend, therefore, to

be more eclectic in their relationship to TWMUP and view exact postulations and formalizations as expressions of the time and place of their origin. Furthermore, as the time of origin of these postulations and formalizations becomes increasingly distant and the place of their origin is often foreign (and usually increasingly so through the cultural changes that occur over time), fourth mode advocates usually view the particularities of postulations as increasingly removed from modern expressions of the experiences of Ultimacy—those very experiences which originally gave rise to such postulations. There is also the alteration and elaboration that seems unavoidable in any transmission over time, especially over a long time and many languages—like some extraordinarily complex and lengthy child's game of Telephone (the American name) or Chinese Whispers (the British name for the same child's game). Just as Bernstein's claim that pedagogic physics is removed from the real discourse of physics, so the particularities of the postulations about TWMUP become removed from the real experience of Ultimacy that gave rise to them.

Many holistic education initiatives explicitly reject what they see as the narrowness of exclusively endorsing any particular cultural postulations about TWMUP, what we shall call 'exclusive-truth-claims'. Exclusive-truth-claims effectively set a person apart from others who make opposing exclusive-truth-claims, working against the holistic education 'similar to' notion. Instead, holistic educators tend to look for similarities between cultural postulations, trying to construct meaning from understanding what is common to different postulations. In this, the work of Aldous Huxley with his book *The Perennial Philosophy*<sup>925</sup> and Joseph Campbell's *The Hero of a Thousand Faces*<sup>926</sup> found wide appeal, as have many subsequent authors similarly seeking to celebrate the commonalities of humanity with pan-cultural postulations. The tendency of holistic educators has been to remain with the general (described by Bohm as "that which generates the particular"<sup>927</sup>) partly because it is felt to be closer to the original truth (before alteration by a particular time and place) but also because it is inclusive rather than exclusive—something seen as essential in a pluralist world. For this reason postulations from indigenous cultures (cultures seen as less complicated and devolved from their original impetuses than modern cultures) are valued as providing insights into TWMUP which existed prior to sophisticated postulations.

Critics have called such attempts to extract the pan-cultural 'cultural strip-mining' and claim that decontextualizing the postulations distorts or removes their meaning. Advocates of pan-culturalism feel

that it is the human experience of what is being postulated and the perception of what lies behind the postulations that gives them meaning. These human experiences are each individual's finding of their own meaning, and as such these individuals feel they are acknowledging an authentic less-culturally-tainted approach to Ultimacy. These advocates claim that it is experiencing Ultimacy, no matter how partially, that validates postulations, not history, cultural or social authority. They claim that if postulations cease to assist contacting TWMUP, or another postulation is better at assisting this contact, then the old postulation loses validity and the new one replaces it. Holistic education advocates claim that this is not religious relativism, as some critics assert, any more than switching from one translation of the Bible to another or changing the language or form of religious ceremonies is religious relativism. They claim that it is recognizing that what is transcendent cannot be culturally bound or encapsulated by any single human expression or formalization. The fundamental "similar to" relation of the fourth mode allows any postulation that is authentic for one individual to be authentic for another, for new ones to be generated from experience, and for these new postulations to be authentic for others.

The major difference between Bernstein's second and third mode is that in the second mode indigenous competences struggle against those of the dominating groups or cultures, while in the third mode a group or culture struggles to find parity not through promoting indigenous competences but through exploiting "inter-class/group opportunities, material and symbolic, to redress its objective dominated position."<sup>928</sup>

The fourth mode is similar to the second mode in that adherents of the fourth mode "attempt to show that a group of competences" which are *indigenous in nature* are repressed by the dominating culture (typically modern and western, although this same movement is appearing in an increasing number of third world countries and former second world countries), and that exercising these competences can liberate a person from this dominant culture. 'Indigenous in nature' is used here as a deliberate replacement for Bernstein's 'indigenous', as this is one way in which the fourth mode differs from Bernstein's second mode. Competences that are 'indigenous in nature' are often not native to the particular location in which they are advocated, but they do have an origin that is indigenous (e.g., Native American, Druidic, Aboriginal, African, early Christian, Sufi), or they spring from a frame of mind that is 'indigenous-like' in that it is dominated by a strong

sense of place which includes nature and pre-industrial traditions. The pluralist world we inhabit, and which often inhabits us (e.g., mixed culture or mixed race parentage, multi-cultural upbringing, etc.), is seen as making us indigenes of multiple locations. Some of these locations where people feel an 'at-homeness' or where they find meaningful 'roots' may not even be locations they have visited. Witness the number of people who find meaning in the myths or other aspects of Native American cultures, have no Native American blood and have never even been to America. There are a large number of films and books that promote finding the 'indigenous in nature'<sup>929</sup> and which borrow from such promotions models for education.<sup>930</sup> Perhaps Wexler best summarizes this tendency.

This new age builds on the core civilizations, submerged by modernism, in order to counter the deadening "mechanical petrification" by life-affirming practices. These practices are not morally induced, but are inductive artefacts of the self at work within the polarized apparatus. In Fromm's terms, they are "experienced values." ...The creation of individuated practices necessarily draws cultural resources from outside the West European history of the last two centuries...<sup>931</sup>

While this may be dismissed and ridiculed by its critics, for those who find meaning in such non-native cultures it is no less authentic or sensible than someone else finding meaning in events that occurred in the Middle East two thousand years ago. Again, importance is given to finding meaning. Indigenesness indicates perspective rather than location, and the fourth mode differs from the second in focusing on indigenesness rather than what is literally indigenous, i.e., located within a local culture. Principle aspects of indigenesness in which fourth mode advocates locate the "similar to" relation are those concerned with TWMUP and consequently, one can say that the "similar to" relation is located in a particular aspect of culture rather than a particular culture.

Bernstein's third mode has the "similar to" relation located within a dominated group or class that "focuses upon inter-class/group opportunities, material and symbolic, to redress its objective dominated positioning." In this the fourth mode is similar in seeing itself struggling for what advocates often call 'a paradigm shift' away from the dominant paradigm of the conventional modern industrial world (also labeled as materialism, Cartesian, atomistic, Western capitalism, etc.) which is seen as destroying the world morally, physically, and spiritually.

These advocates claim that another paradigm, a holistic paradigm, is struggling to gain dominance. The battle is within the 'hearts and minds' of individuals as ecological perspectives struggle against perspectives of progress, and systems thinking struggles against atomistic thinking.<sup>932</sup> Some groups are felt to be representatives of perspectives and are frequently defined by their perspectives (e.g., the road construction protesters or road expansion advocates), but the members of any such perspective-defined group may be in union with members of the opposite perspective-defined group on another issue (e.g., gender or race issues). What is most significant is that this battle of paradigms takes place invisibly within most members of the culture. People's perspectives on paradigm-defining issues slide gradually as the result of changing cultural understandings, and dominated paradigms see changes "material and symbolic" which affect the social order. In this way, fourth mode advocates struggle for a paradigm shift on matters concerned with Ultimacy (amongst other matters as explained earlier) against paradigms that are felt to suppress, inhibit or prevent Ultimacy; and while this struggle often has the appearance of opposing groups (like road protesters and local planners), no way exists of defining members other than on an issue-by-issue basis.

We need to return to the rejection of exclusive-truth-claims by fourth mode advocates in order to look at one more comparison between the fourth mode and Bernstein's third mode. Exclusive-truth-claims are seen not only as creating 'different from' relations by fourth mode advocates, they are also seen as serving the interests of groups or individuals (religious or secular/religious amalgams like religiously anointed leaders) who claim authority on the basis of the particularities of postulations and/or from their role in the formalizations of TWMUP. Such groups or individuals are seen placing themselves as mediators between individuals and TWMUP in order to maintain their position. By rejecting exclusive-truth-claims, it is felt that the foundations of such power bases are also rejected, thereby promoting and effecting fundamental social change through the paradigm shift. In this attempt to "redress its objective dominated position," the fourth mode is like the third mode, but as before, the *raison d'être* is Ultimacy and not social change for any other reason.

Bernstein claims that, "competence modes are generally found regulating the early life of acquirers or in repair sections,"<sup>933</sup> expressing part of the attraction for the fourth mode. Many advocates of holistic education speak of society and the human condition as needing repair. They point to evidence of increasing dysfunction in society, in social

or ethnic groups within society, in families, and within individuals. The perspective that societies and individuals in general are in need of repair is supported by long-standing traditions including 'fallen man' traditions, needing to find unity to repair fragmentation, returning to nature to repair the damage of civilization, and by much psychology which sees neuroses as pandemic. If the notion of repair is extended to include developing the capacity for self-reparation, then it can include theories of life-span psychology,<sup>934</sup> psychological resistance building,<sup>935</sup> and character building.

Bernstein recognizes that competence modes are seen as "empowering' by their sponsors"<sup>936</sup> and this is certainly true for the fourth mode. With the "similar to" relation located in approaching Ultimacy for the fourth mode, it is seen by its advocates as concerned with what is most empowering in human experience. The first mode is seen as the "basis of cognitive empowerment," the second mode as "the basis for cultural empowerment," and the third mode as "the basis for political empowerment."<sup>937</sup> Bernstein also describes the relationships of his three modes to consciousness.

All competence modes, despite oppositions, share a preoccupation with the development (liberal/progressive) [first mode], the recognition (populist) [second mode] and change (radical) [third mode] of consciousness.<sup>938</sup>

Fourth mode advocates would claim a similarity to the third mode in the above, in that they are concerned with the radical change (i.e., transformation) of consciousness, both individually and collectively.

## IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

Concerns with "similar to" relations obviously imply identity, and Bernstein's analysis of identity constructions in competence based pedagogy also helps distinguish the nature of holistic education. Holistic education is unusual in that it usually intends explicitly to create or to foster the development of identities, and these identities are different from those commonly held in the modern world. The discovery of new identities usually entail new relationships to one or more of the following: to the earth, to other humans, to other cultures, to one's own nation, or to the problems of living that are believed to follow these new views of what it means to be human. Such new identities are

often seen by advocates of holistic education to be the most complete and lasting way of solving the world's problems (e.g., seeing one's identity as part of nature changes environmental behavior). The perceived loss of identity in the modern world as well as attempts to sustain incoherent identities (with the loss or warping of relationships that follow) are seen as a major source of current problems. Holistic education advocates often claim that the current cultural paradigm offers a unique opportunity for people to find new identities, echoing sentiments of many who work in field of life span identity:

Our unique selves...are a matter of our own crafting, and particularly in the modern world where traditional constraints of time and space exert far less control over who we *can* be.<sup>939</sup>

Bernstein makes a similar statement.

Much has been written about postmodernism, late modernism, and the localizing of identities.... However, it does seem clear that, in the old speak, those identities which were given a biological focus (age, gender, age relation), 'ascribed' identities, have been considerably weakened, are ambiguous and to some extent can be achieved. These cultural punctuations and specializations (age, gender, age relation) are now weak resources for the construction of identities with a stable and collective base. Further, again in old speak, locational 'achieved' identities of class and occupation have become weak resources for stable unambiguous identities. This weakening of stable, unambiguous, collective resources for the construction of identities consequent upon this new period of transitional capitalism, has brought about a disturbance and disembedding of identities and so created the possibility of new identity constructions.<sup>940</sup>

Bernstein speaks of constructing identities, while holistic education (in accord with the Authors) might prefer to speak of finding identities to indicate its relation to self-discovery and to avoid post-modern relativism with its consequent denial of a core self. However, a distinction between identity and self can be made (as with Jung's *persona* and *ego* mentioned earlier) that would solve this difference. The Authors speak of 'self' as unique and inherent and needing to be discovered or uncovered, and not as anything having to do with occupation or role in society. Bernstein and other modern social psychologists and sociologists speak of self as role, so that, "a self, then, virtually awaits the individual entering a position..." and a person has as



many selves as they have roles.<sup>941</sup> Bernstein uses 'identity' in this second sense, and like Jung's *persona*, it makes sense to see the social and cultural role in constructing identity.

As well as distinguishing two pedagogic models (competence and performance) and three modes within each (while I have made a case for a fourth competence mode), Bernstein also distinguishes different identities that he feels are constructed by the different modes of each model. It is not necessary to repeat what Bernstein says about the relationship of the various identity constructions to the modes within the performance model. It is, however, important to relay briefly some of his views on the different identity constructions for the three modes of his competence model, as well as the nature of identity construction itself. Bernstein's categories, while tremendously helpful as a base, do not completely cover the needs of holistic education, and I shall propose extending his framework in order to accommodate the identity construction of holistic education.

Bernstein originally proposed three "launching pads for the construction of identities,"<sup>942</sup> which he later extended to four.<sup>943</sup> These launching pads are the resources for the construction of identities. Rather than detailing the characteristics of Bernstein's four identity construction "launching pads," I shall discuss only those aspects that apply to the identity construction of holistic education. As in the discussion on modes, holistic education shows itself to be a distinct pedagogy on the basis that it crosses the boundaries that distinguish the other approaches to pedagogy (according to Bernstein) as well as containing elements that are unique.

Part of the "launching pads" that Bernstein proposes are three kinds of relationships that identities can create: decentering, centering, or recentering. The identity of holistic education is very strongly all three.

Holistic education is distinctly *decentering* in Bernstein's terms in that it proposes an identity which removes the individual from the "collective base" of what is perceived as the 'old paradigm'. Holistic education is also decentering in that it does not generally have any social organ that holds the center of the identity and, in fact, eschews such centering. Instead, like nature, the identity is seen as needing to be self-organizing and self-regulating. The holistic education identity is *centering* in Bernstein's terms in that it invites people to resonate with (and in that sense join) older, time-honored groups (e.g., indigenous groups). It is also centering in that people with this identity seek to co-operate with others of like mind, and yet does not divorce them from the rest

of humanity. A holistic education identity is *recentering* in Bernstein's terms in that it claims to be a world-wide and grassroots movement "giving the identity a new collective base."<sup>944</sup>

Bernstein also proposes that the resources for identity construction are generally located in one of three time frames: past, present, or future. Again, holistic education is distinctive with reference to these locations, because it crosses the boundaries between them and also because of the distinctive ways in which it uses these time frames as resources. One of Bernstein's identity constructions is what he calls "retrospective"—it uses a grand narrative from the past as a resource. This is the construction of fundamentalist and old conservative movements which look at visions of their (real or imagined) history in order to see what they are and should be. For holistic education this would also apply, but in a different way, based on the trans-culturalism and indigenouness as discussed previously. The "narratives of the past which provide exemplars and criteria"<sup>945</sup> for holistic education do not make exclusive-culture-virtue-claims any more than their postulations about TWMUP make exclusive-truth-claims. The exemplars and criteria elucidate characteristics of what is seen as noblest in humans (and which forms part of the 'similar to' relation) regardless of their culture, place or time. Narratives from Africa, North America, Japan and chivalric Europe easily mix to provide resources for constructing an identity of a non-time-located and non-place-located human, a tendency identified by Wexler as unique.<sup>946</sup>

In this, forth mode narratives (even if they are as historically accurate as any narrative can be) take on a mythical quality: they are told only to convey timeless truths about the nature of things, and the receiver of the narrative is not expected to relate to its time or place which are relevant only to the internal coherence of the narrative. Unlike Bernstein's retrospective identity constructions, which project the past into the future more or less as a cultural whole with only a few concessions to the passage of time, the holistic education identity construction seeks, from the many pasts, meaning about the condition and the potential of both the collective and the individual. The assemblage of the many possible narratives makes the grand narrative of the unfolding of the human story.

Another element that is common between Bernstein's retrospective identity construction and holistic education construction is what Bernstein says of the fundamentalist retrospective identity.

... [this identity construction] gives it a site outside current and future instabilities... It produces a strong insulation between the sacred and the profane such that it is possible to enter the profane world without being either appropriated or colonized by it.<sup>947</sup>

These could be the words of many parents describing why they send their children to holistic schools at what is often, for them, a very great cost.

Bernstein claims that there are other identities which draw on the present. He feels that both the market-oriented and therapeutic identity constructions do this, but in different ways and for different purposes. The holistic education mode shares this resource but, again, for different reasons. The process of approaching Ultimacy is generally seen as requiring 'being in the present' (as previously discussed). Being 'present' has become a favored topic amongst many people looking at the nature of consciousness and has become a focus for extremely interesting scientific research.<sup>948</sup> The many slogans in the holistic education movement that echo 'Be here now', and which try to help people be aware of what they are doing as they are doing it, testify to this. Unlike Bernstein's market-oriented identities, which are seeking to meet the contingencies of ever changing markets, or his therapeutic identities, which are "produced by introjection"<sup>949</sup> and which are "personal project(s)" and are only "a truly symbolic construction...[with] internal linearity,"<sup>950</sup> the holistic education identity seeks to make sense of the ever-changing contingencies as a reflection of the inner state. This is more like a 'circumjection' in which the outer world is scrutinized for indications of and reflections on the 'inner'. This is not just a personal project; in keeping with the Authors' indications of the self extending to become social, it is one that is engaged in for others as well.

Bernstein also characterizes some identity constructions as launching themselves from projections of the future, and he does so in a way in which many in holistic education would see themselves described.

...prospective identities point to a new basis for solidarity for those entitled to be recognized. ... They change the basis for a collective recognition and relation. Prospective identities are launched by social movements, for example those of gender, race or region. They are, in their take-off stage, evangelist and confrontational. ... Prospective identities, as with fundamentalists, are engaged in conversion, and as

with fundamentalist identities engage in economic and political activity to provide for the development of their new potential.<sup>951</sup>

Those who look to the future often engage positively with change. They are the technophiles, the ones embracing most new technologies with all of the implications, which often involve new life styles and new relationship structures. Holistic educators have often been very active in the use of computers in primary and secondary education, and have an inordinate number of homepages and websites. This is an identity that feels its day has not yet come.

While the identity construction of the holistic education mode may share elements with the other modes by drawing on the past, present and future, there is one temporal notion that Bernstein does not mention but which is important to holistic education and which was alluded to before in the discussion on the use of narrative. By drawing on the mythical qualities of many narratives, and mythologizing historical accounts, holistic education advocates draw on what can be called 'mythological time'. This kind of time has been discussed by writers like Mircea Eliade who identify this non-chronological temporal sense as "sacred time."<sup>952</sup> Sacred time is evoked during religious ceremonies when a sacred event is re-enacted, and people are thought of as transcending time and participating in the original event. The sacred event, like the Last Supper for Christians, is not located in irreversible chronological time; it is in reversible time, time that can be made present again so that the sacredness of that event is present.

As a result of 1) the eclecticism advocated by much of holistic education, 2) a notion that timelessness exists (partly supported by some popular understandings of modern physics, partly by religious traditions, and partly by the sense that some things like 'truths' are perennial), and 3) so many traditional, cultural, and religious elements being recontextualized and mixed; there is a sense that sacred or mythological time is available in a variety of ways. Entering this mythological or sacred time through some deliberate act (like ceremony, ritual or meditation) or through something beyond one's will (e.g., epiphany) is an important part of a person's discovery of self. By locating the self outside the present time, one becomes contemporary with that which is timeless and that which has ultimate meaning. While such self-location has existed in many religions, Jung legitimized secular and trans-cultural versions.

Such a dispersal of the time in which the sacred is located conforms to Bernstein's analysis of the present sense of the location of the sacred.

What appears to be happening at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is a weakening of the location of the sacred. In the beginning of this century the sacred was centrally located and informed the collective base of society through the inter-relation of state, religion and education. Today this collective base has been considerably weakened as a resource for a centralized sacred. The sacred now reveals itself in dispersed sites, movements and discourses. It is less the fragmentation of the sacred but more its dispersal, localization and specialization.<sup>953</sup>

## CONCLUSION TO A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF HOLISTIC EDUCATION

Distinguishing what holistic education *does*, is particularly well served by Bernstein's competence based pedagogic model. It demonstrates that holistic education tries to accomplish different ends to those of performance based pedagogy, and as such treats the various aspects of pedagogy (i.e., the pedagogic discourse, space, time, pedagogic text, evaluation, control, autonomy, and costs) very differently from those in performance based pedagogy. These aspects, in general, show competence based pedagogy to be more of a 'bottom up' approach than the 'top down' approach of performance based pedagogy, and less of a predetermined-outcomes form of pedagogy. These same aspects also serve to show that holistic education is unique as a form of competence based pedagogy.

Holistic education also shows itself to be unique in that it doesn't fit within Bernstein's three modes of competence based pedagogy. Holistic education is a fourth mode, partly because its "similar to" relation is located in approaching Ultimacy. In this it is supra-culturally (non-spatially and non-temporally) located. Many advocates of holistic education would even claim that because of this "similar to" relation, which sees Ultimacy as having religious qualities (as discussed previously), the "similar to" relation extends beyond the human. The opposition which Bernstein claims is part of all "similar to" relations is

against the non-ultimate or non-actualized, which many holistic education advocates would feel is part of the age-old struggle of man with himself.

As a consequence, the “similar to” relation does more for the fourth mode to determine its identity construction than is found in the other modes. The universality of such a construction is felt, by its advocates to best prepare people from any world for any world they might find themselves in during this period of pluralism and rapid change.

## *Summary*

*T*he task of this book has been to answer the question, ‘What is holistic education?’ As much of the foregoing has necessarily been detailed, a brief summary would be useful. Such a summary also serves as part of a concluding answer to this complex question. It has been argued that holistic education stems from notions of Ultimacy, perceives experiential knowledge and sagacious competence as what needs to be learned, and perceives certain personal attributes of the students and teachers as most facilitative of the needed learning.

As indicated in the introduction, holistic education has no core text spelling out what it is and what it isn’t, so this task involves making sense of disparate elements in the different approaches to holistic education. This book has sought a coherence that most holistic educators could say approximates at least a large part of their concerns, and which at the same time distinguishes holistic education from other approaches to education.

### CRITIQUE OF METHOD ADOPTED

There is an inherent limitation in this kind of work. One of the two criteria of success for this task, as stated in the introduction, would be (like that of psychological or literary interpretation) that its adher-

ents acknowledge the interpretations as being a fair representation of their experience or views. This is reinforced by Lincoln who feels that the subjects of research on marginalized groups must feel that the work accurately reflects them if it is to be authentic. This presumes that the group members or adherents are identifiable, which is greatly facilitated if they are from a gender, race, ethnicity, sexual preference group, etc. But when the identifier is a philosophical perspective or worldview, it is the perspective or world-view that must first be delineated in order to identify a group. Without a clear meaning as to what that group is, simply claiming to be a member of it is insufficient. Recently a U.S. Marine Sergeant claimed in a television interview to be making the basic training for Marines more holistic, by which he meant he would instruct his charges so as to avoid trouble with the locals when they are overseas. Can he be considered a holistic educator simply because that is how he describes his activity?

To ascertain whether the views expressed in this book do represent those of the adherents of holistic education, I have consulted some of those who work in the field. However, I have only consulted those in the field with whom I have a friendship (to ask someone to read this work as it has developed required a friendship that can bear some taxing), and such a friendship indicates some affinity. Therefore, this has not been a random sampling of people in the field, but again, the field itself has not previously been delineated so no random sampling was possible.

A combination of disciplines has necessarily been drawn upon for this book so that it resembles *Allgemeine Pädagogik* (as practiced in Germany and Holland), which holds that the activity of education is too complex and multifaceted for any large view of it to be approached from one discipline alone. This certainly seems to be the case in trying to understand the nature of holistic education. This task has been approached as a philosophical one in the sense that Isaiah Berlin engaged in philosophy. It has also partially been an examination of the history of ideas, but not a straight history as it is not the progression of evolving ideas that has been of interest, so much as a delineation of the notions as they first appeared historically which have been woven into the presently held notions. Holistic education does not exist as a set of studied historical texts, but as a tapestry of transformed and conflated notions each of which has a historic origin. It has also been necessary to draw upon the Sociology of Education as elucidated by Basil Bernstein. Such a mixture of disciplines may seem simply undisciplined at first glance, but holistic education does not have a single starting



point or rationale. Instead it has gradually emerged from a variety of disciplines and perspectives. In sum, the intellectual precedents of holistic education reveals such a mixture of disciplines involving philosophy, pedagogy, psychology, and (with Jung at least) something of a history of theological ideas.

## NOTIONS OF ULTIMACY

Rousseau is generally accepted as one of the earliest proponents of holistic education notions, though many holistic educators would claim that going back to the origins of human religiosity is the real starting point. This is because holistic education is rooted in notions of Ultimacy. It claims to be interested in the fullest possible development of “persons,” and feels that this puts it in opposition to education for functions, roles, or enculturation. For holistic education, the nature of “persons” has its essence inextricably linked with Ultimacy and, as such, is fundamentally a religious notion without necessarily being part of any religion. Holistic educators often question the view of human nature implied by many other approaches to education—views of human nature are necessarily embedded in all approaches of education. Holistic education has felt that notions of what it means to be human must be explicit, taken to their logical ends, and educational systems should be clearly designed in keeping with such notions.

The notions of Ultimacy for the Authors led them and lead holistic educators to their views of human nature and meaningful living. Holistic educators claim their view of original goodness stands in opposition to that of original sin, and that different views concerning the need (or lack of need) to control and shape children necessarily follow. Hence, holistic educators feel they have a different view of development which holds that people will naturally go towards the good, and that progress consists largely of unfolding, uncovering, or discovering what is natural or inherent in the child. As there is usually thought to be an inherent link between each individual and Ultimacy (as at least a latency), such unfolding, uncovering, or discovering is seen as related to something that could be called religiousness or wisdom. This is not self-knowledge as narcissistic obsession, but as an approach to Ultimacy.

The link between Ultimacy and both human nature and a human’s meaningful living means that approaching Ultimacy is linked with a person’s well-being. In the Authors and in many holistic education texts,

the outer world derives its meaning from its relation to the inner world. Approaching Ultimacy is even seen as pragmatic due to the understanding that the greater encompasses the lesser; i.e., without understanding the greater, and having one's actions informed by the greater, actions on the lesser will be inefficient or even counter-productive. Further supporting such a worldview are ideas like Gaia and Systems Theory which are popular amongst holistic educators and almost have quasi-religious status. Consequently, a holistic education criterion for what needs to be learned is the relation of such learning to Ultimacy. A question for the Authors and for many holistic education advocates is: If Ultimacy refers to something actual (rather than just an idea or aspiration), and has such consequences for well-being and pragmatic success, what value could education have that is not directed toward and by Ultimacy? For many holistic educators, education for a career or for socialization seems inadequate.

One of the consequences of having Ultimacy as the goal of education is that there is no logical intermediate stopping point. This invites life-long learning and affects the identity of teachers. The teacher is not someone who has accomplished the goal of education and is therefore an expert (unless they have achieved Ultimacy which, by most accounts, would be a risible claim to make), but is instead a fellow learner with the student, albeit at a different stage of the journey. This has led some holistic educators (like Pestalozzi) to encourage slightly more advanced students to help those less advanced, and forms the basis of the therapeutic relationship for humanistic psychology and others. The students' (or patients') experiences of the teachers' (or therapists') own learning are seen as fundamental to the students' learning to learn. Consequently, the onus is on teachers to continue their learning as that is fundamental to the students' learning. It is teaching as an exercise in learning rather than as an exercising of what has been learned.

Similarly, part of what is seen as meaningful living is helping others to find meaning. This relates to both the topics of social development and teaching as a vocation rather than as a career. In the Authors there is often a sense of the missionary, and in the writings of many of the disciples of Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Jung, there is a evangelical tone that far exceeds even that of the Authors themselves. Unfortunately, claims of heresy, schism, and "the infidel" have often accompanied this zeal.

Ultimacy is seen as fundamental to the "similar to" relation of the identity construction (in Bernstein's terms) for holistic education. Such

a “similar to” relation is supra-cultural, supra-temporal, and (for some) supra-human. This has allowed some (including Campbell and Huxley<sup>954</sup>) to postulate new grand narratives which many feel are necessary in our pluralist and rapidly changing world.

## WHAT NEEDS TO BE LEARNED

In examining what holistic education feels needs to be learned, experience has special significance. It indicates both a kind of knowledge and a form of learning. Rather than the classic division of forms of knowledge according to content, this division is based on the manner of acquisition. Experiential knowledge derives its importance from notions of Ultimacy. Knowledge from experience is seen as better partly because such learning involves more than just the head of the learner, so that more of the whole person is involved in knowing. It is also thought that more of the object of knowledge can be known when it is known experientially (e.g., sensations can not be known except through experience). Consequently, educators like Howard Gardner,<sup>955</sup> whose theory of multiple intelligences results in proposing that all learning be more experiential, are applauded by holistic educators.

Experiential knowledge has another important relation to Ultimacy for holistic educators. Clearly, not all experience generates learning, and not all experiential learning is applauded by holistic education (e.g., learning how to steal). The experiences promoted are those experiences which sparks insight or perception. Developing the capacity to have insights is thought of as developing the capacity to see truths and is therefore related to Ultimacy. A truth seen is thought to be of an entirely different order than a truth believed, so that learning to know things through experience is thought of as learning to know in a way that is part of approaching Ultimacy.

Experiential knowledge is also related to Ultimacy through the nature of heuristic learning. What is known from experience depends partly on the questions that the learner asks. As such, learning how to ask and shape questions is seen as very important, often more important than finding answers. The questions a person asks of the universe are seen as determining the relationship the person has with the universe, and related to the activity of finding meaning. Hence, anything that enhances the capacity to ask questions is seen as positive. Performance based pedagogy, which is seen as preoccupied with answers, is not felt to do this.

The only content of knowledge that holistic education would generally consider essential is knowledge of the self. However, self-knowledge cannot solely be approached as content or the object of knowing, as it is also the subject, i.e., the self is the knower who has self-knowledge. In this the implication (found in all the Authors, systems of psychoanalysis and meditation, and many religions) is that the self is altered by what it sees of itself. For those who hold that Ultimacy partially exists in a core-self, this transformative process mirrors the myths of people being transformed by seeing the sacred. Regardless of the object, the self is at least the subject of all experiential knowledge, and is what develops or changes with each insight. In this there can be a confusion in the use of "self" that is often apparent in holistic education writing, but to which the modern Authors (particularly Jung) gave clarity. For Jung, there is the "self" that is "the inner guiding principle tending towards wholeness," "an integrating factor which is not of the individual's own making but which tends toward achieving unity," and that is "equivalent to the God within."<sup>96</sup> There is also, for Jung, two other things which are commonly called "self": 1) a core of inherent characteristics or attributes which must be discovered or uncovered, and 2) an entity which is socially constructed and changes from insights or seeing "truth." Jung labeled these *ego* and *persona* respectively, and it is a distinction that could well serve writers in holistic education.

Some of what are thought of as core elements of the *ego* are individual while others are universal. The individual elements are what make each person naturally idiosyncratic, with all that follows from such idiosyncrasy for educational pacing and content in holistic education. The universal elements of the *ego* are part of the basis for the "similar to" relation and are usually thought of as related to that-which-makes-Ultimacy-possible. The *persona* is the acquired self, the product of conditioning (e.g., culture, environment, training, etc.) and, as such, is accidental. As the *ego* has the universal elements, it is the extent to which *persona* approximates or comes into harmony with *ego* that is seen as the extent to which a person is true to himself (his "real" self), or is seen as self-actualized, individuated, or has sagacious competence.

For the early Authors and for many holistic educators, self-knowledge begins with a young person learning about what might be thought of as their outer capacities (e.g., the capacities to move, talk, make, etc.). With development, a young person moves inward, to learn about the inner capacities (e.g., empathy, compassion, mastering emotions, etc.). This is often put in terms of *doing* and *being* with *being* seen as the

greater of the two, and (with the greater encompassing the lesser) it is felt that *doing* always expresses *being*. Such dependence of *doing* on *being* is seen in many religions (e.g., the Christian criterion of charity rests not on what is given, but the quality of being that is in the act). This issue emphasizes the importance that holistic educators feel should be placed on *being* over *doing* in education. This favors competence based pedagogy over performance based pedagogy and, for holistic education, sagacious competence would describe the nature of the *being* they favor.

For holistic education, self-knowledge is also the basis for social renewal. Contrary to much that seems to have influenced mainstream education (which holds that society is renewed through initiation of the young into the social or cultural discourse), holistic education holds that society is renewed through the psychological and spiritual development of individuals. Holistic education usually sees the need to challenge the status quo (as in Bernstein's notions of competence identity constructions always being in opposition) rather than maintaining it. Holistic educators claim that society is not renewed by maintaining the status quo, but by changing it. Holistic education holds that loosening of cultural and social certainties, cultural and social "not knowing" (like the *naïveté* promoted by Maslow) when coupled with self-knowable individuals generates genuine commonweal.

## WHAT FACILITATES THE NEEDED LEARNING

What holistic educators feel facilitates the needed learning cannot be prescriptive as there is no sense in which it is seen as being caused to occur. What does facilitate the needed learning are principally elements that are in both the students and teachers, giving them both agency in the learning process, with the students' agency being inherent while that of the teachers is acquired. The students' agency is mostly in inherent learning processes and inherent motivation, with students learning about their agency (e.g., learning about their learning processes as part of meta-learning, and learning of their inherent motivation to avoid the seduction of secondary motivation, etc.) being part of sagacious competence. The teachers' agency is an acquired understanding of humanity in general and their students as individuals in particular.

Teachers must also understand the correct pedagogic process, which consists largely of understanding the inherent learning processes in students and protecting that. In this, the students' and teachers' tasks

are similar even if they are approached from different perspectives. Teachers must also understand the correct pedagogic relationship, and this relationship is not very different from what is promoted as social development for students (e.g., having compassion and empathy while simultaneously keeping differentiated, and having a profound sense of responsibility for others while simultaneously according them freedom, etc.). Many holistic educators quote Goethe who maintained that “we only learn from those we love.” This does not mean that we can’t acquire information (e.g., how to get from A to B) from those we don’t love, but the acquisition of information is not learning for holistic education or Goethe.

Teachers also have to be responsible for their own development, which means developing their self-knowledge, sagacious competence and approach to Ultimacy, all of which facilitate the correct pedagogic relationship and understanding of humanity at large and individuals in particular. The teachers have a non-reciprocal responsibility to provide materials and experiences that students don’t have, and to protect the students. This fits with the view, expressed above, of teaching as an exercise of learning, and notions of experiential learning. A large part of what every student experiences in schooling is the teacher. If the students experience someone who is learning and developing sagacious competence, then the students have experiences (vicariously, empathetically, or through some non-conscious communication) of such learning. Consequently, teaching is a *doing* that is seen as very much stemming from the doer’s *being*.

Unlike the shaping or prescriptive model, being a teacher in holistic education mirrors the Buddhist notions of being a Buddha; a person does not become a teacher by virtue of teaching but by virtue of the student’s learning. A person becomes a teacher only when a student of that teacher learns. In this sense, being a teacher is a gift from the student (not the reverse). While an idea can be acquired from and with others, discovering that an idea is true (the “real” learning called by the Authors and holistic educators by various names, e.g., “significant learning,” insight, etc.) is always done alone, and no one can claim credit for that insight other than the person who has it. A person making a significant contribution to the insights of another is seen as what distinguishes that person as a teacher. Often in holistic education, as in many indigenous cultures, animals, objects and events can be spoken of as “teachers.”

## HOLISTIC EDUCATION AS DISTINCT

Many writers have proposed two incompatible developmental or educational approaches, some of which help elucidate the nature of holistic education. Bernstein proposes performance based pedagogy and competence based pedagogy. Kieran Egan proposes the Platonic and Rousseauian views of development.<sup>957</sup> In this distinction Egan claims that the Platonic model views the mind as an epistemological organ which develops, to a significant degree, according to the knowledge it acquires. Consequently, development occurs by mastering various forms of knowledge which bring the mind from ignorance to understanding the truth about reality. In this, emphasis is necessarily placed on the construction of curriculum as it is that which constructs the mind. Rousseau's model of the mind is more biological; the mind has its own inherent process of development and knowledge acquired does not really affect that development. For Rousseau, the inherent process is encouraged by giving it an appropriate environment. Several writers have contrasted views of education that could be labeled "constructivist" (just providing bricks and mortar to a site will not construct a wall) and "horticultural" (an acorn need only be provided with light, soil and water and will develop into an oak tree on its own). Even Rousseau had a contrasting view of development for education, i.e., education for becoming a "man" or for becoming a "citizen." What all of these views have in common is that they claim their contrasting models are incompatible, with no approach to education able to do both.

The incompatibility of non-holistic education with holistic education has led advocates of each to view the other with suspicion and often as misguided. It may be more accurate to conclude that they have different views of development, different views of human nature, and are trying to accomplish different ends. The views of development, human nature, and educational ends in holistic education do not have any significant educational sponsors. As has been seen, holistic education does have its champions; Rousseau, Jung, Maslow and Rogers, are generally seen as worthy of respect. Yet, these champions' views of development, human nature and educational ends have had very little, if any, impact on the organizations which shape mainstream education. Holistic education claims that its increasing popularity is a grass-roots movement that, like the counter culture of the 1960s, has not had a institutional organization to promote it. Holistic education advo-

cates claim that the general public's views of development, human nature, and the needed goals for education are increasingly those held by holistic education, and that the dissonance many students and parents feel towards their schools stems from their views on these things differing from those embedded in mainstream schools. This is not to the discredit of the teachers or administrators in those schools; it is a systemic problem and not easily solved. This is why so many teachers and parents have simply turned their backs on mainstream education to start or join holistic schools, or to homeschool with holistic approaches.

Insofar as any conclusion can be reached from this book, it is that holistic education is a true alternative to mainstream education with a carefully thought out philosophical foundation. With innumerable schools and programs claiming to be holistic now existing, it is certainly time that holistic education became clearly recognized for what it is attempting and why it is attempting it. With such clarity the various kinds of holistic schools might better reflect and refine what they are doing, and non-holistic schools might benefit from the years of effort and insights of holistic education. Perhaps this book is a step toward that progress.



# Notes

- <sup>1</sup> (Mintz 1994).
- <sup>2</sup> (Miller 1992).
- <sup>3</sup> (Dudty and Dudty 1994; Miller 1993; Miller, Bruce Cassie, and Drake 1990; Pathfinder 1997).
- <sup>4</sup> (Wittgenstein 1953) p. 32 § 66–67.
- <sup>5</sup> e.g., (Miller 1992).
- <sup>6</sup> From (Heafford 1967) p. 43.
- <sup>7</sup> (Darling 1994) p. 17.
- <sup>8</sup> e.g., (Berlin 1999).
- <sup>9</sup> (Lincoln 1993) p. 29.
- <sup>10</sup> (Lincoln 1993) p. 29.
- <sup>11</sup> (Lincoln 1993) p. 44.
- <sup>12</sup> (Winch 1990) p. 88.
- <sup>13</sup> (Purpel 1989).
- <sup>14</sup> (Tillich 1957).
- <sup>15</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 24. See Appendix note 1.
- <sup>16</sup> e.g., (Maslow 1993) p. 45 & (Smith 1990) p. 22. See Appendix note 2.
- <sup>17</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 5. See Appendix note 3.
- <sup>18</sup> (von Franz 1975) p. 115.
- <sup>19</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 41–42.
- <sup>20</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 45.
- <sup>21</sup> (Hayward 1904) pp. 24–25. See Appendix note 4.
- <sup>22</sup> (Krishnamurti 1970) p. 113.
- <sup>23</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>24</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 83.
- <sup>25</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 67.
- <sup>26</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>27</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>28</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>29</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>30</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 329.
- <sup>31</sup> (Taylor 1989).
- <sup>32</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 41.
- <sup>33</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 205. See Appendix note 5.
- <sup>34</sup> e.g., (Rousseau 1979) p. 445. See Appendix note 6.
- <sup>35</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 194.
- <sup>36</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 41–42. See Appendix note 7.
- <sup>37</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 201.
- <sup>38</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92. See Appendix note 8.
- <sup>39</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 37. Jung quotes this statement as being typical of Rousseau as well as of the whole romantic movement. (Jung 1971c) p. 81 § 121.
- <sup>40</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 37. See Appendix note 9.
- <sup>41</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 383.
- <sup>42</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 83.
- <sup>43</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 117–118. See Appendix note 10.
- <sup>44</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 79. See Appendix note 11.
- <sup>45</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 82–83. See Appendix note 301.
- <sup>46</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 83.
- <sup>47</sup> (d'Entrevèves 1963).
- <sup>48</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 313–314. See Appendix note 12.
- <sup>49</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 260. See Appendix note 13.
- <sup>50</sup> (Grimsley 1968) p. 69. See Appendix note 14.
- <sup>51</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 381. See Appendix note 15.
- <sup>52</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 38. See Appendix note 16.
- <sup>53</sup> (Rousseau 1790).
- <sup>54</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 126. See Appendix note 17.

- <sup>55</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 118.
- <sup>56</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 202.
- <sup>57</sup> (Rousseau 1967) letter no.743; my translation only.
- <sup>58</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 158.
- <sup>59</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 165. See Appendix note 18.
- <sup>60</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 107. See Appendix note 19.
- <sup>61</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 158.
- <sup>62</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 203.
- <sup>63</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 168. See Appendix note 20.
- <sup>64</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 157–158.
- <sup>65</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 203. See Appendix note 21.
- <sup>66</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 166. See Appendix note 22.
- <sup>67</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 52.
- <sup>68</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 125. See Appendix note 23.
- <sup>69</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 125.
- <sup>70</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 112. See Appendix note 24.
- <sup>71</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 168. See Appendix note 25.
- <sup>72</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 157.
- <sup>73</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 157.
- <sup>74</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 99–100. See Appendix note 26.
- <sup>75</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 109–110. See Appendix note 27.
- <sup>76</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 248.
- <sup>77</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 125.
- <sup>78</sup> (Rousseau 1790) p. 295. See Appendix note 28.
- <sup>79</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>80</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 245. See Appendix note 29.
- <sup>81</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 184.
- <sup>82</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 450–451. See Appendix note 30.
- <sup>83</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 98. See Appendix note 31.
- <sup>84</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 180. See Appendix note 32.
- <sup>85</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 168. See Appendix note 33.
- <sup>86</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 178.
- <sup>87</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 323. See Appendix 34.
- <sup>88</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 321. See Appendix note 35.
- <sup>89</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 168–169. See Appendix note 36.
- <sup>90</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 78.
- <sup>91</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 445. See Appendix note 37.
- <sup>92</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 446. See Appendix note 38.
- <sup>93</sup> (Grimsley 1969).
- <sup>94</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 213.
- <sup>95</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 213.
- <sup>96</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 214.
- <sup>97</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 235.
- <sup>98</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>99</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 244.
- <sup>100</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 212–213. See Appendix note 39.
- <sup>101</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 212.
- <sup>102</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 215.
- <sup>103</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 214. See Appendix note 40.
- <sup>104</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 212.
- <sup>105</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 445. See Appendix note 41.
- <sup>106</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 212.
- <sup>107</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 219. See Appendix note 42.
- <sup>108</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 444. See Appendix note 43.
- <sup>109</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 444.
- <sup>110</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 222. See Appendix note 44.
- <sup>111</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 222–223. See Appendix note 45.
- <sup>112</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 226. See Appendix note 46.
- <sup>113</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 451. See Appendix note 47.
- <sup>114</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 108. See Appendix note 48.
- <sup>115</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 119.
- <sup>116</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 160.
- <sup>117</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 126.
- <sup>118</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 162.
- <sup>119</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 171. See Appendix note 49.
- <sup>120</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 161 & p. 169. See Appendix note 50.
- <sup>121</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 143–144. See Appendix note 51.
- <sup>122</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 187.
- <sup>123</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 232.
- <sup>124</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 139.
- <sup>125</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 444.

- <sup>126</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 444.
- <sup>127</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 241. See Appendix note 52.
- <sup>128</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 339.
- <sup>129</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 327.
- <sup>130</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 242.
- <sup>131</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 244.
- <sup>132</sup> e.g., (Rousseau 1979) p. 335.
- <sup>133</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 160. See Appendix note 53.
- <sup>134</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 472.
- <sup>135</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 120.
- <sup>136</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 116.
- <sup>137</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 172.
- <sup>138</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 84. See Appendix note 54.
- <sup>139</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 472–473.
- <sup>140</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 177.
- <sup>141</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 432. See Appendix note 55.
- <sup>142</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>143</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 85.
- <sup>144</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 471–472.
- <sup>145</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 473.
- <sup>146</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 425.
- <sup>147</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 176.
- <sup>148</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 207 & 176. See Appendix note 56.
- <sup>149</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 171. See Appendix note 57.
- <sup>150</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 205.
- <sup>151</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 207. See Appendix note 58.
- <sup>152</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 205.
- <sup>153</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 119.
- <sup>154</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 119. See Appendix note 59.
- <sup>155</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 418.
- <sup>156</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 39.
- <sup>157</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>158</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 187.
- <sup>159</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 249.
- <sup>160</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 255.
- <sup>161</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 205. See Appendix note 60.
- <sup>162</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 39.
- <sup>163</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 41. See Appendix note 61.
- <sup>164</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 195. See Appendix note 62.
- <sup>165</sup> (Boyd 1963) p. 236.
- <sup>166</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 112.
- <sup>167</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 473.
- <sup>168</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 97. See Appendix note 63.
- <sup>169</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 244–245. See Appendix note 64.
- <sup>170</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 89–90. See Appendix note 65.
- <sup>171</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 148.
- <sup>172</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 148.
- <sup>173</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 316. See Appendix note 66.
- <sup>174</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 416.
- <sup>175</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 139–143.
- <sup>176</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 442.
- <sup>177</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 132.
- <sup>178</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 178.
- <sup>179</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 182.
- <sup>180</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 328. See Appendix note 67.
- <sup>181</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 350.
- <sup>182</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 33–34.
- <sup>183</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 126.
- <sup>184</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 33–34. See Appendix note 68.
- <sup>185</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 158.
- <sup>186</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 79.
- <sup>187</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 90.
- <sup>188</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 182.
- <sup>189</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 257. See Appendix note 69.
- <sup>190</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 259.
- <sup>191</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 257.
- <sup>192</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 314.
- <sup>193</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 212.
- <sup>194</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 167.
- <sup>195</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>196</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 116.
- <sup>197</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 178.
- <sup>198</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 178. See Appendix note 70.
- <sup>199</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.
- <sup>200</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 179.
- <sup>201</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 116. See Appendix note 71.
- <sup>202</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 94. See Appendix note 72.
- <sup>203</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 192.
- <sup>204</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 179.
- <sup>205</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 35. See Appendix note 73.
- <sup>206</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 219. See Appendix note 74.
- <sup>207</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 100.
- <sup>208</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 115.

- <sup>209</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 317.  
<sup>210</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 107.  
<sup>211</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 41.  
<sup>212</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 119. See Appendix note 75.  
<sup>213</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 93–94. See Appendix note 76.  
<sup>214</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 117. See Appendix note 77.  
<sup>215</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 93. See Appendix note 78.  
<sup>216</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 107.  
<sup>217</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 104. See Appendix note 79.  
<sup>218</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 104.  
<sup>219</sup> (Rousseau 1790) pp. 295–296; my translation only.  
<sup>220</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 206.  
<sup>221</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 187.  
<sup>222</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 101. See Appendix note 80.  
<sup>223</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 85.  
<sup>224</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 86–87. See Appendix note 81.  
<sup>225</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 120.  
<sup>226</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 92.  
<sup>227</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 185. See Appendix note 82.  
<sup>228</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 167.  
<sup>229</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 63.  
<sup>230</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 323.  
<sup>231</sup> e.g., (Rousseau 1979) p. 145. See Appendix note 83.  
<sup>232</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 177.  
<sup>233</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 111–112. See Appendix note 84.  
<sup>234</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 97.  
<sup>235</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 237. See Appendix note 85.  
<sup>236</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 240.  
<sup>237</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 250. See Appendix note 86.  
<sup>238</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 231. See Appendix note 87.  
<sup>239</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 223.  
<sup>240</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 223. See Appendix note 308.  
<sup>241</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 224.  
<sup>242</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 224.  
<sup>243</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 224.  
<sup>244</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 205.  
<sup>245</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 239.  
<sup>246</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 187.  
<sup>247</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 187.  
<sup>248</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 241.  
<sup>249</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 217.  
<sup>250</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 327. See Appendix note 88.  
<sup>251</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 327.  
<sup>252</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 327.  
<sup>253</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 327. See Appendix note 89.  
<sup>254</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 149.  
<sup>255</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 162.  
<sup>256</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 162.  
<sup>257</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 198.  
<sup>258</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 162. See Appendix note 90.  
<sup>259</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 199.  
<sup>260</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 198.  
<sup>261</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 189. See Appendix note 91.  
<sup>262</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 94. See Appendix note 92.  
<sup>263</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 170. See Appendix note 93.  
<sup>264</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 183–184. See Appendix note 94.  
<sup>265</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 319. See Appendix note 95.  
<sup>266</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 170.  
<sup>267</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 319. See Appendix note 96.  
<sup>268</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 217. See Appendix note 97.  
<sup>269</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 96.  
<sup>270</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 94.  
<sup>271</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 325. See Appendix note 98.  
<sup>272</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 172. See Appendix note 99.  
<sup>273</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 344. See Appendix note 100.  
<sup>274</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 248.  
<sup>275</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 375.  
<sup>276</sup> e.g., (Rousseau 1979) p. 202. See Appendix note 101.  
<sup>277</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 184. See Appendix note 102.  
<sup>278</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 172.  
<sup>279</sup> (Rousseau 1979) footnote on p. 89. See Appendix note 103.  
<sup>280</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 38.  
<sup>281</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 38.  
<sup>282</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 91. See Appendix note 104.

- <sup>283</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 91.
- <sup>284</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 91.
- <sup>285</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 91. See Appendix note 105.
- <sup>286</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 121.
- <sup>287</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 120. See Appendix note 106.
- <sup>288</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 316.
- <sup>289</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 316.
- <sup>290</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 216. See Appendix note 107.
- <sup>291</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 334. See Appendix note 108.
- <sup>292</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 246. See Appendix note 109.
- <sup>293</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 246–247. See Appendix note 110.
- <sup>294</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 247.
- <sup>295</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 201.
- <sup>296</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 316.
- <sup>297</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 325.
- <sup>298</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 97.
- <sup>299</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 95.
- <sup>300</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 95. See Appendix note 111.
- <sup>301</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859b) p. 176. See Appendix note 112.
- <sup>302</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859b) p. 176. See Appendix note 112.
- <sup>303</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 156.
- <sup>304</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 160. See Appendix note 113.
- <sup>305</sup> (Pestalozzi 1912b) p. 178.
- <sup>306</sup> (Pestalozzi 1912c) p. 271. See Appendix note 114.
- <sup>307</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 156.
- <sup>308</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931e) p. 99.
- <sup>309</sup> (Hayward 1904) p. 37.
- <sup>310</sup> This may seem like a philosophical contradiction, but it is increasingly examined in some literature concerned with states of consciousness and mind, e.g., (Claxton 1998). Non-conceptual insight or understanding (*Prajna*) has been part of the Buddhist tradition for more than two thousand years.
- <sup>311</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 189. See Appendix note 115.
- <sup>312</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 202–203. See Appendix note 116.
- <sup>313</sup> e.g., (Heafford 1967) p. 60. See Appendix note 117.
- <sup>314</sup> e.g., (Biber 1859) p. 176. See Appendix note 118.
- <sup>315</sup> From (Anderson 1931) p. 127.
- <sup>316</sup> From (Heafford 1967) pp. 47–48. See Appendix note 119.
- <sup>317</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827a) p. 7. See Appendix note 120.
- <sup>318</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 281.
- <sup>319</sup> (Pestalozzi 1912c) pp. 268–269. See Appendix note 121.
- <sup>320</sup> (Hayward 1904) p. 39.
- <sup>321</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 200.
- <sup>322</sup> (Anderson 1931) p. 7.
- <sup>323</sup> (Diesterweg) p. 25.
- <sup>324</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 290.
- <sup>325</sup> From (Heafford 1967) p. 40.
- <sup>326</sup> From (Anderson 1931) p. 200. See Appendix note 122.
- <sup>327</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827c) p. 87.
- <sup>328</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 173. See Appendix note 123.
- <sup>329</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 293. See Appendix note 124.
- <sup>330</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 290. See Appendix note 125.
- <sup>331</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827h) p. 147.
- <sup>332</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859b) p. 177.
- <sup>333</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 158.
- <sup>334</sup> From (Raumer 1859) p. 60.
- <sup>335</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827d) p. 95.
- <sup>336</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 157.
- <sup>337</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827f) p. 123. See Appendix note 126.
- <sup>338</sup> (Russell 1926) p. 17. See Appendix note 127.
- <sup>339</sup> From (Raumer 1859) p. 60. Raumer worked with Pestalozzi, and he translated this excerpt from Pestalozzi's first book, *The Evening Hour of a Hermit* published 1781.
- <sup>340</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827f) pp. 195–197. See Appendix note 128.
- <sup>341</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 58. See Appendix note 129.
- <sup>342</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827f) p. 195. See Appendix note 130.
- <sup>343</sup> (Russell 1926) p. 100. See Appendix note 131.
- <sup>344</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931d) p. 133.
- <sup>345</sup> (Pestalozzi, 1907) pp. 18–19. See Appendix note 132.
- <sup>346</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 315.
- <sup>347</sup> (Green 1912) p. 284. See Appendix note

133.  
<sup>348</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 156. See Appendix note 134.  
<sup>349</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 156–157. See Appendix note 135.  
<sup>350</sup> From (Heafford 1967) p. 81.  
<sup>351</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 157.  
<sup>352</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827c) p. 85. See Appendix note 136.  
<sup>353</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827f) p. 195. See Appendix note 130.  
<sup>354</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 157.  
<sup>355</sup> From (Anderson 1931) p. 211. See Appendix note 137.  
<sup>356</sup> (Pestalozzi 1912a) p. 157.  
<sup>357</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931b) pp. 209–210.  
<sup>358</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931c) pp. 212–213.  
<sup>359</sup> From (Russell 1926) p. 20.  
<sup>360</sup> (Goleman 1995) pp. 80–83.  
<sup>361</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827b) pp. 66–67.  
<sup>362</sup> (Diesterweg 1859) p. 27.  
<sup>363</sup> From (Russell 1926) p. 2.  
<sup>364</sup> From (Jung 1954k) footnote on p. 106.  
<sup>365</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 26.  
<sup>366</sup> e.g. (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 32.  
<sup>367</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 157. See Appendix note 138.  
<sup>368</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 157.  
<sup>369</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 50–51.  
<sup>370</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 312. See Appendix note 139.  
<sup>371</sup> (Furst and Skrine 1971).  
<sup>372</sup> (Furst and Skrine 1971) p. 3.  
<sup>373</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 267.  
<sup>374</sup> e.g. (Pestalozzi 1827f).  
<sup>375</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 199.  
<sup>376</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 202–203. See Appendix note 140.  
<sup>377</sup> (A Foreigner 1823) p. 38.  
<sup>378</sup> (A Foreigner 1823) pp. 6–7.  
<sup>379</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827g) p. 130. See Appendix note 141.  
<sup>380</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827g).  
<sup>381</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 253.  
<sup>382</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931a) p. 39.  
<sup>383</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931a) pp. 39–40. See Appendix note 142.  
<sup>384</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 159–160. See Appendix note 143.  
<sup>385</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931a) p. 37. See Appendix note 144.  
<sup>386</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 6–7.  
<sup>387</sup> From (Heafford 1967) p. 47.  
<sup>388</sup> (Paterson 1914).  
<sup>389</sup> (Barnard 1859).  
<sup>390</sup> (Anderson 1931) p. 6.  
<sup>391</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 254. See Appendix note 145.  
<sup>392</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 155 & (Pestalozzi 1818) pp. 3–4. See Appendix note 146.  
<sup>393</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931d) pp. 131–132. See Appendix note 147.  
<sup>394</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 156.  
<sup>395</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 202. See Appendix note 140.  
<sup>396</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 319.  
<sup>397</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 289.  
<sup>398</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931d) pp. 127–128. See Appendix note 148.  
<sup>399</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 289.  
<sup>400</sup> (Ullich 1935; Woodham-Smith 1952a).  
<sup>401</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 17.  
<sup>402</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 319.  
<sup>403</sup> From (Green 1912) p. 320.  
<sup>404</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827b) p. 65.  
<sup>405</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827b) p. 65.  
<sup>406</sup> (Pestalozzi 1859a) p. 157.  
<sup>407</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 191. See Appendix note 149.  
<sup>408</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827g).  
<sup>409</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 248.  
<sup>410</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827e) p. 125.  
<sup>411</sup> (Woodham-Smith 1952b) p. 23.  
<sup>412</sup> (Pestalozzi 1931d) p. 127.  
<sup>413</sup> (Pestalozzi 1827b) p. 66.  
<sup>414</sup> (Pestalozzi 1907) p. 196. See Appendix note 150.  
<sup>415</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 332. See Appendix note 151.  
<sup>416</sup> From (Lawrence 1952) p. 188.  
<sup>417</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 19.  
<sup>418</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 332. See Appendix note 151.  
<sup>419</sup> (Lawrence 1952) p. 190. See Appendix note 152.  
<sup>420</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 120.  
<sup>421</sup> (Priestman 1952) p. 157. See Appendix note 153.  
<sup>422</sup> (Lawrence 1952) p. 191.  
<sup>423</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 8.  
<sup>424</sup> (Froebel 1890) pp. 8–9. See Appendix note 154.  
<sup>425</sup> From (Lawrence 1952) p. 188.  
<sup>426</sup> From (Murray 1914) p. 14.  
<sup>427</sup> From (Murray 1914) p. 14.

- <sup>428</sup> From (Murray 1914) pp. 15–16. See Appendix note 155.
- <sup>429</sup> (Froebel ) p. 19.
- <sup>430</sup> (Lawrence 1952) p. 188. See Appendix note 156.
- <sup>431</sup> (Hayward 1904) p. 29. See Appendix note 157.
- <sup>432</sup> (Hamilton 1952) p. 166.
- <sup>433</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 237. See Appendix note 158.
- <sup>434</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 231.
- <sup>435</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 279.
- <sup>436</sup> (Rousseau 1979) pp. 42–44.
- <sup>437</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 21.
- <sup>438</sup> (Froebel 1890) pp. 54–55. See Appendix note 159.
- <sup>439</sup> (Hamilton 1952) p. 174.
- <sup>440</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 8.
- <sup>441</sup> From (Murray 1914) pp. 6–7.
- <sup>442</sup> From (Murray 1914) p. 3.
- <sup>443</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 28. See Appendix note 160.
- <sup>444</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 7.
- <sup>445</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 137. See Appendix note 305.
- <sup>446</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 9.
- <sup>447</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 21. See Appendix note 161.
- <sup>448</sup> (Froebel 1890) p. 328. See Appendix note 162.
- <sup>449</sup> (Froebel 1890) pp. 54–55.
- <sup>450</sup> (Hamilton 1952) p. 175.
- <sup>451</sup> (Browning 1987) p. 8. See Appendix note 163.
- <sup>452</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 314 § 557.
- <sup>453</sup> (Jung 1959b) p. 288 § 522–523. See Appendix note 302.
- <sup>454</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 171 § 289. See Appendix note 164.
- <sup>455</sup> (Jung 1958b) pp. 554–555 § 905. See Appendix note 165.
- <sup>456</sup> (Jung 1958b) p. 545 § 890. See Appendix note 166.
- <sup>457</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 172 § 291. See Appendix note 167.
- <sup>458</sup> (Jung 1953a) p. 70.
- <sup>459</sup> (Sands 1961) & (Jung 1957) p. 4. See Appendix note 168.
- <sup>460</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 344 § 531. See Appendix note 169.
- <sup>461</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 334 § 509 & (Jung 1958e) p. 331 § 497. See Appendix note 170.
- <sup>462</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 183 § 314. See Appendix note 171.
- <sup>463</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 330–331 § 496–497. See Appendix note 172.
- <sup>464</sup> (Jung 1954h) p. 160 § 352. See Appendix note 173.
- <sup>465</sup> (Smith 1990) p. 89. See Appendix note 174.
- <sup>466</sup> (Jung 1977g) p. 655 § 1485.
- <sup>467</sup> (Jung 1971b) p. 212 § 355.
- <sup>468</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 167 § 284.
- <sup>469</sup> (Jung 1958b) p. 556 § 906. See Appendix note 175.
- <sup>470</sup> (Jung 1954c) pp. 175–177 § 299–302.
- <sup>471</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 62 § 125.
- <sup>472</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 164–165 § 278. See Appendix note 176.
- <sup>473</sup> (Jung 1964b) pp. 74–75 § 149–150.
- <sup>474</sup> e.g. (Ergardt 1983).
- <sup>475</sup> (Jung 1959d) pp. 322–323 § 567.
- <sup>476</sup> (Browning 1987) p. 5. See Appendix note 177.
- <sup>477</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 186 § 323.
- <sup>478</sup> (Heisig 1979) p. 78n. See Appendix note 178.
- <sup>479</sup> (Jung 1964b) p. 83 § 168. See Appendix note 179.
- <sup>480</sup> e.g., (White 1952), (White 1960) & (Ergardt 1983).
- <sup>481</sup> (Coward 1985).
- <sup>482</sup> Jung sums up all of his past comments on this in (Jung 1959a).
- <sup>483</sup> (Jung 1958d) pp. 8–9 § 9–10. See Appendix note 180.
- <sup>484</sup> The Dominican Friar, Victor White claimed, “While it is difficult to divest Freud of the professor’s gown, it is quite impossible to divest Jung of his surplice.” (White 1952) p. 71.
- <sup>485</sup> (Noll 1996) pp. 41–42.
- <sup>486</sup> (Ellenberger 1970).
- <sup>487</sup> from (Heisig 1979) p. 94.
- <sup>488</sup> (Jung 1958a) p. 363 § 558. See Appendix note 181.
- <sup>489</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 538 § 768. He worked on this manuscript from 1941 to 1954.
- <sup>490</sup> e.g., (Bohm 1980).
- <sup>491</sup> (Noll 1996).
- <sup>492</sup> e.g., (von Franz 1975).
- <sup>493</sup> (Jung 1959b) p. 288 § 522–523.
- <sup>494</sup> (Jung 1960f).
- <sup>495</sup> (Jung 1959b) p. 289 § 524.

- <sup>496</sup> (Jung 1977g) p. 655 § 1485.
- <sup>497</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 164–165 § 278. See Appendix note 176.
- <sup>498</sup> (Jung 1953b) p. 236 § 399.
- <sup>499</sup> (Jung 1964a) p. 463 §873.
- <sup>500</sup> (Jung 1964a) p. 463 §874. See Appendix note 182.
- <sup>501</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 546 § 778.
- <sup>502</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 547 § 779. See Appendix note 183.
- <sup>503</sup> (Jung 1958c) p. 490 § 782 & (Jung 1959b) pp. 287–288 §520. See Appendix note 184.
- <sup>504</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 546 § 778.
- <sup>505</sup> (von Franz 1975) pp. 13–14. See Appendix note 185.
- <sup>506</sup> (von Franz 1975) pp. 116–117. See Appendix note 186.
- <sup>507</sup> Jung's claims of acting only as a scientist have been criticised, e.g.; (Browning 1987) p. 164. See Appendix note 187.
- <sup>508</sup> (Heisig 1979) pp. 89–90.
- <sup>509</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 330 § 496. See Appendix note 188.
- <sup>510</sup> For a summary Jung's frequent comments on this see (Jung 1958c) pp. 477–480 § 763–768.
- <sup>511</sup> e.g., (Jung 1958a) pp. 359–361 § 553–555. See Appendix note 189.
- <sup>512</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 534 § 760.
- <sup>513</sup> (Jung 1963) pp. 533–540 § 760–771.
- <sup>514</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 552–553 § 788.
- <sup>515</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 553 § 789.
- <sup>516</sup> (Noll 1996) p. 6.
- <sup>517</sup> e.g., (Noll 1996) & (Browning 1987).
- <sup>518</sup> (Jung 1954c) pp. 175–179 §299–305.
- <sup>519</sup> (Jung 1958b) p. 556 § 906.
- <sup>520</sup> (Jung 1964b) pp. 83–84 § 170.
- <sup>521</sup> (Jung 1964b) pp. 83–84 § 171. See Appendix note 190.
- <sup>522</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 347 § 538.
- <sup>523</sup> (Jung 1954a; Jung 1954b; Jung 1954e; Jung 1954l).
- <sup>524</sup> (Jung 1954a) p. 131 § 228.
- <sup>525</sup> (Jung 1960d) p. 390 § 753.
- <sup>526</sup> (Jung 1967) p. 92 § 122.
- <sup>527</sup> (von Franz 1975) p. 236.
- <sup>528</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 538 § 768. See Appendix note 191.
- <sup>529</sup> (von Franz 1975) p. 247.
- <sup>530</sup> (Jung 1960e) p. 493 § 931.
- <sup>531</sup> (Jung 1960e) p. 481 § 912.
- <sup>532</sup> (Jung 1960e) p. 489 § 923. See Appendix note 192.
- <sup>533</sup> (Jung 1953a) pp. 65–66 § 104.
- <sup>534</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 315 § 619.
- <sup>535</sup> (Jung 1958d) pp. 104–105 § 167. See Appendix note 193.
- <sup>536</sup> (Jung 1963) p. 545 § 777.
- <sup>537</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 99–100 § 183.
- <sup>538</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 106–107 § 198. See Appendix note 194.
- <sup>539</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 106–107 § 198.
- <sup>540</sup> (Jung 1960a) pp. 380–381 § 739. See Appendix note 195.
- <sup>541</sup> (Jung 1960a) pp. 380–381 § 739.
- <sup>542</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 331–332 § 500–501. See Appendix note 196.
- <sup>543</sup> (Jung 1977e) p. 821 § 1820.
- <sup>544</sup> (Jung 1954j) p. 279 § 492.
- <sup>545</sup> (Jung 1964a) p. 456 § 858.
- <sup>546</sup> (Jung 1977i) p. 625 § 1428.
- <sup>547</sup> (Jung 1959a) p. 25 § 48.
- <sup>548</sup> (Jung 1958c) p. 476 § 760.
- <sup>549</sup> (Jung 1977h) p. 664 § 1504.
- <sup>550</sup> (Jung 1959a) pp. 31–33 § 60–61. See Appendix note 197.
- <sup>551</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 313 § 555.
- <sup>552</sup> (Jung 1958c) pp. 477–478 § 763.
- <sup>553</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 313 § 555.
- <sup>554</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 343 §529. See Appendix note 198.
- <sup>555</sup> (Jung 1958c) p. 480 § 768. See Appendix note 199.
- <sup>556</sup> (Jung 1964d) p. 249 § 491.
- <sup>557</sup> (Jung 1977d) p. 817 § 1813.
- <sup>558</sup> (Jung 1959a) p. 28 § 53.
- <sup>559</sup> (Jung 1977c) p. 611 § 1398.
- <sup>560</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 168–169 § 287.
- <sup>561</sup> (Jung 1953b) p. 227 § 380. See Appendix note 200.
- <sup>562</sup> (Jung 1971b) p. 213 § 357.
- <sup>563</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 472. See Appendix note 201.
- <sup>564</sup> (Jung 1958d) pp. 86–87 § 143.
- <sup>565</sup> From (Jung 1954k) footnote on p. 108.
- <sup>566</sup> (Jung 1977a) p. 452 § 1098.
- <sup>567</sup> (Jung 1977a) p. 451 § 1095. See Appendix note 202.
- <sup>568</sup> (Jung 1977a) p. 451–452 § 1096.
- <sup>569</sup> (Jung 1971c) pp. 87–88 § 134.
- <sup>570</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 349 § 617.
- <sup>571</sup> (Jung 1977b) p. 605 § 1386.
- <sup>572</sup> (Jung 1977b) p. 605 § 1387.
- <sup>573</sup> (Jung 1954k) p. 106 § 224.



- <sup>574</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 349 § 618. See Appendix note 203.
- <sup>575</sup> (Jung 1954k) p. 108 § 227. See Appendix note 204.
- <sup>576</sup> (Jung 1954l) p. 149 § 253.
- <sup>577</sup> (Jung 1954l) p. 150 § 254.
- <sup>578</sup> (Jung 1954l) p. 151 § 256.
- <sup>579</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 174 § 296. See Appendix note 205.
- <sup>580</sup> (Jung 1954l) p. 151 § 257.
- <sup>581</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 52 § 104. See Appendix note 206.
- <sup>582</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 54 § 107.
- <sup>583</sup> (Jung 1954a) p. 119 § 211.
- <sup>584</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 50 § 99. See Appendix note 207.
- <sup>585</sup> (Jung 1954f) p. 42 § 84. See Appendix note 208.
- <sup>586</sup> (Jung 1954a) p. 78–79 § 154. See Appendix note 209.
- <sup>587</sup> (Jung 1954g) p. 191 § 328. See Appendix notes 210 and 211.
- <sup>588</sup> (Jung 1964c) pp. 486–487 § 921.
- <sup>589</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107. See Appendix note 212.
- <sup>590</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 168–169 § 287.
- <sup>591</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 168–169 § 287.
- <sup>592</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 169 § 286. See Appendix note 213.
- <sup>593</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 169 § 286. See Appendix note 214 and 215.
- <sup>594</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 171 § 288.
- <sup>595</sup> (Jung 1959d) p. 351 § 621.
- <sup>596</sup> (Jung 1958f) p. 534 § 868. See Appendix note 216.
- <sup>597</sup> (Jung 1958f) p. 534 § 868.
- <sup>598</sup> (Jung 1954b) pp. 55–56 § 107.
- <sup>599</sup> (Jung 1954e) p. 144 § 250.
- <sup>600</sup> (Jung 1954e) p. 140 § 242. See Appendix note 217.
- <sup>601</sup> (Jung 1958c) pp. 481–482 § 770–771. See Appendix note 307.
- <sup>602</sup> (Jung 1960b) p. 60 § 112.
- <sup>603</sup> (Jung 1959c) pp. 170 171 § 289. See Appendix note 218.
- <sup>604</sup> (Jung 1971b) pp. 212–213 § 356.
- <sup>605</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 173 § 293.
- <sup>606</sup> (Jung 1964d) p. 250 § 495.
- <sup>607</sup> (Jung 1954a) p. 93 § 173. See Appendix note 219.
- <sup>608</sup> (Jung 1954c) p. 179 § 307.
- <sup>609</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107. See Appendix note 212.
- <sup>610</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107.
- <sup>611</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107.
- <sup>612</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107.
- <sup>613</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 55–56 § 107.
- <sup>614</sup> e.g., (Smith 1990).
- <sup>615</sup> (Jung 1960c).
- <sup>616</sup> (Wickes 1977).
- <sup>617</sup> (Noll 1996) p. 282.
- <sup>618</sup> (Sells 1994).
- <sup>619</sup> (Sells 1994) p. 3.
- <sup>620</sup> (Noll 1996) p. 282.
- <sup>621</sup> (Jung 1958b) p. 554 § 904.
- <sup>622</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 346 § 537.
- <sup>623</sup> (Jung 1958e) p. 347 § 537.
- <sup>624</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 338–339 § 519.
- <sup>625</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 338–339 § 519.
- <sup>626</sup> (Jung 1954e) p. 144 § 249.
- <sup>627</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 339–340 § 521.
- <sup>628</sup> (Jung 1954d) p. 116 § 239.
- <sup>629</sup> (Jung 1977d) p. 817 § 1813.
- <sup>630</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 57 § 109.
- <sup>631</sup> (Jung 1954i) p. 75 § 174.
- <sup>632</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 58 § 110.
- <sup>633</sup> (Jung 1977f) p. 822 § 1824.
- <sup>634</sup> (Jung 1954e) p. 140 § 240. See Appendix note 220.
- <sup>635</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 119–120 § 211.
- <sup>636</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 119–120 § 211. See Appendix note 221.
- <sup>637</sup> (Jung 1954a) p. 132 § 229.
- <sup>638</sup> (Jung 1954a) pp. 131–132 § 228.
- <sup>639</sup> (Jung 1954b) p. 57 § 108.
- <sup>640</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 339–340 § 521.
- <sup>641</sup> (Jung 1977c) pp. 610–611 § 1396.
- <sup>642</sup> (Jung 1958e) pp. 339–340 § 521.
- <sup>643</sup> (Thorsen 1983) p. 20. See Appendix note 222.
- <sup>644</sup> (Wilson 1972) p. 15.
- <sup>645</sup> See the appendices of (Maslow 1968; Maslow 1993; Maslow 1994). For a short form of such a list of the characteristics of self-actualised people see Appendix note 223.
- <sup>646</sup> (Geiger 1993) pp. xvi–xvii. See Appendix note 224.
- <sup>647</sup> (Maslow 1996e) p. 117. See Appendix note 225.
- <sup>648</sup> (Wilson 1972) p. 189.
- <sup>649</sup> e.g., (Maslow 1993) p. xvi.
- <sup>650</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 126.
- <sup>651</sup> (Maslow 1959b) p. 130. See Appendix note 226.
- <sup>652</sup> (Maslow 1959b) pp. 125–126. See Ap-

- pendix note 227.
- <sup>653</sup> e.g., (Maslow 1993) p. xvi.
- <sup>654</sup> For example, (Maslow 1968) p. vi. See Appendix note 228.
- <sup>655</sup> (Geiger 1993) p. xvii.
- <sup>656</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 64.
- <sup>657</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 64.
- <sup>658</sup> (Maslow 1994) footnote p. 37.
- <sup>659</sup> (Maslow 1994) pp. 36–37. See Appendix note 229.
- <sup>660</sup> (Maslow 1996a) pp. 36–37.
- <sup>661</sup> From (Wilson 1972) pp. 15–16. See Appendix note 230.
- <sup>662</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 111.
- <sup>663</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 59–60. See Appendix note 231.
- <sup>664</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. viii. See Appendix note 232.
- <sup>665</sup> These terms had previously been used by Jung (Jung 1971a) and Jung gives credit to Nietzsche their coinage.
- <sup>666</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. viii. See Appendix note 303.
- <sup>667</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 88. See Appendix note 233.
- <sup>668</sup> (Browning 1987) p. 81. See Appendix note 234.
- <sup>669</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 66.
- <sup>670</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 111.
- <sup>671</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 83.
- <sup>672</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 88–89.
- <sup>673</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 69. See Appendix note 235.
- <sup>674</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 45. See Appendix note 236.
- <sup>675</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 58.
- <sup>676</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 58.
- <sup>677</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. xiii.
- <sup>678</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 9. See Appendix note 237.
- <sup>679</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 11. See Appendix note 238.
- <sup>680</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 54.
- <sup>681</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 11.
- <sup>682</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 46. See Appendix note 239.
- <sup>683</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 48. See Appendix note 240.
- <sup>684</sup> (Maslow 1994) pp. xi–xii.
- <sup>685</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 49–50.
- <sup>686</sup> (Maslow 1959a) p. 309.
- <sup>687</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) pp. 101–102. See Appendix note 241.
- <sup>688</sup> (Maslow 1993; Maslow 1994).
- <sup>689</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 49–50.
- <sup>690</sup> (Maslow 1959a) p. 310.
- <sup>691</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 94–95. See Appendix note 242.
- <sup>692</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 79.
- <sup>693</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 173. See Appendix note 243.
- <sup>694</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 173.
- <sup>695</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) p. 104. See Appendix note 244.
- <sup>696</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 70.
- <sup>697</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 67.
- <sup>698</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 66.
- <sup>699</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. ix. See Appendix note 245.
- <sup>700</sup> (Maslow 1966) pp. 62–63. See Appendix note 246.
- <sup>701</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 64.
- <sup>702</sup> (Maslow 1959a) pp. 306–307. See Appendix note 247.
- <sup>703</sup> (Maslow 1959a) p. 307.
- <sup>704</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) pp. 100–101. See Appendix note 248.
- <sup>705</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 176.
- <sup>706</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 176.
- <sup>707</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 177.
- <sup>708</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 7.
- <sup>709</sup> (Maslow 1966) pp. 53–54.
- <sup>710</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 103.
- <sup>711</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 52.
- <sup>712</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 112. See Appendix note 249.
- <sup>713</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 51.
- <sup>714</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 74–75. See Appendix note 250.
- <sup>715</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 88–89. See Appendix note 251.
- <sup>716</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 160.
- <sup>717</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 160.
- <sup>718</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 118.
- <sup>719</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 118.
- <sup>720</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 106–107. See Appendix note 252.
- <sup>721</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 101. See Appendix note 253.
- <sup>722</sup> (Wilson 1972) p. 165.
- <sup>723</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 84. See Appendix note 254.
- <sup>724</sup> (Thorsen 1983) p. 63. See Appendix note 255.
- <sup>725</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 10.
- <sup>726</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 59.

- <sup>727</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 91. See Appendix note 256.
- <sup>728</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 187–188. See Appendix note 257.
- <sup>729</sup> From (Thorsen 1983) p. 14.
- <sup>730</sup> (Maslow 1959a) p. viii.
- <sup>731</sup> (Maslow 1959b) pp. 119–120. See Appendix note 258.
- <sup>732</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 12. See Appendix note 259.
- <sup>733</sup> From (Thorsen 1983) p. 14.
- <sup>734</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 177. See Appendix note 260.
- <sup>735</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 178. See Appendix note 261.
- <sup>736</sup> (Maslow 1959b) p. 120 & (Maslow 1968) pp. 150–151. See Appendix note 262.
- <sup>737</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 168–170. See Appendix note 263.
- <sup>738</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 48. See Appendix note 264.
- <sup>739</sup> (Maslow 1966) p. 48.
- <sup>740</sup> (Maslow 1993) pp. 149–150. See Appendix note 265.
- <sup>741</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. xii. See Appendix note 266.
- <sup>742</sup> (Wilson 1972) pp. 188–189. See Appendix note 267.
- <sup>743</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 182.
- <sup>744</sup> (Maslow 1996b) pp. 31–32. See Appendix note 268.
- <sup>745</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 180.
- <sup>746</sup> (Miller 1992) pp. 81–94.
- <sup>747</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 57.
- <sup>748</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 57.
- <sup>749</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 57–58.
- <sup>750</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) p. 3.
- <sup>751</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 55.
- <sup>752</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 45. See Appendix note 269.
- <sup>753</sup> (Maslow 1996b) p. 27.
- <sup>754</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 55–56.
- <sup>755</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 25. See Appendix note 270.
- <sup>756</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 337.
- <sup>757</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 167. See Appendix note 271.
- <sup>758</sup> (Maslow 1996c) p. 71.
- <sup>759</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 289.
- <sup>760</sup> (Maslow 1996b) p. 27.
- <sup>761</sup> (Maslow 1959b) p. 131.
- <sup>762</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 4.
- <sup>763</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 162. See Appendix note 272.
- <sup>764</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 89.
- <sup>765</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 182.
- <sup>766</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 50.
- <sup>767</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 181.
- <sup>768</sup> (Maslow 1968) pp. 53–54.
- <sup>769</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 53.
- <sup>770</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 182.
- <sup>771</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 54.
- <sup>772</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 53.
- <sup>773</sup> (Maslow 1968) p. 53.
- <sup>774</sup> (Maslow 1996d) p. 45.
- <sup>775</sup> (Maslow 1994) p. 89.
- <sup>776</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 95.
- <sup>777</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. 96.
- <sup>778</sup> (Rousseau 1979) p. 323.
- <sup>779</sup> (Maslow 1994) pp. 84–85.
- <sup>780</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 121. See Appendix note 273.
- <sup>781</sup> (Rogers and Stevens 1973) p. 89.
- <sup>782</sup> (Maslow 1994) pp. 16–17.
- <sup>783</sup> (Maslow 1993) p. xv.
- <sup>784</sup> For a list of such acknowledgements and instances of their referring to each others work see (De Carvalho 1991) p. 15.
- <sup>785</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 290. See Appendix note 274.
- <sup>786</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 39.
- <sup>787</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) p. 78.
- <sup>788</sup> (Maslow 1959a) p. viii.
- <sup>789</sup> (Rogers 1990a) p. 369.
- <sup>790</sup> (Walker 1956) p. 89. See Appendix note 275.
- <sup>791</sup> (Rogers 1990b) p. 402.
- <sup>792</sup> (Rogers 1990a) p. 368.
- <sup>793</sup> (Rogers 1990a) p. 369. See Appendix note 304.
- <sup>794</sup> (Rogers 1990a) p. 369.
- <sup>795</sup> (Rogers 1983) pp. 295–296. See Appendix note 276.
- <sup>796</sup> (Rogers 1990c) p. 284. See Appendix note 306.
- <sup>797</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 281.
- <sup>798</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 35.
- <sup>799</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 35.
- <sup>800</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 37.
- <sup>801</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 296.
- <sup>802</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 296.
- <sup>803</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 276.
- <sup>804</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 304.
- <sup>805</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 304.

- <sup>806</sup> (Rogers and Stevens 1973) pp. 47–48.  
See Appendix note 277.
- <sup>807</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 283.
- <sup>808</sup> (Rogers and Stevens 1973) p. 56. See Appendix note 278.
- <sup>809</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 120.
- <sup>810</sup> (Langer 1989).
- <sup>811</sup> (Rogers 1990c) p. 270.
- <sup>812</sup> (Rogers 1990c) p. 270.
- <sup>813</sup> (Rogers 1990c) pp. 271–272.
- <sup>814</sup> (Rogers 1990c) p. 272.
- <sup>815</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 264.
- <sup>816</sup> (De Carvalho 1991) p. 90.
- <sup>817</sup> (Rogers 1983) pp. 264–265.
- <sup>818</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 268. See Appendix note 279.
- <sup>819</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) pp. 288–291. See Appendix note 280.
- <sup>820</sup> (Rogers 1961) pp. 115–119. See Appendix note 281.
- <sup>821</sup> (Rogers 1961) pp. 115–119.
- <sup>822</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 18. See Appendix note 282.
- <sup>823</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 280.
- <sup>824</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 20. See Appendix note 283.
- <sup>825</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 20.
- <sup>826</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 276.
- <sup>827</sup> (Boutin 1976) pp. 18–20; my translation only.
- <sup>828</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 133.
- <sup>829</sup> (Rogers 1983) pp. 135–136. See Appendix note 284.
- <sup>830</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 18.
- <sup>831</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 213.
- <sup>832</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 213.
- <sup>833</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 148.
- <sup>834</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 290.
- <sup>835</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 213.
- <sup>836</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 277.
- <sup>837</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 142.
- <sup>838</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 95.
- <sup>839</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 95.
- <sup>840</sup> (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) p. 156.
- <sup>841</sup> From (Anderson and Cissna 1997) p. 94.
- <sup>842</sup> From (Anderson and Cissna 1997) p. 94.
- <sup>843</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 282.
- <sup>844</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 33.
- <sup>845</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 122.
- <sup>846</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 282.
- <sup>847</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 124.
- <sup>848</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 32.
- <sup>849</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 33.
- <sup>850</sup> (Rogers and Stevens 1973) p. 55.
- <sup>851</sup> (Rogers 1961) pp. 37–38.
- <sup>852</sup> (Anderson and Cissna 1997).
- <sup>853</sup> (Baldwin, Kalhorn, and Breese 1945).
- <sup>854</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 81 & (Freire 1995a) p. 61.
- <sup>855</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 124.
- <sup>856</sup> (Rogers 1983) p. 127.
- <sup>857</sup> (Rogers 1961) p. 56.
- <sup>858</sup> (Wittgenstein 1953) p. 32 § 66–67.
- <sup>859</sup> (Bernstein 1996a).
- <sup>860</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>861</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 67. See Appendix note 285.
- <sup>862</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 55.
- <sup>863</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 57.
- <sup>864</sup> From (Russell 1926) p. 18.
- <sup>865</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56.
- <sup>866</sup> (Eysenck 1964).
- <sup>867</sup> (Kaplan 1980).
- <sup>868</sup> (Hirschi and Hindelang 1977).
- <sup>869</sup> (Jennings, Kilkenny, and Kohlberg 1983; Smetana 1990).
- <sup>870</sup> (Freedman et al. 1978; Spence 1981).
- <sup>871</sup> (Dodge 1986).
- <sup>872</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56.
- <sup>873</sup> See Appendix note 286.
- <sup>874</sup> (Krishnamurti 1953; Krishnamurti 1974; Krishnamurti 1994).
- <sup>875</sup> See Appendix note 287.
- <sup>876</sup> (Mitchell 1994).
- <sup>877</sup> (Bohm 1993).
- <sup>878</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56.
- <sup>879</sup> See Appendix note 288.
- <sup>880</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56.
- <sup>881</sup> Abbeydale Grange School in Sheffield, and Akland Burley School in Tuffnal Park, North London.
- <sup>882</sup> See Appendix note 289.
- <sup>883</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 63.
- <sup>884</sup> (Luvmour and Luvmour 1997).
- <sup>885</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56.
- <sup>886</sup> (Wexler 1997) p. 76.
- <sup>887</sup> See Appendix note 290.
- <sup>888</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56. See Appendix 291.
- <sup>889</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 56. See Appendix 291.
- <sup>890</sup> (Freire 1995a; Friere 1995b).
- <sup>891</sup> e.g., (Hooks 1994).
- <sup>892</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 58. See Appendix

- note 292.
- <sup>893</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) pp. 58–59. See Appendix note 293.
- <sup>894</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 62.
- <sup>895</sup> See Appendix note 294.
- <sup>896</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 59.
- <sup>897</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 59.
- <sup>898</sup> e.g., *The City and Country School* in New York, see (City 1997).
- <sup>899</sup> See Appendix note 295.
- <sup>900</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 59.
- <sup>901</sup> (Krishnamurti 1962)
- <sup>902</sup> e.g., (Burman 1994; Morss 1992).
- <sup>903</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 61.
- <sup>904</sup> (Nunes, Schliemann, and Carraher 1993).
- <sup>905</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 61.
- <sup>906</sup> e.g., (Luvmour and Luvmour 1997).
- <sup>907</sup> (Bernstein 1997).
- <sup>908</sup> See Appendix note 296.
- <sup>909</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) pp. 59–60.
- <sup>910</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 60.
- <sup>911</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 60.
- <sup>912</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 60.
- <sup>913</sup> See Appendix note 298.
- <sup>914</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 60.
- <sup>915</sup> See Appendix note 297.
- <sup>916</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 61.
- <sup>917</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 61.
- <sup>918</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 62.
- <sup>919</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) pp. 62–63.
- <sup>920</sup> (Senge 1990).
- <sup>921</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 64. See Appendix note 299.
- <sup>922</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 64.
- <sup>923</sup> See Appendix note 300.
- <sup>924</sup> (Duveen and Lloyd 1990).
- <sup>925</sup> (Huxley 1946).
- <sup>926</sup> (Campbell 1949).
- <sup>927</sup> (Bohm 1980; Bohm 1994).
- <sup>928</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 64.
- <sup>929</sup> e.g., *Dances with Wolves*, (Carter 1976), (Elk 1988), (Liedloff 1989) etc.
- <sup>930</sup> e.g., (Cajete 1994), (Egan 1989), etc.
- <sup>931</sup> (Wexler 1997) p. 88.
- <sup>932</sup> (Hanson 1995).
- <sup>933</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 65.
- <sup>934</sup> e.g., (Sugarman 1986).
- <sup>935</sup> (Grotberg 1995).
- <sup>936</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 67.
- <sup>937</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 71.
- <sup>938</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 68.
- <sup>939</sup> (Coupland and Nussbaum 1993) p. xxi.
- <sup>940</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 76.
- <sup>941</sup> (Goffman 1997) p. 35.
- <sup>942</sup> (Bernstein 1996a).
- <sup>943</sup> (Bernstein 1996b).
- <sup>944</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 76.
- <sup>945</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 78.
- <sup>946</sup> (Wexler 1997) p. 113.
- <sup>947</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 78.
- <sup>948</sup> (Langer 1989; Langer 1997; Nunn 1996).
- <sup>949</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 77.
- <sup>950</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 77.
- <sup>951</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 79.
- <sup>952</sup> (Eliade 1959).
- <sup>953</sup> (Bernstein 1996a) p. 81.
- <sup>954</sup> (Campbell 1949; Huxley 1946).
- <sup>955</sup> (Gardner 1983; Gardner 1993; Gardner 1987).
- <sup>956</sup> (Storr 1999).
- <sup>957</sup> (Egan 1998).

# Appendix

1. For the writers.... Fromm, Horney, Jung, C. Buhler, Angyal, Rogers, G. Allport, Schachtel, and Lynd, and recently some Catholic psychologists, [M. Arnold, J. Gasson, J. Nuttin], growth, individuation, autonomy, self-actualization, self-development, productiveness, self-realization, are all crudely synonymous, designating a vaguely perceived area rather than a sharply defined concept. In my opinion, it is *not* possible to define this area sharply at the present time. Nor is this desirable either, since a definition which does not emerge easily and naturally from well known facts is apt to be inhibiting and distorting rather than helpful, since it is quite likely to be wrong or mistaken if made by an act of the will, on a priori grounds. Its meaning can be *indicated* rather than defined, partly by positive pointing, partly by negative contrast, i.e., what it is *not*. (Maslow 1968) p.24.

2. ...self-actualization is not only an end state but also the process of actualizing one's potentialities at any time, in any amount. (Maslow 1993) p.45.

According to Jung's use of the term, individuation designates both a process and a goal. As a goal it refers to the realization of the self (*Selbstverwirklichung*), while as a process it refers to the stages or "way" leading to that goal (*der Weg der Individuation*). (Smith 1990) p.22.

3. Every age but ours has had its model, its ideal. All of these have been given up by our culture; the saint, the hero, the gentleman, the knight, the mystic. About all we have left is the well-adjusted man without problems, a very pale and doubtful substitute. Perhaps we shall soon be able to use as our guide and model the fully growing and self-fulfilling human being, the one whose inner nature expresses itself freely, rather than being warped, suppressed, or denied. (Maslow 1968) p.5.

4. Both Pestalozzi and Froebel, like Rousseau (who, in the long run, was their inspirer), were in revolt against the traditions of the Renaissance or Revival of Learning ... {which}... had led to the enthronement, in all schools, of *book knowledge*. The men of the Renaissance had rediscovered the treasures of ancient learning, and they were so entranced by the discovery—especially as the printing press seemed providentially designed to help on the dissemination of books—that they set to work to transform every school into an institution where the classical languages, and practically nothing else, could be taught and acquired. Henceforth "scholar" meant "book-reader"—reader of Latin and Greek books...

The "bookishness" of schools continued for two or three centuries, despite the protest of "Realists," that is, of men who regarded a knowledge of external nature as possessing a higher value than any knowledge or culture that could be derived

from books. The most violent of all these protests came from Rousseau; ... (Hayward 1904) pp.24-25.

5. I will be told that I abandon nature. I do not believe that at all. It chooses its instruments and regulates them according to need, not to opinion. Now, needs change according to the situation of men. There is a great difference between the natural man living in the state of nature and the natural man living in the state of society. Emile is not a savage to be relegated to the desert. He is a savage made to inhabit cities. He has to know how to find his necessities in them, to take advantage of their inhabitants, and to live, if not like them, at least with them. (Rousseau 1979) p.205.

6. Do not expect lengthy precepts of morality from me. I have only one precept to give you, and it comprehends all the others. Be a man. Restrain your heart within the limits of your condition. Study and know these limits. (Rousseau 1979) p.445.

7. In the natural order, since men are all equal, their common calling is man's estate and whoever is well raised for that calling cannot fail to fulfill those callings related to it. Let my students be destined for the sword, the church, the bar. I do not care. Prior to the calling of his parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach him. On leaving my hands, he will, I admit, be neither magistrate nor soldier nor priest. He will, in the first place, be a man. All that a man should be, he will in case of need know how to be as well as anyone; and fortune may try as it may to make him change place, he will always be in his own place. (Rousseau 1979) pp.41-42.

8. Let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right. There is no original perversity in the human heart. There is not a single vice to be found in it of which it cannot be said how and whence it entered. (Rousseau 1979) p.92.

9. Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man. ... [Man] wants nothing as nature made it, not even man; for him, man must be trained like a school horse; man must be fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden.

Were he not to do this, however, everything would go even worse, and our species does not admit of being formed halfway. In the present state of things a man abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from birth would be the most disfigured of all. Prejudices, authority, necessity, example, all the social institutions in which we find ourselves submerged would stifle nature in him and put nothing in its place. (Rousseau 1979) p.37.

10. If, according to the plan I have begun to outline, you follow rules directly contrary to the established ones; if instead of taking your pupil's mind far away; if instead of constantly leading it astray in other places, other climates, other times, at the extremities of the earth and up to the heavens, you apply yourself to keeping him always within himself and attentive to what touches him immediately, then you will find him capable of perception, memory, and even reasoning. This is nature's order. (Rousseau 1979) pp.117-118.

11. What, then, must be thought of that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens a child with chains of every sort and begins by making him miserable in order to prepare him from afar for I know not what pretended happiness which it is to be believed he will enjoy? Even if I were to suppose this education reasonable in its object, how can one without indignation see poor unfortunates submitted to an unbearable yoke and condemned to continual labor like galley slaves, without any assurance that so many efforts will ever be useful

to them? The age of gaiety passes amidst tears, punishments, threats, and slavery. The unlucky fellow is tormented for his own good; ... (Rousseau 1979) p.79.

12. So long as one concedes nothing to the authority of men or to the prejudices of the country in which one was born, the light of reason alone cannot, in the education founded by nature, lead us any farther than natural religion. This is what I limit myself to with my Emile. If he must have another religion, I no longer have the right to be his guide in that. It is up to him alone to choose it. (Rousseau 1979) pp.313-314.

13. It is especially in matters of religion that opinion triumphs. But we who pretend to shake off the yoke of opinion in everything, we who want to grant nothing to authority, we who want to teach nothing to our Emile which he could not learn by himself in every country, in what religion shall we raise him? To what sect shall we join the man of nature? The answer is quite simple, it seems to me. We shall join him to neither this one nor that one, but we shall put him in a position to choose the one to which the best use of his reason ought to lead him. (Rousseau 1979) p.260.

14. To find God man has only to make 'good use of his faculties.' The authority of other men, with their claim to privileged knowledge, is a serious hindrance to the experience of genuine religion, which every man must and can discover for himself in the simplicity of his own heart and 'in the silence of his passions.' (Grimsley 1968) p.69.

15. Therefore, neglect all these mysterious dogmas which are only words without ideas for us—all these bizarre doctrines whose vain study takes the place of virtues in those who indulge in it and serves to make them mad rather than good. Always keep your children within the narrow circle of the dogmas connected with morality. Persuade them that there is nothing useful for us to know except that which teaches us to do good. Do not make your daughters theologians and reasoners; teach them regarding heaven only those things that serve human wisdom. Accustom them always to feel themselves under the eyes of God; to have Him as witness of their actions, their thoughts, their virtue, and their pleasures; to do good without ostentation because He loves it; to suffer evil without a murmur because He will compensate them for it; finally, to be all the days of their lives as they will be glad to have been when they appear before Him. This is the true religion; this is the only one which is susceptible of neither abuse nor impiety nor fanaticism. Let them preach more sublime religions as much as they want; I recognize none other than this. (Rousseau 1979) p.381.

16. This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things. The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature. The use we are taught to make of this development is the education of men. And what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the education of things.

Each of us is thus formed by three kinds of masters. The disciple in whom their various lessons are at odds with one another is badly raised and will never be in agreement with himself. He alone in whom they all coincide at the same points and tend to the same ends reaches his goal and lives consistently. He alone is well raised. (Rousseau 1979) p.38.

17. All those who have reflected on the way of life of the ancients attribute to gymnastic exercises that vigor of body and soul which distinguishes them most palpably from the moderns. The way in which Montaigne supports this sentiment



shows that he was powerfully impressed by it. He returns to it endlessly and in countless ways in speaking of a child's education. To stiffen his soul, he says, his muscles must be hardened; by becoming accustomed to work, he becomes accustomed to pain; one must break him to the harshness of exercise in order to train him in the harshness of dislocations, colics, and all illness. The wise Locke, the good Rollin, the learned Fleury, the pedant Crousaz—so different among themselves in everything else—all agree on this single point that there should be much exercise for children's bodies. It is the most judicious of their precepts; it is the one which is and always will be the most neglected. (Rousseau 1979) p.126.

18. From where does man's weakness come? From the inequality between his strength and his desires. It is our passions that make us weak, because to satisfy them we would need more strength than nature gives us. Therefore, diminish desires, and you will increase strength. He who is capable of more than he desires has strength left over; he is certainly a very strong being. (Rousseau 1979) p.165.

19. Although memory and reasoning are two essentially different faculties, nevertheless the one develops truly only with the other. Before the age of reason the child receives not ideas but images; and the difference between the two is that images are only absolute depictions of sensible objects, while ideas are notions of objects determined by relations. An image can stand all alone in the mind which represents it, but every idea supposes other ideas. When one imagines, one does nothing but see; when one conceives, one is comparing. Our sensations are purely passive, while all our perceptions or ideas are born out of an active principle which judges. (Rousseau 1979) p.107.

20. Let us transform our sensations into ideas but not leap all of a sudden from objects of sense to intellectual objects. It is by way of the former that we ought to get to the latter. In the first operations of the mind let the senses always be its guides. No book other than the world, no instruction other than the facts. The child who reads does not think, he only reads; he is not informing himself, he learns words. (Rousseau 1979) p.168.

21. The manner of forming ideas is what gives a character to the human mind. The mind which forms its ideas only on the basis of real relations is a solid mind. The one satisfied with apparent relations is a superficial mind. The one which sees relations such as they are is a precise mind. The one which evaluates them poorly is a defective mind. The one which makes up imaginary relations that have neither reality nor appearance is mad. The one which does not compare at all is imbecillic. The greater or lesser aptitude at comparing ideas and at finding relations is what constitutes in men greater or lesser intelligence, etc. (Rousseau 1979) p.203.

22. Human intelligence has its limits; and not only is it impossible for a man to know everything, he cannot even know completely the little that other men know. Since the contradictory of each false proposition is a truth, the number of truths is as inexhaustible as that of errors. A choice must, therefore, be made of the things that ought to be taught as well as of the proper time for learning them. Of the fields of learning that are available to us, some are false, others are useless, others serve to feed the pride of the man who possesses them. The small number of those which really contribute to our well-being is alone worthy of the researches of a wise man and, consequently, of a child whom one wants to make wise. It is a question not of knowing what is but only of knowing what is useful. (Rousseau 1979) p.166.

23. Since man's first natural movements are, therefore, to measure himself against everything surrounding him and to experience in each object he perceives all the

qualities which can be sensed and relate to him, his first study is a sort of experimental physics relative to his own preservation, from which he is diverted by speculative studies before he has recognised his place here on earth. While his delicate and flexible organs can adjust themselves to the bodies on which they must act, while his still pure senses are exempt from illusion, it is the time to exercise both in their proper functions, it is the time to teach the knowledge of the sensible relations which things have with us. (Rousseau 1979) p.125.

24. The kind of memory a child can have does not, without his studying books, for this reason remain idle. Everything he sees, everything he hears strikes him, and he remembers it. He keeps in himself a record of the actions and the speeches of men, and all that surrounds him is the book in which, without thinking about it, he continually enriches his memory while waiting for his judgement to be able to profit from it. It is in the choice of these objects, it is in the care with which one constantly presents him the objects he can know, and hides from him those he ought not to know, that the true art of cultivating in him this first faculty consists; and it is in this way that one must try to form in him a storehouse of knowledge which serves his education during his youth and his conduct at all times. This method, it is true, does not form little prodigies and does not make governors and preceptors shine. But it forms men who are judicious, robust, healthy of body and understanding, men who, without having made themselves admired when young, make themselves honored when grown. (Rousseau 1979) p.112.

25. Make your pupil attentive to the phenomena of nature. Soon you will make him curious. But to feed his curiosity, never hurry to satisfy it. Put the questions within his reach and leave them to him to resolve. Let him know something not because you told it to him but because he has understood it himself. Let him not learn science but discover it. If ever you substitute in his mind authority for reason, he will no longer reason. He will be nothing more than the plaything of others' opinion.

Be satisfied, therefore, with presenting him with objects opportunely. Then, when you see his curiosity sufficiently involved, put to him some laconic question which sets him on the way to answering it. (Rousseau 1979) pp.168-169.

26. Young masters, think, I beg you, about this example, and remember that in everything your lessons ought to be more in actions than in speeches; for children easily forget what they have said and what has been said to them, but not what they have done and what has been done to them. (Rousseau 1979) pp.99-100.

I do not tire of repeating it: put all the lessons of young people in actions rather than in speeches. Let them learn nothing in books which experience can teach them. (Rousseau 1979) p.251.

Do not give your pupil any kind of verbal lessons; he ought to receive them only from experience. (Rousseau 1979) p.92.

One must speak as much as one can by deeds and say only what one does not know how to do. (Rousseau 1979) p.182.

Master! Make few speeches! But learn to choose places, times, and persons. Then give all your lessons in examples, and be sure of their effect. (Rousseau 1979) p.232.

27. In any study whatsoever, unless one has the ideas of the things represented, the representative signs are nothing. However, one always limits the child to these signs without ever being able to make him understand any of the things which they represent. Thinking he is being taught a description of the earth, he learns only to

know some maps. He is taught the names of cities, of countries, of rivers which he does not conceive as existing anywhere else but on the paper where he is showed them. I remember having seen somewhere a geography text which began thus: "What is the world? It is a cardboard globe." Such precisely is the geography of children. I set down as a fact that after two years of globe and cosmography there is not a single child of ten who, following the rules he has been given, knows how to get from Paris to Saint-Denis. I set down as a fact that there is not one who, on the basis of a map of his father's garden, is able to follow its winding paths without getting lost. These are the doctors who know on the spur of the moment where Peking, Ispahan, Mexico, and all the countries of the earth are. (Rousseau 1799) pp.109-110.

28. In all schools gyms or places of corporeal exercise should be established for the young. This is so neglected and, from my perspective, is the most important part of education. This is so not only for forming robust and healthy temperaments, but even more for moral education purposes which are neglected and which we now meet with so many vain and pedantic precepts, which amount to nothing more than lost words. *{my translation only}* (Rousseau 1790) p.295.

29. The sole folly of which one cannot disabuse a man who is not mad is vanity. For this there is no cure other than experience—if, indeed, anything can cure it. At its birth, at least, one can prevent its growth. Do not get lost in fine reasonings intended to prove to the adolescent that he is a man like others and subject to the same weaknesses. Make him feel it, or he will never know it. (Rousseau 1799) p.245.

30. The abuse of books kills science: Believing that we know what we have read, we believe that we can dispense with learning it. Too much reading only serves to produce presumptuous ignoramuses. Among all literary ages there has been none in which men read so much as in this one, and none in which men are less knowledgeable. (Rousseau 1799) pp.450-451.

In general, never substitute the sign for the thing except when it is impossible for you to show the latter, for the sign absorbs the child's attention and makes him forget the thing represented. (Rousseau 1799) p.170.

31. Readers, in this example and in a hundred thousand others, I beg you to note how we stuff children's heads with words which have no meaning within their reach and then believe we have instructed them very well. (Rousseau 1799) p.98.

32. I do not like explanations in speeches. Young people pay little attention to them and hardly retain them. Things, things! I shall never repeat enough that we attribute too much power to words. With our babbling education we produce only babblers. (Rousseau 1799) p.180.

33. You want to teach geography to this child, and you go and get globes, cosmic spheres, and maps for him. So many devices! Why all these representations? Why do you not begin by showing him the object itself, so that he will at least know what you are talking to him about? (Rousseau 1799) p.168.

34. Never reason in a dry manner with youth. Clothe the reason in a body if you want to make youth able to grasp it. Make the language of the mind pass through the heart, so that it may make itself understood. I repeat, cold arguments can determine our opinions, but not our actions. They make us believe and not act. They demonstrate what must be thought, not what must be done. If that is true for all men, it is a fortiori true for young people, who are still enveloped in their senses and think only insofar as they imagine. (Rousseau 1799) p.323.

35. One of the errors of our age is to use reason in too unadorned a form, as if men were all mind. In neglecting the language of signs that speak to the imagination,

the most energetic of languages has been lost. The impression of the word is always weak, and one speaks to the heart far better through the eyes than through the ears. In wanting to turn everything over to reasoning, we have reduced our precepts to words; we have made no use of actions. Reason alone is not active. It sometimes restrains, it arouses rarely, and it has never done anything great. Always to reason is the mania of small minds. Strong souls have quite another language. It is with this language that one persuades and makes others act. (Rousseau 1979) p.321.

36. Full of the enthusiasm he feels, the master wants to communicate it to the child. He believes he moves the child by making him attentive to the sensations by which he, the master, is himself moved. Pure stupidity! It is in man's heart that the life of nature's spectacle exists. To see it, one must feel it. The child perceives the objects, but he cannot perceive the relations linking them; he cannot hear the sweet harmony of their concord. For that is needed experience he has not acquired; in order to sense the complex impression that results all at once from all these sensations, he needs sentiments he has not had. (Rousseau 1979) pp.168-169.

37. Restrain your heart within the limits of your condition. Study and know these limits. However narrow they may be, a man is not unhappy as long as he closes himself up within them. He is unhappy only when he wants to go out beyond them. He is unhappy only when, in his senseless desires, he puts in the rank of the possible what is not possible. He is unhappy when he forgets his human estate in order to forge for himself imaginary estates from which he always falls back into his own. The only goods that it is costly to be deprived of are those one believes one has a right to. (Rousseau 1979) p.445.

38. Do you want, then, to live happily and wisely? Attach your heart only to imperishable beauty. Let your condition limit your desires; let your duties come before your inclinations; extend the law of necessity to moral things. Learn to lose what can be taken from you; learn to abandon everything when virtue decrees it, to put yourself above events and to detach your heart lest it be lacerated by them; to be courageous in adversity, so as never to be miserable; to be firm in your duty, so as never to be criminal. Then you will be happy in spite of fortune and wise in spite of the passions. Then you will find in the possession even of fragile goods a voluptuousness that nothing will be able to disturb. You will possess them without their possessing you; and you will feel that man, who can keep nothing, enjoys only what he knows how to lose. You will not, it is true, have the illusion of imaginary pleasures, but you will also not have the pains which are their fruit. You will gain much in this exchange, for these pains are frequent and real, and these pleasures are rare and vain. As the conqueror of so many deceptive opinions, you will also be the conqueror of the opinion that places so great a value on life. You will pass your life without disturbance and terminate it without fright. You will detach yourself from it as from many things. How many others are horror-stricken because they think that, in departing from life, they cease to be? Since you are informed about life's nothingness, you will believe that it is then that you begin to be. Death is the end of the wicked man's life and the beginning of the just man's. (Rousseau 1979) p.446.

39. The source of our passions, the origin and the principle of all the others, the only one born with man and which never leaves him so long as he lives is self-love [*amour de soi*]*—*a primitive, innate passion, which is anterior to every other, and of which all others are in a sense only modifications. In this sense, if you wish, all passions are natural. But most of these modifications have alien causes without which they would never have come to pass; and these same modifications, far from

being advantageous for us, are harmful. They alter the primary goal and are at odds with their own principle. It is then that man finds himself outside of nature and sets himself in contradiction with himself. (Rousseau 1979) pp.212-213.

40. Thus what makes man essentially good is to have few needs and to compare himself little to others; what makes him essentially wicked is to have many needs and to depend very much on opinion. On the basis of this principle it is easy to see how all the passions of children and men can be directed to good or bad. (Rousseau 1979) p.214.

41. It is an error to distinguish permitted passions from forbidden ones in order to yield to the former and deny oneself the latter. All passions are good when one remains their master; all are bad when one lets oneself be subjected to them. What is forbidden to us by nature is to extend our attachments further than our strength; what is forbidden to us by reason is to want what we cannot obtain; what is forbidden to us by conscience is not temptations but rather letting ourselves be conquered by temptations. It is not within our control to have or not to have passions. But it is within our control to reign over them. All the sentiments we dominate are legitimate; all those which dominate us are criminal. A man is not guilty for loving another's wife if he keep this unhappy passion enslaved of the law of duty. He is guilty for loving his own wife to the point of sacrificing everything to that love. (Rousseau 1979) p.445.

42. This is, then, the summary of the whole of human wisdom in the use of the passions: (1) To have a sense of the true relations of man, with respect to the species as well as the individual. (2) To order all the affections of the soul according to these relations.

But is man the master of ordering his affections according to this or that relation? Without a doubt, if he is master of directing his imagination toward this or that object or of giving it this or that habit. (Rousseau 1979) p.219.

43. Who, then, is the virtuous man? It is he who knows how to conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it. Up to now you were only apparently free. You had only the precarious freedom of a slave to whom nothing has been commanded. Now be really free. Learn to become your own master. Command your heart, Emile, and you will be virtuous. (Rousseau 1979) p.444.

44. At sixteen the adolescent knows what it is to suffer, for he has himself suffered. But he hardly knows that other beings suffer too. To see it without feeling it is not to know it; and as I have said a hundred times, the child, not imagining what others feel, knows only his own ills. But when the first development of his senses lights the fire of imagination, he begins to feel himself in his fellows, to be moved by their complaints and to suffer from their pains. It is then that the sad picture of suffering humanity ought to bring to his heart the first tenderness it has ever experienced. (Rousseau 1979) p.222.

45. Thus is born pity, the first relative sentiment which touches the human heart according to the order of nature.

Thus, no one becomes sensitive until his imagination is animated and begins to transport him out of himself. (Rousseau 1979) pp.222-223.

46. In a word, teach your pupil to love all men, even those who despise men. Do things in such a way that he puts himself in no class but finds his bearings in all. Speak before him of humankind with tenderness, even with pity, but never with contempt. Man, do not dishonor man!

It is by these roads and other similar ones—quite contrary to those commonly taken—that it is fitting to penetrate the heart of a young adolescent in order to arouse the first emotions of nature and to develop his heart and extend it to his fellows. (Rousseau 1979) p.226.

47. Let us then leave the vaunted resource of books to those who are so constituted as to be satisfied by books. Like Raymond Lulle's art, they are good for learning to babble about what one does not know. They are good for training fifteen-year-old Platos to philosophize in polite society and for informing a gathering about the practices of Egypt and India on the testimony of Paul Lucas or Tavernier. (Rousseau 1979) p.451.

48. The pedagogues who present such a showy display of the instruction they give their disciples are paid for using other language than mine. However, one sees by their very conduct that they think exactly as I do, for what do they teach them after all? Words, more words, always words. Among the various sciences that they boast of teaching their pupils, they are quite careful not to include those which would be truly useful to them, because they would be sciences of things, and with these they would not succeed. Rather they choose those sciences one appears to know when one knows their terminology: heraldry, geography, chronology, languages, etc.—all studies so far from man, and especially from the child, that it would be a wonder if anything at all in them were of use to him a single time in his life. (Rousseau 1979) p.108.

49. Remember always that the spirit of my education consists not in teaching the child many things, but in never letting anything but accurate and clear ideas enter his brain. Were he to know nothing, it would be of little importance to me provided he made no mistakes. I put truths into his head only to guarantee him against the errors he would learn in their place. Reason and judgement come slowly; prejudices come in crowds; it is from them that he must be preserved. But if you look at science in itself, you enter into a bottomless sea, without shores, full of reefs. You will never get away. When I see a man, enamoured of the various kinds of knowledge, let himself be seduced by their charm and run from one to the other without knowing how to stop himself, I believe I am seeing a child on the shore gathering shells and beginning by loading himself up with them; then, tempted by those he sees next, he throws some away and picks up others, until, overwhelmed by their multitude and not knowing anymore which to choose, he ends by throwing them all away and returning empty-handed. (Rousseau 1979) p.171.

50. He will not stupidly question others about everything he sees, but he will examine it himself and will tire himself out to discover what he wants to learn before asking. (Rousseau 1979) p.161.

Raised in the spirit of our maxims, accustomed to draw all his instruments out of himself and never to have recourse to another person before he has himself recognised his insufficiency, he examines each new object he sees for a long time without saying anything. He is pensive, and not a questioner. Be satisfied, therefore, with presenting him with objects opportunely. Then, when you see his curiosity sufficiently involved, put to him some laconic question which sets him on the way to answering it. (Rousseau 1979) p.169.

51. Children, who are great imitators, all try to draw. I would want my child to cultivate this art, not precisely for the art itself but for making his eye exact and his hand flexible. And in general it is of very little importance that he knows this or that exercise, provided that his senses acquire the perspicacity and his body the good

habits one gains by this exercise. I will, therefore, carefully avoid giving him a drawing master who would give him only imitations to imitate and would make him draw only from drawings. I want him to have no other master than nature and no other model than objects. I want him to have before his eyes the original itself and not the paper representing it, to sketch a house from a house, a tree from a tree, a man from a man, so that he gets accustomed to observing bodies and their appearances well and not to taking false and conventional imitations for true imitations. I will even divert him from drawing from memory in the absence of the objects until their exact shapes are well imprinted on his imagination by frequent observations, for fear that, by substituting bizarre and fantastic shapes for the truth of things, he will lose the knowledge of proportions and the taste for the beauties of nature. (Rousseau 1979) pp.143-144.

52. Eighteen years of assiduous care have had as their only object the preservation of a sound judgement and a healthy heart. (Rousseau 1979) p.241.

53. He does not know what routine, custom, or habit is. What he did yesterday does not influence what he does today. He never follows a formula, does not give way before authority or example, and acts and speaks only as it suits him. So do not expect from him dictated speeches or studied manners, but always the faithful expression of his ideas and the conduct born of his inclinations. (Rousseau 1979) p.160.

54. Nature has, for strengthening the body and making it grow, means that ought never be opposed. A child must not be constrained to stay when he wants to go nor to go when he wants to stay. When children's wills are not spoiled by our fault, children want nothing uselessly. They have to jump, run, and shout when they wish. All their movements are needs of their constitution seeking to strengthen itself. But one should distrust what they desire but are unable to do for themselves and others have to do for them. Then true need, natural need, must be carefully distinguished from the need which stems from nascent whim or from the need which comes only from the superabundance of life of which I have spoken. (Rousseau 1979) p.84.

55. Most of the habits you believe you give to children and young people are not true habits. Because children only adopt such habits by force and stick to them grudgingly, they are only waiting for the occasion to be rid of them. One does not get the taste for being in prison by dint of staying there. Far from diminishing the aversion, the habit then increases it. (Rousseau 1979) p.432.

56. Forced to learn by himself, he uses his reason and not another's; for to give nothing to opinion, one must give nothing to authority, and most of our errors come to us far less from ourselves than from others. From this constant exercise there ought to result a vigor of mind similar to the vigor given to bodies by work and fatigue. Another advantage is that one advances only in proportion to one's strength. The mind, no less than the body, bears only what it can bear. When understanding appropriates things before depositing them in memory, what it draws from memory later belongs to it; whereas, by overburdening memory without the participation of understanding, one runs the risk of never withdrawing anything from memory suitable for understanding. (Rousseau 1979) p.207.

Without question, one gets far clearer and far surer notions of the things one learns in this way by oneself than of those one gets from another's teachings. One's reason does not get accustomed to a servile submission to authority; furthermore, we make ourselves more ingenious at finding relations, connecting ideas, and invent-

ing instruments than we do when, accepting all of these things as they are given to us, we let our minds slump into indifference—like the body of a man, who, always clothed, shod, and waited on by his servants and drawn by his horses, finally loses the strength and use of his limbs. (Rousseau 1979) p.176.

57. ...the goal is not that he know exactly the topography of the region, but that he know the means of learning about it. It is of little importance that he have maps in his head, provided that he is able to get a good conception of what they represent, and that he has a distinct idea of the art which serves to draw them. See the difference there already is between your pupils' knowledge and mine's ignorance! They know maps, and he makes them. Here are new ornaments for his room. (Rousseau 1979) p.171.

58. Emile has little knowledge, but what he has is truly his own. He knows nothing halfway. Among the small number of things he knows and knows well, the most important is that there are many things of which he is ignorant and which he can know one day; there are many more that other men know that he will never know in his life; and there are an infinite number of others that no man will ever know. Emile has a mind that is universal not by its learning but by its faculty to acquire learning: a mind that is open, intelligent, ready for everything, and, as Montaigne says, if not instructed, at least able to be instructed. It is enough for me that he knows how to find the "what's it good for?" in everything he does and the "why?" in everything he believes. Once again, my object is not to give him science but to teach him to acquire science when needed, to make him estimate it for exactly what it is worth, and to make him love the truth above all. With this method one advances little, but one never takes a useless step, and one is not forced to go backward. (Rousseau 1979) p.207.

59. As for my pupil, or rather nature's, trained early to be as self-sufficient as possible, he is not accustomed to turning constantly to others; still less is he accustomed to displaying his great learning for them. On the other hand, he judges, he foresees, he reasons in everything immediately related to him. He does not chatter; he acts. He does not know a word of what is going on in society, but he knows very well how to do what suits him. Since he is constantly in motion, he is forced to observe many things, to know many effects. He acquires a large experience early. He gets his lessons from nature and not from men. He instructs himself so much the better because he sees nowhere the intention to instruct him. Thus his body and his mind are exercised together. Acting always according to his own thought and not someone else's, he continually unites two operations: the more he makes himself strong and robust, the more he becomes sensible and judicious. This is the way one day to have what are believed incompatible and what are united in almost all great men: strength of body and strength of soul; a wise man's reason and an athlete's vigor. (Rousseau 1979) p.119.

60. Now, needs change according to the situation of men. There is a great difference between the natural man living in the state of nature and the natural man living in the state of society. Emile is not a savage to be relegated to the desert. He is a savage made to inhabit cities. He has to know how to find his necessities in them, to take advantage of their inhabitants, and to live, if not like them, at least with them. (Rousseau 1979) p.205.

61. He who in the civil order wants to preserve the primacy of the sentiments of nature does not know what he wants. Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either a man or



a citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing. (Rousseau 1979) p.41.

62. You owe others more than if you were born without property, since you were favored at birth. It is not just that what one man has done for society should relieve another from what he owes it; for each, owning himself wholly, can pay only for himself and no father can transmit to his son the right to be useless to his fellows. (Rousseau 1979) p.195.

63. Our first duties are to ourselves; our primary sentiments are centered on ourselves; all our natural movements relate in the first instance to our preservation and our well-being. Thus, the first sentiment of justice does not come to us from the justice we owe but from that which is owed us; and it is again one of the mistakes of ordinary educations that, speaking at first to children of their duties, never of their rights, one begins by telling them the opposite of what is necessary, what they cannot understand, and what cannot interest them. (Rousseau 1979) p.97.

64. Emile, in considering his rank in the human species and seeing himself so happily placed there, will be tempted to honor his reason for the work of yours and to attribute his happiness to his own merit. He will say to himself, "I am wise, and men are mad." In pitying them, he will despise them; in congratulating himself, he will esteem himself more, and in feeling himself to be happier than them, he will believe himself worthier to be so. This is the error most to be feared, because it is the most difficult to destroy. If he remained in this condition, he would have gained little from all our care; and if one had to choose, I do not know whether I would not prefer the illusion of the prejudices to that of pride. (Rousseau 1979) pp.244-245.

65. To reason with children was Locke's great maxim. It is the one most in vogue today. Its success, however, does not appear to me such as to establish its reputation; and, as for me, I see nothing more stupid than these children who have been reasoned with so much. Of all the faculties of man, reason, which is, so to speak, only a composite of all the others, is the one that develops with the most difficulty and latest. And it is this one which they want to use in order to develop the first faculties! The masterpiece of a good education is to make a reasonable man, and they claim they raise a child by reason! This is to begin with the end, to want to make the product the instrument. If children understood reason, they would not need to be raised. But by speaking to them from an early age a language which they do not understand, one accustoms them to show off with words, to control all that is said to them, to believe themselves as wise as their masters, to become disputatious and rebellious; and everything that is thought to be gotten from them out of reasonable motives is never obtained other than out of motives of covetousness or fear or vanity which are always perforce joined to the others. (Rousseau 1979) pp.89-90.

66. On the other hand, how could your young people, who are bored and exasperated by your insipid lessons, your long-winded moralizing, and your eternal catechisms, fail to refuse to apply their minds to what has been made a gloomy business for them—the heavy precepts with which they have constantly been burdened, and the meditations on the Author of their being, Who has been made the enemy of their pleasures? They have conceived only aversion, disgust, and distaste for all that; constraint has repelled them. What means is left to make them devoted to such things when they begin to decide for themselves? They have to have novelty to be pleased; they no longer can stand anything children are told. (Rousseau 1979) p.316.

67. Each sort of instruction has its proper time, which must be known, and its dangers, which must be avoided. (Rousseau 1979) p.328.

68. This is the study to which I have most applied myself, so that even though my entire method were chimerical and false, my observations could still be of profit. My vision of what must be done may have been poor, but I believe I have seen clearly the subject on which one must work. (Rousseau 1979) pp.33-34.

69. If I had to depict sorry stupidity, I would depict a pedant teaching the catechism to children. If I wanted to make a child go mad, I would oblige him to explain what he says in saying his catechism. Someone will object to me that since most of the dogmas of Christianity are mysteries, to wait for the human mind to be capable of having a conception of them is not to wait for the child to be a man but to wait for the man to exist no more. To that I answer, in the first place, that there are mysteries it is impossible for man not only to conceive but to believe, and that I do not see what is gained by teaching them to children, unless it be that they learn how to lie early. I say, moreover, that, to accept the mysteries, one must at least comprehend that they are incomprehensible, and children are not even capable of this conception. At the age when everything is mystery, there are no mysteries strictly speaking. (Rousseau 1979) p.257.

70. Let the child do nothing on anybody's word. Nothing is good for him unless he feels it to be so. In always pushing him ahead of his understanding, you believe you are using foresight, and you lack it. To arm him with some vain instruments which he will perhaps never use, you take away from him man's most universal instrument, which is good sense. You accustom him to let himself always be led, never to be anything but a machine in others' hands. You want him to be docile when little: that is to want him to be credulous and a dupe when he is grown up. You constantly tell him, "All that I ask of you is for your own advantage. But you are not in a condition to know it. What difference does it make to me whether you do what I demand? It is only for you yourself that you are working." With all these fine speeches that you make to him now in order to get him to be obedient, you are preparing the success of those speeches which will be made to him one day by a visionary, an alchemist, a charlatan, a cheat, or any kind of madman in order to catch your pupil in his trap or to get him to adopt his madness. (Rousseau 1979) p.178.

71. The art of speaking to and hearing from absent people, the art of communicating our feelings, our wills, our desires to them at a distance without a mediator is an art whose utility can be rendered palpable to all ages. What wonderful means were used to turn so useful and so agreeable an art into a torment for childhood? Because the young are constrained to apply themselves to it in spite of themselves, it is put to uses of which they understand nothing. A child is not very eager to perfect the instrument with which he is tormented. But arrange things so that this instrument serves his pleasures, and soon he will apply himself to it in spite of you.

A great business is made of seeking the best methods of teaching reading. Desks and cards are invented; a child's room is made into a printing shop. Locke wants him to learn to read with dice. Now is that not a clever invention? What a pity! A means surer than all these, and the one always forgotten, is the desire to learn. Give the child this desire; then let your desks and your dice go. Any method will be good for him. (Rousseau 1979) pp.116-117.

72. Another consideration confirms the utility of this method. One must know well the particular genius of the child in order to know what moral diet suits him. Each mind has its own form, according to which it needs to be governed; the suc-

cess of one's care depends on governing it by this form and not by another. Prudent man, spy out nature for a long time; observe your pupil well before saying the first word to him. To start with, let the germ of his character reveal itself freely; constrain it in no way whatsoever in order better to see the whole of it. Do you think this time of freedom is lost for him? Not at all. This is the best way to use it, for you are learning now not to lose a single moment in a more valuable time; while if you begin to act before knowing what must be done, you will act haphazardly. Subject to error, you will have to retrace your steps; you will be farther removed from the goal than if you had been in less of a rush to reach it. Do not therefore act like the miser who loses a great deal for wanting not to lose anything. In the earliest age sacrifice time that you will regain with interest at a more advanced age. The wise doctor does not at first sight giddily give prescriptions but in the first place studies the constitution of his patient before prescribing anything to him. He may begin to treat the patient late but he cures him, whereas the doctor who is in too much of a rush kills him. (Rousseau 1979) p.94.

73. The greater or lesser facility or execution depends on countless circumstances that are impossible to determine otherwise than in a particular application of the method to this or that country, to this or that station. Now all these particular applications, not being essential to my subject, do not enter into my plan. (Rousseau 1979) p.35.

74. Do you wish to put order and regularity in the nascent passions? Extend the period during which they develop in order that they have the time to be arranged as they are born. Then it is not man who orders them; it is nature itself. Your care is only to let it arrange its work. If your pupil were alone, you would have nothing to do. But everything surrounding him influences his imagination. The torrent of prejudices carries him away. To restrain him, he must be pushed in the opposite direction. Sentiment must enchain imagination, and reason silence the opinion of men. The source of all the passions is sensibility; imagination determines their bent. (Rousseau 1979) p.219.

75. Young teacher, I am preaching a difficult art to you, that of governing without precepts and doing everything by doing nothing. This art, I agree, is not one that goes with your age; it is not fit to make your talents conspicuous from the outset nor to make an impression on fathers. But it is the only one fit for succeeding. You will never get to the point of producing wise men if you do not in the first place produce rascals. (Rousseau 1979) p.119.

76. Thus, the first education ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in securing the heart from vice and the mind from error. If you could do nothing and let nothing be done, if you could bring your pupil healthy and robust to the age of twelve without his knowing how to distinguish his right hand from his left, at your first lessons the eyes of his understanding would open up to reason. Without prejudice, without habit, he would have nothing in him which could hinder the effect of your care. Soon he would become in your hands the wisest of men; and in beginning by doing nothing, you would have worked an educational marvel. (Rousseau 1979) pp.93-94.

77. I shall add this one word which constitutes an important maxim: it is that usually one gets very surely and quickly what one is not in a hurry to get. I am almost certain that Emile will know how to read and write perfectly before the age of ten, precisely because it makes very little difference to me that he knows how before fifteen. But I would rather that he never knew how to read if this science has to be

bought at the price of all that can make it useful. Of what use will reading be to him if it has been made repulsive to him forever? (Rousseau 1979) p.117.

78. Dare I expose the greatest, the most important, the most useful rule of all education? It is not to gain time but to lose it. Common readers, pardon me my paradoxes. When one reflects, they are necessary and, whatever you may say, I prefer to be a paradoxical man than a prejudiced one. The most dangerous period of human life is that from birth to the age of twelve. This is the time when errors and vices germinate without one's yet having any instrument for destroying them; and by the time the instrument comes, the roots are so deep that it is too late to rip them out. If children jumped all at once from the breast to the age of reason, the education they are given might be suitable for them. But, according to the natural progress, they need an entirely contrary one. They ought to do nothing with their soul until all of its faculties have developed, because while the soul is yet blind, it cannot perceive the torch you are presenting to it or follow the path reason maps out across the vast plain of ideas, a path which is so faint even to the best of eyes. (Rousseau 1979) p.93.

79. Think through all the rules of your education; you will find them misconceived, especially those that concern virtues and morals. The only lesson of morality appropriate to childhood, and the most important for every age, is never to harm anyone. The very precept of doing good, if it is not subordinated to this one, is dangerous, false, and contradictory. Who does not do good? Everybody does it—the wicked man as well as others. He makes one man happy at the expense of making a hundred men miserable; and this is the source of all our calamities. The most sublime virtues are negative. They are also the most difficult, because they are without ostentation and above even that pleasure so sweet to the heart of man, the pleasure of sending someone away satisfied with us. O what good is necessarily done to his fellows by the one among them, if there is such a one, who never does them harm! What an intrepid soul, what a vigorous character he needs for that! It is not in reasoning about this maxim, but in trying to put it into practice, that one feels how great it is and how difficult of success. (Rousseau 1979) p.104.

80. I have said enough to make it understood that punishment as punishment must never be inflicted on children, but it should always happen to them as a natural consequence of their bad action. Thus you will not declaim against lying; you will not precisely punish them for having lied; but you will arrange it so that all the bad effects of lying—such as not being believed when one tells the truth, of being accused of the evil that one did not do although one denies it—come in league against them when they have lied. But let us explain what lying is for children. (Rousseau 1979) p.101.

81. There is an excess of rigor and an excess of indulgence, both equally to be avoided. If you let children suffer, you expose their health, their life. You make them miserable in the present. If by too much care you spare them every kind of discomfort, you are preparing great miseries for them; you make them delicate, sensitive; you cause them to leave man's estate to which they will return one day in spite of you. So, as not to expose them to some ills of nature, you are the artisan of those nature did not give them. (Rousseau 1979) pp.86-87.

82. The surest means of raising oneself above prejudices and ordering one's judgements about the true relations of things is to put oneself in the place of an isolated man and to judge everything as this man himself ought to judge of it with respect to his own utility. (Rousseau 1979) p.185.

83. As for me I do not intend to teach geometry to Emile; it is he who will teach

it to me; I will seek the relations, and he will find them, for I will seek them in such a way as to make him find them. For example, instead of using a compass to draw a circle, I shall draw it with a point at the end of a string turning on a pivot. After that, when I want to compare the radii among themselves, Emile will ridicule me and make me understand that the same string, always taut, cannot have drawn unequal distances. (Rousseau 1979) p.145.

84. What is the use of inscribing in their heads a catalogue of signs which represent nothing for them? In learning the things, will they not learn the signs? Why put them to the useless effort of learning the signs twice? And, meanwhile, what dangerous prejudices does one not begin to inspire in them by making them take for science words which have no sense for them? It is with the first word the child uses in order to show off, it is with the first thing he takes on another's word without seeing its utility himself, that his judgement is lost. He will have to shine in the eyes of fools for a long time in order to make up for such a loss. (Rousseau 1979) p.111-112.

85. If you want to instruct him by principles and teach him, along with the nature of the human heart, the external causes which are brought to bear on it and turn our inclinations into vices, you employ a metaphysic he is not in a condition to understand by thus transporting him all of a sudden from sensible objects to intellectual objects. You fall back into the difficulty so carefully avoided up to now of giving him lessons resembling lessons, of substituting in his mind the master's experience and authority for his own experience and the progress of his reason.

To remove both of these obstacles at once and to put the human heart in his reach without risk of spoiling his own, I would want to show him men from afar, to show him them in other times or other places and in such a way that he can see the stage without ever being able to act on it. This is the moment for history. It is by means of history that, without the lessons of philosophy, he will read the hearts of men; it is by means of history that he will see them, a simple spectator, disinterested and without passion, as their judge and not as their accomplice or as their accuser.

To know men, one must see them act. In society one hears them speak. They show their speeches and hide their actions. But in history their actions are unveiled, and one judges them on the basis of the facts. Even their talk helps in evaluating them; for in comparing what they do with what they say, one sees both what they are and what they want to appear to be. The more they disguise themselves, the better one knows them. (Rousseau 1979) p.237.

86. The exercise of the social virtues brings the love of humanity to the depths of one's heart. It is in doing good that one becomes good; I know of no practice more certain. Busy your pupil with all the good actions within his reach. Let the interest of indigents always be his. Let him assist them not only with his purse but with his care. Let him serve them, protect them, consecrate his person and his time to them. Let him be their representative; he will never again in his life fulfill so noble a function. (Rousseau 1979) p.250.

87. He must be touched and not hardened by the sight of human miseries. Long struck by the same sights, we no longer feel their impressions. Habit accustoms us to everything. What we see too much, we no longer imagine; and it is only imagination which makes us feel the ills of others. It is thus by dint of seeing death and suffering that priests and doctors become pitiless. Therefore, let your pupil know the fate of man and the miseries of his fellows, but do not let him witness them too often. A

single object well chosen and shown in a suitable light will provide him emotion and reflection for a month. (Rousseau 1979) p.231.

88. Those who want to guide the young soberly, in order to preserve them from the traps of the senses, make love disgusting to them and would gladly make it a crime for them to think of it at their age, as though love were made for the old. All these deceitful lessons, to which the heart gives the lie, are not persuasive. The young man, guided by a surer instinct, secretly laughs at the gloomy maxims to which he feigns acquiescence, and all he waits for is the occasion to discard them. All this is contrary to nature. By following an opposite route, I shall more surely arrive at the same goal. I shall not be afraid to indulge him in the sweet sentiment for which he has such a thirst. I shall depict it to him as the supreme happiness of life, because in fact it is. In depicting it to him, I want him to yield to it. In making him sense how much charm the union of hearts adds to the attraction of the sense, I shall disgust him with libertinism, and I shall make him moderate by making him fall in love. (Rousseau 1979) p.327.

89. How limited one must be to see only an obstacle to the lessons of reason in the nascent desires of a young man! I see in them the true means of making him amenable to these very lessons. One has a hold on the passions only by means of the passions. It is by their empire that their tyranny must be combated; and it is always from nature itself that the proper instruments to regulate nature must be drawn. (Rousseau 1979) p.327.

90. Now, a child, no more than a man, is not to be seen in a moment. Where are the observers who know how to grasp at first glance the traits which characterise him? Such observers exist, but they are few; and in a hundred thousand fathers not one of them will be found. (Rousseau 1979) p.162.

91. An error difficult to avoid is always to assume the child has the same taste for the activities about which the master is enthusiastic. When the entertainment of work carries you away, be careful that in the meantime he is not bored without daring to indicate it to you. The child ought to be wholly involved with the thing, but you ought to be wholly involved with the child—observing him, spying on him without letup and without appearing to do so, sensing ahead of time all his sentiments and forestalling those he ought not to have—in a word, busying him in such a way that he not only feels he is of use in the work but is pleased by dint of understanding well the purpose of that work. (Rousseau 1979) p.189.

92. Take the opposite of the practised path, and you will almost always do well. Since what is wanted is not to make a child out of a child but a doctor out of a child, fathers and masters can never soon enough scold, correct, reprimand, flatter, threaten, promise, instruct, talk reason. Do better: be reasonable, and do not reason with your pupil, especially to get his approbation for what displeases him. Bringing reason to bear on unpleasant things only makes reason tedious for him and discredits it early in a mind not yet in a condition to understand it. (Rousseau 1979) p.94.

93. Since we always proceed slowly from one idea based on the senses to another, we familiarize ourselves with one for a long time before going on to another, and finally, we never force our pupil to be attentive; it is a long way from this first lesson to knowledge of the path of the sun and the shape of the earth. (Rousseau 1979) p.170.

94. Never show the child anything he cannot see. While humanity is almost alien to him, and you are unable to raise him to man's estate, for his sake lower man

to the child's estate. In thinking about what can be useful to him at another age, speak to him only about things whose utility he sees right now. (Rousseau 1979) pp.183-184.

95. Judge whether the time for listening to grave lessons of wisdom is when the inflamed senses derange the understanding and tyrannize the will. Therefore, never talk reason to young people, even when they are at the age of reason, without first putting them in a condition to understand it. Most wasted speeches are wasted due to the fault of masters rather than of disciples. The pedant and the teacher say pretty much the same things, but the former says them on every occasion, while the latter says them only when he is sure of their effect. (Rousseau 1979) p.319.

96. One of the things that makes preaching most useless is that it is done indiscriminately to everyone without distinction or selectivity. How can one think that the same sermon is suitable to so many auditors of such diverse dispositions, so different in mind, humor, age, sex, station, and opinion? There are perhaps not even two auditors for whom what one says to all can be suitable; and all our affections are so inconstant that there are perhaps not even two moments in the life of each man when the same speech would make the same impression on him. (Rousseau 1979) p.319.

97. Although modesty is natural to the human species, naturally children have none. Modesty is born only with the knowledge of evil, and how could children, who do not and should not have this knowledge, have the sentiment which is its effect? To give them lessons in modesty and decency is to teach them that there are shameful and indecent things. It is to give them a secret desire to know those things. Sooner or later they succeed, and the first spark which touches the imagination inevitably accelerates the inflammation of the senses. Whoever blushes is already guilty. True innocence is ashamed of nothing. (Rousseau 1979) p.217.

98. How do we fail to see that if all the lessons given to a young man on this point are without success, it is because they are without reasons suitable to his age, and because it is important at every age to clothe reason in forms which will make it loved. Speak to him gravely when necessary, but let what you say always have an attraction that forces him to listen to you. Do not combat his desires with dryness. Do not stifle his imagination; guide it lest it engender monsters. (Rousseau 1979) p.325.

99. The issue is not to teach him the sciences but to give him the taste for loving them and methods for learning them when this taste is better developed. This is very certainly a fundamental principle of every good education. (Rousseau 1979) p.172 .

100. My principle aim in teaching him to feel and to love the beautiful of all sorts is to fix his affections and tastes on it, to prevent his natural appetites from becoming corrupted, and to see to it that he does not one day seek in his riches the means for being happy—means that he ought to find nearer to him. (Rousseau 1979) p.344.

101. Let the value of what he makes be drawn not from the worker but from the work. Let us never allow his work to be judged except by comparing it to that of good masters; let his work be valued for the work itself and not because it is his. Say of what is well made, "This is well made." But do not add, "Who made that?" If he himself says with a proud and self-satisfied air, "I made it," add coldly, "You or another, it makes no difference; in any event it is work well done." (Rousseau 1979) p.202.

102. Moreover, let there never be any comparisons with other children, no ri-

vals, no competitors, not even in running, once he has begun to be able to reason. I prefer a hundred times over that he not learn what he would only learn out of jealousy or vanity. However, every year I shall note the progress he has made; I shall compare it to that which he will make the following year. I shall tell him, "You have grown so many inches. That is the ditch you jumped over, the load you carried, the distance you threw a pebble, the course you ran before getting winded, etc. Let us now see what you will do." Thus I arouse him without making him jealous of anyone. He will want to outdo himself. He ought to. I see no problem in his being his own competitor. (Rousseau 1979) p.184.

103. It ought to be sensed that just as pain is often a necessity, pleasure is sometimes a need. There is, therefore, only one single desire of children which ought never be satisfied: that of being obeyed. From this it follows that in everything they ask for, attention must above all be paid to the motive which leads them to ask for it. So, as far as possible, grant them everything that can give them a real pleasure; always refuse them what they ask for only due to whim or in order to assert their authority. (Rousseau 1979) footnote on p.89.

104. Command him nothing, whatever in the world it might be, absolutely nothing. Do not even allow him to imagine that you might pretend to have any authority over him. Let him know only that he is weak and you are strong, that by his condition and yours he is necessarily at your mercy. Let him know it, learn it, feel it. Let his haughty head at an early date feel the harsh yoke which nature imposes on man, the heavy yoke of necessity under which every finite being must bend. Let him see this necessity in things, never in the caprice of men. Let the bridle that restrains him be force and not authority. Do not forbid him to do that from which he should abstain; prevent him from doing it without explanations, without reasonings. What you grant him, grant at his first word, without solicitations, without prayers—above all, without conditions. Grant with pleasure; refuse only with repugnance. But let all your refusals be irrevocable; let no importunity shake you; let 'no,' once pronounced, be a wall of bronze against which the child will have to exhaust his strength at most five or six times in order to abandon any further attempts to overturn it. (Rousseau 1979) p.91.

105. The worst education is to leave him floating between his will and yours and to dispute endlessly between you and him as to which of the two will be the master. I would a hundred times prefer that it were always he. (Rousseau 1979) p.91.

106. Thus, not seeing you eager to oppose him, not distrusting you, with nothing to hide from you, he will not deceive you, he will not lie to you, he will fearlessly show himself precisely as he is. You will be able to study him at your complete ease and arrange all around him the lessons you want to give him without his ever thinking he is receiving any. (Rousseau 1979) p.120.

107. One cannot teach children the danger of lying to men without being aware of the greater danger, on the part of men, of lying to children. A single proved lie told by the master to the child would ruin forever the whole fruit of the education. (Rousseau 1979) p.216.

108. Another error which I have already combated, but which small minds will never abandon, is that of always affecting magisterial dignity and wanting to pass for a perfect man in the mind of one's disciple. This method is misconceived. How can such masters fail to see that in wanting to strengthen their authority, they destroy it; to make yourself heard, you must put yourself in the place of those you are addressing, and you must be a man in order to know how to speak to the human heart? All



those perfect people are neither touching nor persuasive. One always tells oneself that it is quite easy for them to combat passions they do not feel. Show your weaknesses to your pupils if you want to cure his own. Let him see that you undergo the same struggles which he experiences. Let him learn to conquer himself by your example. And do not let him say as other pupils do: "These old men are spiteful because they are no longer young; they want to treat young people like old men; and because all their desires are extinguished, they treat ours as a crime." (Rousseau 1979) p.334.

109. Here I cannot prevent myself from mentioning the false dignity of governors who, in order stupidly to play wise men, run down their pupils, affect always to treat them as children, and always distinguish themselves from their pupils in everything they make them do. Far from thus disheartening your pupils' youthful courage, spare nothing to lift up their souls; make them your equals in order that they may become your equals; and if they cannot yet raise themselves up to you, descend to their level without shame, without scruple. Remember that your honour is no longer in you but in your pupil. Share his faults in order to correct them. (Rousseau 1979) p.246.

110. Now, if the master were to let himself be deceived like the disciple, he would lose the right to exact deference and to give his disciple lessons. Still less should the latter suppose that the master purposely lets him be ensnared and sets traps for his simplicity. What then must be done to avoid both of these difficulties at once? That which is best and most natural: be simple and true like him, warn him of the perils to which he is exposed, and show them to him clearly and sensibly, but without exaggeration, ill humor, pedantic display, and above all, without giving him your advice as an order until it has become one and this imperious tone is absolutely necessary. Is he obstinate after that, as he will very often be? Then say nothing more to him; leave him free; follow him; imitate him, and do it gaily and frankly. Let yourself go, enjoy yourself as much as he does, if it is possible. If the consequences become too great, you are always there to put a stop to them. And meanwhile, will not the young man, witnessing your foresight and your kindness, be at once greatly struck by the one and touched by the other? All his faults are so many bonds he provides you for restraining him in case of need. What here constitutes the master's greatest art is to provide occasions and to manage exhortations in such a way that he knows in advance when the young man will yield and when he will be obstinate. Thus the master can surround him on all sides with the lessons of experience without ever exposing him to too great dangers.

Warn him about his mistakes before he falls into them. When he has fallen into them, do not reproach him for them. You would only inflame his *amour-propre* and make it rebel. A lesson that causes revolt is of no profit. I know of nothing more inept than the phrase: "I told you so!" The best means of making him remember what one has told him is to appear to have forgotten it. Instead of reproaching him when you see him ashamed of not having believed you, gently efface this humiliation with good words. He will surely be more fond of you when he sees that you forget yourself for him, and that, instead of finishing the job of crushing him, you console him. But if you add reproaches to his sorrow, he will conceive a hatred of you and will make it a law unto himself not to listen to you anymore, as though to prove to you that he does not agree with you about the importance of your advice. (Rousseau 1979) pp.246-247.

111. Make yourself respectable to everyone. Begin by making yourself loved so

that each will seek to please you. You will not be the child's master if you are not the master of all that surrounds him; and this authority will never be sufficient if it is not founded on the esteem for virtue. It is not a question of emptying one's purse and spending money by the handful. I have never seen that money has made anyone loved. One ought not to be miserly and hard nor merely pity the poverty that one can relieve. But you can open your coffers all you want; if you do not also open your heart, others' hearts will always remain closed to you. It is your time, your care, your affection, it is you yourself that must be given. For no matter what you do, people never feel that your money is you. There are tokens of interest and benevolence which produce a greater effect and are really more useful than any gifts. How many unfortunate people, how many sick people need consolation more than alms! How many oppressed people need protection more than money! Reconcile people who have quarreled; forestall litigations; bring children to their duty, fathers to indulgence; encourage happy marriages; prevent harassment; use, lavish the influence of your pupil's parents in favor of the weak man to whom justice is denied and who is crushed by the powerful man. Loudly proclaim yourself the protector of the unfortunate. Be just, humane, and beneficent. Give not only alms; give charity. Works of mercy relieve more ills than does money. Love others, and they will love you. Serve them, and they will serve you. Be their brother, and they will be your children. (Rousseau 1979) p.95.

112. What I seek is, to elevate human nature to its highest, its noblest; and this I seek to do by love. Only in the holy power of love do I recognize the basis of the development of my [human] race to whatever of the divine and eternal lies within its nature. All the capacities for intellect, and art, and knowledge, which are within my nature, I hold to be only means for the divine elevation of the heart to love... Love is the only, the eternal foundation of the training of our race to humanity. (Pestalozzi 1859b) p.176.

113. Man will only become man through his inner and spiritual life. He becomes through it independent, free, and contented. Mere physical Nature leads him not hither. (Pestalozzi 1907) p.160.

114. Although the course of Nature in the development of man is laid down by God, nevertheless, when children are left entirely to themselves, only primitive instincts are awakened, whereas it is man's object—it is the aim of the Elementary Method, it is the aim of the wise and god-fearing—to call the human and Divine elements into life. (Pestalozzi 1912c) p.271.

115. Even before the child is born, the germs of future capacity are all there. Man's powers continue to develop through his whole life, just as in the case with the tree. His capacities are distinct from, and independent of, one another... His varied powers work together to a common end—manhood, the inner nature of which is not dependent upon the body. From (Green 1912) p.189.

116. Never forget this physical nearness or distance of all objects around you has an immense effect in determining your positive sense impressions [*Anschauung*], practical ability and even virtue. But even this law of your nature converges as a whole towards another. It converges towards the centre of our whole being, and we ourselves are this centre. Man! never forget it! All that you are, all you wish, all you might be, comes out of yourself. All must have a centre in your physical sense impression [*Anschauung*], and this again is yourself... (Pestalozzi 1907) pp.202-203.

117. Pestalozzi on why moral education is of fundamental importance, "The subordination of intellectual education to moral education follows on directly from

the recognition of the basic aim of education: the elevation of ourselves to a sense of the inner dignity of our nature, and of the pure higher, godly being, which lies within us. This sense is not developed by the power of our mind in thought, but is developed by the power of our heart in love." From (Heafford 1967) p.60.

118. [From Pestalozzi's address to his school on New Years Day 1809.] Amongst us, neither vanity nor fear, neither honor nor shame, neither reward nor punishment, as they are elsewhere almost universally used, purposely and as part of the method, are used to show you the path in which you are to go. The divine nature, which is in you, is counted holy in you. You are, among us, what the divine nature within you and without you summons you to be. We oppose no vile force against your gifts or your tendencies; we constrain them not—we only develop them. ... We do not instill into you what is ours, what exists in us as corrupted by ourselves; we develop in you what remains uncorrupted within yourselves... It is far from us to make you men as we are. It is far from us to make you such men as the majority of the men of the time are. Under our hands, you will become such men as your natures require; as the holy, the divine, within your natures require... From (Biber 1859) p.176.

119. Nature forms the child as an indivisible whole, as a vital organic unity with many-sided moral, mental, and physical capacities. She wishes that none of these capacities remain undeveloped. Where nature has influence and the child is well and truly guided by her, she develops the child's heart, mind, and body in harmonious unity. The development of the one is not only indivisibly linked with the development of the other, but each of these capacities is developed through and by means of the others." (Heafford 1967) pp.47-48.

120. A child is a being endowed with all the faculties of human nature, but none of them developed: *a bud not yet opened*. When the bud is unclosed, every one of the leaves unfolds, not one remains behind. Such must be the process of education.

No faculty in human nature but must be treated with the same attention; for their co-agency alone can ensure their success. (Pestalozzi 1827a) p.7.

121. Conversely, only that which affects man as an indissoluble unit is educative in our sense of that word. It must reach his hand and his heart as well as his head. No partial approach can be satisfactory. To consider any one capacity exclusively (head or heart or hand) is to undermine and destroy man's native equilibrium. It means unnatural methods of training, and produces partial human products. It is as wrong to think only of morality and religion as it is to have the intellect solely in mind...

The unity of human faculties is a Divine and permanent gift to the race. Respect for that unity is an essential condition of successful education. "What God has joined let no man put asunder." Whoever disregards this principle in the practice of education, in any way whatever, makes but half-men of us, in whom no satisfaction can be sought or found...

Want of balance, whether it is due to excessive emotional or to excessive intellectual development, brings ultimate discomfiture. (Pestalozzi 1912c) pp.268-269.

122. If I say that any subject will do for the purpose {of education}, I mean this literally. Not only there is not one of the little incidents in the life of a child, in his amusements and recreations, in his relation to his parents and friends and playfellows, but there is not actually anything within the reach of the child's attention, whether it belong to nature or to the employments and arts of life, that might not be made the object of a lesson by which some useful knowledge might be imparted, and, which is still more important, by which the child might not be familiarized with the habit of thinking on what he sees and speaking after he has thought.

The mode of doing this is not by any means to talk much to a child, but to enter into conversation *with* a child; ... *From Pestalozzi's Letters to James Pierrepont Greaves Letter XXIX, April 4, 1819* (Anderson 1931) pp.199-200.

123. Perhaps the most fearful gift that a fiendish spirit has made to this age is *knowledge without power of doing* {*Fertigkeit*} and *insight without that power of exertion or of overcoming* that makes it possible and easy for our life to be in harmony with our inmost nature.

Man! needing much and desiring all, thou must, to satisfy thy wants and wishes, *know* and *think*, but for this thou must also {*can* and} *do*. And knowing and doing are so closely connected, that if one ceases the other ceases with it. (Pestalozzi 1907) p.173.

124. Whenever we put empty words into a child's mind, and impress upon his memory, as if they were real knowledge, or genuine means of acquiring it, even when neither his feelings nor his experience of things are in a position to furnish clues to their meaning, we are obviously deviating from the principle, "Life teaches"... We are sowing the seeds of callous insincerity and shallowness to which is due so much of the blundering arrogance which is characteristic of our time. *From Pestalozzi's The Swansong* in (Green 1912) p.293.

125. On the intellectual side, we accept the same fundamental principle, *Life Educates*. Just as moral education begins in inner experiences—i.e., in impressions which touch our feelings—so the education of the intellect results from the experience of objects which act as stimuli upon our senses. *From The Swansong* in (Green 1912) p.290.

126. But if a mother is to teach by THINGS, she must recollect also, that to the formation of ideas, more is requisite, than the bringing the object before the senses. Its qualities must be explained; its origin must be accounted for; its parts must be described, and their relation to the whole ascertained; its use, its effect or consequences, must be stated. (Pestalozzi 1827f) p.123.

127. To have a knowledge of words with no distinct idea of the things they represent enormously increases the difficulty of getting at the truth.... {children} should learn to read first in the Book of Nature. *From Pestalozzi's diary Feb. 2, 1774* (Russell 1926) p.17.

128. ...the first rule is to teach always by *things* rather than by *words*....

Whenever the knowledge of an abstract idea, which will not of course admit of any representation of that kind [representation by things rather than words], is to be communicated to the child, on the same principle an equivalent of that representation should be given by an exemplification through the medium of a fact laid before the child. This is the original intention and use of moral tales; and, this, too, agrees with the excellent old adage, "The way by precept is long and laborious, that by example short and easy." (Pestalozzi 1827f) pp.195-197.

129. In rainy weather toadstools grow fast on every dunghheap; and in the same way definitions, not founded on sense-impression, produce, just as quickly, a fungus-like wisdom, which dies just as quickly in the sunlight, and which looks upon the clear sky as poison to it. The baseless, wordy show of such baseless wisdom produces men, who believe they have reached the end in all subjects, because their life is a tiresome babble about this end. (Pestalozzi 1907) p.58.

130. To the want of this distinction [*Things v. Words*—the title of the letter] I think we may safely ascribe much of the waste of time, and the deceptive exhibition of apparent knowledge, which is so frequent in schools, both of a higher and of a

lower character. ... No doubt a proceeding of this sort... is the most commodious system for the indolence or ignorance of those who practise upon it as a system of instruction. Add to which the powerful stimulus of vanity in the pupils—the hope of distinction and reward for some, the fear of exposure or punishment in others—and we shall have the principal motives before us owing to which this system, in spite of its wretchedness, has so long been patronized by those who do not think at all, and tolerated by those who do not sufficiently think for themselves. (Pestalozzi 1827f) p.195.

131. The mania for words and books, which pervades our whole system of popular education, has taught us at least this—that we can not remain as we are. Everything confirms me in my opinion that the only way of escaping the civil, moral, and religious degradation, is to have done with the superficiality, narrowness, and other errors of our popular instruction, and to recognize sense-impression as the real foundation of all knowledge. (Russell 1926) p.100.

132. I saw in this combination of unschooled ignorance a power of seeing [*Anschauung*], and a firm conception of the known and the seen of which our ABC puppets have no notion.

I learned from them—I must have been blind if I had not learned—to know the natural relation in which real knowledge stands to book-knowledge. I learnt from them what a disadvantage this one-sided letter-knowledge and entire reliance on words (which is only sound and noise when there is nothing behind them) must be. I saw what a real hindrance this may be to the real power of observation [*Anschauung*], and the firm conception of the objects that surround us. (Pestalozzi 1907) pp.18-19.

133. The possibility of a straight forward psychological achievement of this idea [simple stages of general human development in *The Elementary Method*] depends on the recognition of the difference between the method of unfolding man's fundamental capacities, which follow certain unchangeable laws, and the methods adopted in teaching special branches of knowledge and special dexterities in which those powers are applied.

... These last differ from each other as completely as the objects which we strive to know and put to use, and as completely as the position and circumstances of the individuals concerned differ. *The Elementary Method* proposes to avoid confusion by giving the first place to the methods of developing capacity. These are constant. (Green 1912) p.284.

... the problem of education ... does not consist in communicating special knowledge or special dexterities, but in developing the fundamental human powers. (Green 1912) p.196.

134. The general elevation of these inward powers of the human mind to a pure human wisdom, is the universal purpose of the education even of the lowest men. The practice, application and use of these powers and this wisdom, under special circumstances and conditions of humanity, is education for a profession or social condition. These must always be kept subordinate to the general object of human training....

To him who is not a Man, a man developed in his inmost powers, to him is wanting a basis for an education suited to his immediate destiny and to his special circumstances, such as no external elevation can excuse. (Pestalozzi 1859a) p.156.

135. Any method, that brands the brow of the learner with the stamp of completely stifled natural powers, and the want of common sense and mother-wit, is

condemned by me, whatever other advantages it may have. I do not deny that even *such* methods may produce good tailors, shoemakers, tradesmen, and soldiers; but I do deny that they can produce a tailor or a tradesman who is *a man* in the highest sense of the word. Oh! if men could only comprehend that the aim of all instruction is, and can be, no other but the development of human nature, by the harmonious cultivation of its powers and talents, and the promotion of manliness of life. (Pestalozzi 1907) pp.156-157.

136. We must bear in mind that the ultimate end of education is, not a perfection in the accomplishments of the school, but fitness for life; not the acquirement of habits of blind obedience and of prescribed diligence, but a preparation for independent action. We must bear in mind that, whatever class of society a pupil may belong to, whatever calling he may be intended for, there are certain faculties in human nature common to all, which constitute the stock of the fundamental energies of man. We have no right to withhold from anyone the opportunities of developing all their faculties... I repeat that we have no right to shut out the child from the development of those faculties also, which we may not for the present conceive to be very essential for his future calling or station in life. (Pestalozzi 1827c) p.85

137. *From Letters to James Pierrepont Greaves Letter XXXII April 25, 1819.* In order to give the character described here [a happy and fulfilled one] to the action and to the life of an individual, I consider it as necessary that all the faculties implanted in human nature should be properly developed. It is not that *virtuosity* ought to be attained in any direction, or that a degree of excellence ought to be anxiously aspired to which is the exclusive privilege of pre-eminent talent. But there is a degree of development of all the faculties which is far from the refinement of any; and of such a course that great advantage will be to prepare the mind for a more especial application to any line of studies congenial to its inclination, or connected with certain pursuits.

[In a footnote Pestalozzi then quotes Locke, "The business of education, in respect of knowledge, is not to perfect the learner in all or any one of the sciences; but to give his mind that disposition, and those habits, that may enable him to attain any part of knowledge he shall stand in need of in the future course of his life."] (Anderson 1931) p.211.

138. Men, fathers, force not the faculties of your children into paths too distant, before they have attained strength by exercise, and avoid harshness and over-fatigue.

When this right order of proceedings is anticipated, the faculties of the mind are weakened, and lose their steadiness, and the equipoise of their structure.

This you do when, before making them sensitive to truth and wisdom by the real knowledge of actual objects, you engage them in the thousand-fold confusions of word-learning and opinions; and lay the foundation of their mental character and of the first determination of their powers, instead of with truth and actual objects, with sounds and speech—and words. (Pestalozzi 1859a) p.157.

139. The child's own impulses induce free activity, and instruction must not hurry to interfere. It must only make demands for which the child is already prepared. When he *feels*, "I can do that now," then we may ask him to do it. The child must be allowed to take chalk, pencil, charcoal, etc., in his hand, and draw straight and crooked lines all over without attempting to interfere and correct. Only when the child begins of its own accord to imitate easy words, pleasant sounds, and to take pleasure in the changes and more accurate representation of his random strokes; only when he is stimulated to imitate a greater variety of words and sounds, and to

make his strokes more correct and varied, does the thought awaken in him: "My dear mother can help me to do this, which I very much want to do, but cannot do properly." *Then* is the time when instruction can be offered to the child in a natural way; then and then only should it be offered to him. In all departments of practical education the mode of procedure is the same. From (Green 1912) p.312.

140. The mechanism of Nature as a whole is great and simple. Man! imitate it. Imitate this action of great Nature, who out of the seed of the largest tree produces a scarcely perceptible shoot, then, just as imperceptibly, daily and hourly by gradual stages, unfolds first the beginnings of the stem, then the bough, then the branch, then the extreme twig on which hangs the perishable leaf.

Consider carefully this action of great Nature, how she tends and perfects every single part as it is formed, and joins on every new part to the permanent life of the old...

The mechanism of physical human nature is essentially subject to the same laws by which physical Nature generally unfolds her powers. (Pestalozzi 1907) pp. 202-203.

141. When I recommend to a mother to avoid *wearying* a child by her instructions, I do not wish to encourage the notion that instruction should always take the character of an amusement, or even of a play. I am convinced that such a notion, where it is entertained and acted upon by a teacher, will forever preclude solidity of knowledge, and from a want of sufficient exertions on the part of the pupils, will lead to that very result which I wish to avoid by my principle of a constant employment of the thinking powers.

A child must very early in life be taught a lesson which frequently comes too late, and is then a most painful one,—that exertion is indispensable for the attainment of knowledge. But a child should not be taught to look upon exertion as an unavoidable *evil*. (Pestalozzi 1827g) p.130.

142. Man is in general very incapable of comprehending great, general points of view, and, on the other hand, very apt in rightly comprehending a single definite object and in working himself into a thorough knowledge of it, and one can more easily find a thousand men who are in a position to abstract principles of education from the observation of their own children than a single one who through reflection on nature and the general needs of man makes himself capable in a particular case of educating a particular child for the demands of his particular situation. (Pestalozzi 1931 a) pp.39-40.

143. You must generally distinguish between the laws of Nature and her course, that is, her single workings, and statements about those workings. In her laws she is eternal truth, and for us, the eternal standard of all truth; but in her modifications, in which her laws apply to every individual and to every case, her truth does not satisfy and content our race. The positive truth of the condition and circumstances of any individual case claims the same equal right of necessity, by virtue of eternal laws, as the common law of human nature itself. Consequently, the claim of necessity of both laws must be brought into harmony, if they are to work satisfactorily for men. (Pestalozzi 1907) pp.159-160.

144. But then indeed the individual circumstances of man are so infinitely various that it seems to me that if all the animals of earth had to be educated each to his career they would not have to be fitted for more dissimilar situations than has man alone. (Pestalozzi 1931 a) p.37.

145. What makes me more assertive—and, I believe, more to be excused for being so—is that, instead of yielding to the systematic spirit, I grant as little as possible to reasoning and I trust only observation. I found myself not on what I have imagined but on what I have seen. It is true that I have not restricted my experience to the compass of a city's walls or to a single class of people. But after having compared as many ranks and peoples as I could see in a life spent observing them, I have eliminated as artificial what belonged to one people and not to another, to one station and not to another, and have regarded as incontestably belonging to man only what was common to all, at whatever age, in whatever rank, and in whatever nation. (Rousseau 1979) p.254.

146. Central point of life, individual destiny of man, thou art the book of nature. In thee lieth the power and the plan of that wise teacher; and every school education not erected upon the principles of human development, leads astray. (Pestalozzi 1859a) p.155.

It is to this end [finding a new approach to education] that I have devoted my whole time and attention, for this purpose I have endeavoured to trace nature to her source, and sought to find in her, the means, when properly applied, that will effectually relieve the powers of the mind from their Egyptian State of Bondage, that will awaken slumbering faculties, that will put the whole energies of the soul into a state of action, and will cause to germinate and fructify those seeds of Knowledge which the God of all Life has implanted in Man, and finally convert a physical corporal subject, into a rational thinking Being. The means which I come forward to offer, is not a system of Education, warp'd by the sophistry of Art, but one founded on the most simple Laws of nature.

After a life spent in the most minute researches and careful examination of elementary principles, I have the gratification to see the means that I have adopted, Which are faith and love themselves brought into action by natural simplicity, succeed in many points, not only in my own Establishment, but in that of numbers of others that have adopted and practiced my system. (Pestalozzi 1818) pp.3-4.

147. In my later years and especially since the founding of my boarding establishment I have, in cooperation with my friends, endeavored to organize the several means of developing the individual powers and capacities in a psychological sequence corresponding to the course through which nature herself develops these powers. The cultivation of these several powers, respectively, in accordance with the laws of nature has seemed to my house almost ever since its origin to be the problem the solution of which should be considered the task of the pedagogy of our time. (Pestalozzi 1931d) pp.131-132.

148. [in answer to his own question as to what is the art of education] I answer it is the art of the gardener under whose protective care a thousand trees grow and flourish. Notice that he contributes nothing to their growth in itself. Their growth depends essentially on themselves... So the educator. It is not he who endows man with capacity of any sort; he only sees to it that no external force should hinder or disturb natural course of development of any capacity... (Pestalozzi 1931d) pp.127-128.

149. The germ, out of which the feelings that are essential to religion and morality spring, is the same from which the whole spirit of my method of teaching arises. It begins entirely in the natural relation, which exists between the infant and its mother, and essentially rests on the Art of connection, instruction, from the



cradle upwards, with this natural relation, and building it with continuous Art upon a state of mind that resembles our dependence on the Author of our being. (Pestalozzi 1907) p.191.

150. I have recognised the Eternal *in myself*. I have *seen* the way of The Lord, I have *read* the laws of the Almighty in the dust, I have *sought* out the ways of His love in my heart I *know* in whom I *believe*. My trust in God becomes infinite through my self-knowledge, and through the insight germinated in it, of the laws of the moral world. (Pestalozzi 1907) p.196.

151. Thus, we find human being even at the earliest stages of boyhood fitted for the highest and most important concern of mankind, for the fulfillment of his destiny and mission, which is the representation of the divine nature within him. [This, he goes on to say, is the purpose of his educational program] (Froebel 1890) p.332.

152. The whole purpose of education must of necessity be to foster the realization of the divine principle in man. From (Lawrence 1952) p.190.

153. The only infallible remedy for counteracting any shortcoming and even wickedness is to find the originally good side of the human being that has been repressed, disturbed or misled into the shortcoming, and then foster, build up and properly guide the good side... From (Priestman 1952) p.157.

154. We grant space and time to young plants and animals because we know that, in accordance with the laws that live in them, they will develop properly and grow well; young animals and plants are given rest, and arbitrary interference with their growth is avoided, because it is known that the opposite practice would disturb their pure unfolding and sound development; but the young human is looked upon as a piece of wax, a lump of clay, which man can mold into what he pleases. O man, who roamest through garden and field, through meadow and grove, why dost thou close thy mind to the silent teaching of nature?... Thus, O parents, could your children on whom you force in tender years forms and aims against their nature, and who, therefore, walk with you in morbid and unnatural deformity—thus could your children, too, unfold in beauty and develop in all sided harmony! (Froebel 1890) pp. 8-9.

155. We find also three attitudes, spheres of work, and regions of the mind in man: 1.) the region of the soul, the heart, Feeling; 2.) the region of the mind, the head, Intellect; 3.) the region of the active life, the putting forth to actual deed, Will. As mental attitudes these three divisions seem the wider apart the more we contemplate them, as spheres of work and regions of mind they seem quite separate and perfect opposites... The need for the uniting link appears in almost every circumstance of life... To satisfy that need is the most imperative need now set before the human race, ... Intellect, feeling and will would then unite, a many-sided power, to build up and constitute our life. From (Murray 1914) pp.15-16.

156. But every human being is born as a member of a family and a community and a nation, and he can achieve his own growth only as a harmonious part of these larger wholes, and they in turn represent different realms of unity through which it realizes by progressive stages its total growth toward the divine. From (Lawrence 1952) p.188.

157. Froebel, I think, was certainly carried away by his pantheism, and went to the full length of his contemporary Wordsworth, believing even in human pre-existence; the soul was "originally one with God" (Hayward 1904) p.29.

158. It is futile to object that the boy at this age, if he is to reach a certain degree

of skill and insight, ought to direct his whole strength to the learning of words, to verbal instruction, to intellectual culture. On the contrary, genuine experience shows that external, physical, productive activity interspersed in intellectual work strengthens not only the body but in a very marked degree the mind in its various phases of development, so that the mind, after such a refreshing work-bath (I can find no better name), enters upon its intellectual pursuits with new vigour and life. (Froebel 1890) p.237.

159. Play is the highest phase of child development—of human development at this period...

Play is the purest, most spiritual activity of man at this stage, and, at the same time, typical of human life as a whole—of the inner hidden natural life in man and all things... It holds the source of all that is good. A child that plays thoroughly, with self-active determination, persevering until physical fatigue forbids, will surely be a thorough, determined man, capable of self-sacrifice for the promotion of the welfare of himself and others.

As already indicated, play at this time is not trivial, it is highly serious and of deep significance. Cultivate and foster it, O mother; protect and guard it, O father! to the calm, keen vision of one who truly knows human nature, the spontaneous play of the a child discloses the future inner life of the man. (Froebel 1890) pp. 54-55.

160. Sharp limits and definite subdivisions with the continuous series of the years of development, withdrawing from attention the permanent continuity, the living connection, the inner living essence, are therefore highly pernicious, and even destructive in their influence. Thus, it is highly pernicious to consider the stages of human development—infant, child, boy or girl, youth or maiden, man or woman, old man or matron—as really distinct and not as life shows them, as continuous in themselves, in unbroken transitions; highly pernicious to consider the child or boy as something wholly different from the youth or man, and as something so distinct that the common foundations (human being) is seen but vaguely in the idea and word, and scarcely at all considered in life and for life. (Froebel 1890) p.28.

161. Therefore the child should, from the very time of his birth, be viewed in accordance with his nature, treated correctly, and given the free, all-sided use of his powers. By no means should the use of certain powers and members be enhanced at the expense of others, and these hindered in their development; the child should neither be partly chained, fettered, nor swathed; nor, later on, spoiled by too much assistance. (Froebel 1890) p.21.

162. Therefore, we ought to at last understand that we do great violence to boy-nature when we repress and supplant these normal many-sided tendencies in the growing human being; when, in the belief of doing service to God and man, and of promoting the future earthly prosperity, inner peace, and heavenly salvation of the boy, we cut off one or the other of these tendencies and graft others in their places.

God neither engrafts nor inoculates. He develops the most trivial and imperfect things in continuously ascending series and in accordance with eternal self-grounded and self-developing laws. (Froebel 1890) p.328.

163. It is my thesis that significant portions of the modern psychologies, and especially the clinical psychologies, are actually instances of religio-ethical thinking. They are, in fact, mixed disciplines which contain examples of religious, ethical, and scientific language. To state this about the modern psychologies is certainly to go against their own self-understanding.... But when many of these psychologies are

submitted to careful analysis one discovers that they have religious and moral horizons about which both they and the general public are unclear. (Browning 1987) p.8.

164. The achievement of personality means nothing less than the optimum development of the whole individual human being. ...Personality is the supreme realization of the innate indiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination. To educate a man to *this* seems to me no light matter. It is surely the hardest task the modern mind has set itself. (Jung 1954c) p.171 § 289.

165. As we know this question [of "making wholes"] has occupied the most adventurous minds of the East for more than two thousand years, and in this respect methods and philosophical doctrines have been developed which simply put all Western attempts along these lines into the shade. Our attempts have, with few exceptions, all stopped short at either magic (mystery cults, amongst which we must include Christianity) or intellectualism (philosophy from Pythagoras to Schopenhauer). It is only the tragedies of Goethe's *Faust* and Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* which mark the first glimmerings of a break-through of total experience in our Western hemisphere. [In a footnote he includes William Blake.] (Jung 1958b) pp.554-555 § 905.

166. Earlier, I raised the question of whether we have anything like satori in the West. If we discount the sayings of our Western mystics, a superficial glance discloses nothing that could be likened to it in even the faintest degree. ...In India it was yoga and in China Buddhism which supplied the driving force for these attempts to wrench oneself free from bondage to a state of consciousness that was felt to be incomplete. So far as Western mysticism is concerned, its texts are full of instructions as to how man can and must release himself from the "I-ness" of his consciousness, so that through knowledge of his own nature he may rise above it and attain the inner (godlike) man. (Jung 1958b) p.545 § 890.

167. Personality, as the complete realization of our whole being, is an unattainable ideal. But unattainability is no argument against the ideal, for ideals are only signposts, never the goal. (Jung 1954c) p.172 § 291.

168. [Jung, from an interview four days before his death] All that I have learned has led me step by step to an unshakable conviction of the existence of God. I only believe in what I know. And that eliminates believing. Therefore I do not take his existence on belief—I *know* that he exists. From (Sands 1961).

[Jung, answering the question, "Do you now believe in God?"] I *know*. I don't need to believe. I know. (Jung 1957) p.4

169. Freud has unfortunately overlooked the fact that man has never yet been able single-handed to hold his own against the powers of darkness—that is, of the unconscious. Man has always stood in need of the spiritual help which his particular religion held out to him. ...It was to arm himself against this threat and to heal the damage done that he developed religious and magical practices. This is why the medicine-man is also the priest; he is the saviour of the soul as well as of the body, and religions are systems of healing for psychic illness. This is especially true of the two greatest religions of humanity, Christianity and Buddhism. Man is never helped in his suffering by what he thinks of for himself; only suprahuman, revealed truth lifts him out of his distress. (Jung 1958e) p.344 § 531.

170. Among all my patients in the second half of life—that is to say, over thirty-five—there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of

finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that every one of them fell ill because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook. This of course has nothing whatever to do with a particular creed or membership of a church. (Jung 1958e) p.334 § 509.

Ordinary reasonableness, sound human judgement, science as a compendium of common sense, these certainly help us over a good part of the road, but they never take us beyond the frontiers of life's most commonplace realities, beyond the merely average and normal. They afford no answer to the question of psychic suffering and its profound significance. A psychoneurosis must be understood, ultimately, as the suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning. But all creativeness in the realm of spirit as well as every psychic advance of man arises from the suffering of the soul, and the cause of the suffering is spiritual stagnation, or psychic sterility. (Jung 1958e) p.331 § 497.

171. To the extent that a man is untrue to the law of his being and does not rise to personality, he has failed to realize his life's meaning. Fortunately, in her kindness and patience, Nature never puts the fatal question as to the meaning of their lives into the mouths of most people. And where no one asks, no one need answer. (Jung 1954c) p.183 § 314.

172. ... it is only meaning that liberates. (Jung 1958e) p.330 § 496. (See fuller quotation in appendix note 188.)

173. The way of successive assimilation goes far beyond the curative results that specifically concern the doctor. It leads in the end to that distant goal which may perhaps have been the first urge to life: the complete actualization of the whole human being, that is, individuation. (Jung 1954h) p.160 § 352.

174. Since the ultimate authority of life lies within the individual, there is nothing more important in life than to develop the innate tendency of the psyche to realize its wholeness. The psyche demands to be developed and to be made whole; obedience to this command is the highest good and the ultimate concern of life. (Smith 1990) p.89.

175. The attainment of wholeness requires one to stake one's whole being. Nothing less will do; there can be no easier conditions, no substitutions, no compromises. (Jung 1958b) p.556 § 906.

176. I have called this wholeness which transcends consciousness the "self." The goal of the individuation process is the synthesis of the self. From another point of view the term "entelechy" might be preferable to "synthesis." There is empirical reason why "entelechy" is, in certain conditions, more fitting: the symbols of wholeness frequently occur at the beginning of the individuation process, indeed they can often be observed in the first dreams of early infancy. This observation says much for the *a priori* existence of potential wholeness, and on this account the idea of *entelechy* instantly recommends itself. (Jung 1959c) pp.164-165 § 278.

177. The culture of joy [Jungian and humanistic psychology]...sees the world as basically harmonious. It also sees human wants and needs as easily reconciled and coordinated in almost frictionless compatibility. This state is especially realized by people who are true to their own most basic natures. (Browning 1987) p.5.

178. [From a letter of Jung to D. Hoch, 28<sup>th</sup> May 1952] I am completely of your opinion that a man only lives, and lives ever completely, if he is related to God, who stands over him and defines him. From (Heisig 1979) p.78n.

179. The psychological interest of the present time is an indication that modern

man expects something from the psyche which the outer world has not given him: doubtless something which our religion ought to contain, but no longer does contain, at least for modern man. For him the various forms of religion no longer appear to come from within, from the psyche; they seem more like items from the inventory of the outside world. (Jung 1964b) p.83 § 168.

180. I want to make clear that by the term “religion” I do not mean a creed. It is, however, true that every creed is originally based on one hand upon the experience of the *numinosum* and on the other hand upon {Greek word for ‘faith’}, that is to say, trust or loyalty, faith and confidence in a certain experience of a numinous nature and in the change of consciousness that ensues. The conversion of Paul is a striking example of this. We might say, then, that the term “religion” designates the attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of the *numinosum*.

Credo is codified and dogmatized forms of original religious experience. The contents of the experience have become sanctified and are usually congealed in a rigid, often elaborate, structure of ideas. ...The psychologist, if he takes up a scientific attitude, has to disregard the claim of every creed to be unique and eternal truth. He must keep his eye on the human side of the religious problem, since he is concerned with the original religious experience quite apart from what the creeds have made of it. (Jung 1958d) pp.8-9 § 9-10.

181. The tremendous effectiveness of these images [God images] is such that they not only give one the feeling of pointing to the *Ens realissimum*, but make one convinced that they actually express it and establish it as a fact. This makes discussion uncommonly difficult, if not impossible. It is, in fact, impossible to demonstrate God’s reality to oneself except by using images which have arisen spontaneously or are sanctified by tradition, and whose psychic nature and effects the naïve-minded person has never separated from their unknowable metaphysical background. He instantly equates the effective image with the transcendental *x* to which it points. ...it must be remembered that the image and the statement are psychic processes which are different from their transcendental object; they do not posit it, they merely point to it. In the realm of psychic processes criticism and discussion are not only permissible but are unavoidable. (Jung 1958a) p.363 § 558.

182. It is a misunderstanding to accuse me of having made out of this an “immanent God” or a “God-substitute.” I am an empiricist and as such I can demonstrate empirically the existence of a totality supraordinate to consciousness. Consciousness experiences this supraordinate totality as something numinous, as a *tremendum* or *fascinosum*. As an empiricist I am interested only in the experiential character of this totality, which in itself, ontologically considered, is indescribable. This “self” never at any time takes the place of God, though it may perhaps be a vessel for divine grace. (Jung 1964a) p.463 § 874.

183. As I have shown elsewhere, an experience of the self may be expected as a result of these psychotherapeutic endeavours, and quite often these experiences are numinous. It is not worth the effort to try to describe their totality character. Anyone who has experienced anything of the sort will know what I mean, and anyone who has not had the experience will not be satisfied by any amount of descriptions. Moreover there are countless descriptions of it in world literature. But I know of no case in which the bare description conveyed the experience. (Jung 1963) p.547 § 779.

184. One hopes to control the unconscious, but the past masters in the art of

self-control, the yogis, attain perfection in *samadhi*, a state of ecstasy, which so far as we know is equivalent to a state of unconsciousness. It makes no difference whether they call our unconscious a “universal consciousness”; the fact remains that in their case the unconscious has swallowed up ego-consciousness. ... “Universal consciousness” is logically identical with unconsciousness. It is nevertheless true that a correct application of the methods described in the Pali Canon or in the *Yoga-sutra* induces a remarkable extension of consciousness. But, with increasing extension, the contents of consciousness lose in clarity of detail. In the end, consciousness becomes all-embracing, but nebulous; an infinite number of things merge into an indefinite whole, a state in which subject and object are almost completely identical. This is all very beautiful, but scarcely to be recommended anywhere north of the Tropic of Cancer. (Jung 1959b) pp.287-288 § 520.

185. When I once remarked to Jung that his psychological insights and his attitude to the unconscious seemed to me to be in many respects the same as those of the most archaic religions—for example shamanism, or the religion of the Naskapi Indians who have neither priest nor ritual...—Jung answered with a laugh: “Well, that’s nothing to be ashamed of. It is an honor!” ... The basis and substance of Jung’s entire life and work do not lie in the traditions and religions which have become contents of collective consciousness, but rather in that primordial experience which is the final source of these contents: the encounter of the single individual with his own god or daimon, his struggle with the overpowering emotions, affects, fantasies and creative inspirations and obstacles which come to light from within. (von Franz 1975) pp.13-14.

186. Jung’s discovery of the technique of active imagination is a return to the oldest known forms of meditation, as they existed *before* the subsequent development into yoga, Buddhistic meditation and Taoist alchemy. It was as if he had been carried back over the millennia, in one daring leap, to that world in which primordial man, completely naïve, first began to make contact with the world of the spirit. Unlike the shamans Jung did not enter this world in a trance-state, but rather in full consciousness and without any diminution of the individual moral responsibility which is one of the attainments of Western culture. This is something new and unique, something which cannot be compared with the earlier stages of culture which have been described. (von Franz 1975) pp.116-117.

187. In spite of his own self-understanding as a scientist taking a purely phenomenological approach to the study of psychology, Jung lapsed into both religious and ethical judgements at every turn. His psychological models quickly become metaphors orienting his readers to the meaning of life, and his descriptions of health and wholeness rapidly became moral prescriptions. (Browning 1987) p.164.

188. Even though the theories of Freud and Adler come much nearer to getting at the bottom of the neuroses than any earlier approach from the medical side, their exclusive concern with the instincts fails to satisfy the deeper spiritual needs of the patient. They are too much bound by the premises of nineteenth-century science, too matter of fact, and they give too little value to fictional and imaginative processes. In a word, they do not give enough meaning to life. And it is only meaning that liberates. (Jung 1958e) pp.330 § 496.

189. “Physical” is not the only criterion of truth: there are also *psychic* truths which can neither be explained nor proved nor contested in any physical way... Religious statements are of this type. They refer without exception to things that cannot be established as physical facts.

The psyche is an autonomous factor, and religious statements are psychic confessions which in the last resort are based on unconscious, i.e., on transcendental, processes. These processes are not accessible to physical perception but demonstrate their existence through the confession of the psyche. The resultant statements are filtered through the medium of human consciousness: that is to say, they are given visible forms which in their turn are subject to manifold influences from within and without. That is why whenever we speak of religious contents we move in a world of images that point to something ineffable. We do not know how clear or unclear these images, metaphors, and concepts are in respect of their transcendental object. If, for instance, we say "God," we give expression to an image or verbal concept which has undergone many changes in the course of time. We are, however, unable to say with any degree of certainty—unless it be by faith—whether these changes affect only the images and concepts, or the Unspeakable itself. ...There is no doubt that there is something behind these images that transcends consciousness and operates in such a way that the statements do not vary limitlessly and chaotically, but clearly all relate to a few basic principles or archetypes. These, like the psyche itself, or like matter are unknowable as such. All we can do is to construct models of them which we know to be inadequate, a fact which is confirmed again and again by religious statements. (Jung 1958a) pp.359-361 § 553-555.

190. I do not believe that I am going too far when I say that modern man, in contrast to his nineteenth-century brother, turns to the psyche with very great expectations, and does so without reference to any traditional creed but rather with a view to Gnostic experience. ...Modern man abhors faith and the religions based upon it. He holds them valid only so far as their knowledge-content seems to accord with his own experience of the psychic background. He wants to *know*—to experience for himself. (Jung 1964b) pp.83-84 § 171.

191. The common background of microphysics and depth-psychology is as much physical as psychic and therefore neither, but rather a third thing; a neutral nature which can at most be grasped in hints since in essence it is transcendental. (Jung 1963) p.538 § 768.

192. ...if you have insight "you use your inner eye, your inner ear, to pierce to the heart of things, and have no need of intellectual knowledge." [quoting Chaung-Tzu] This is obviously an allusion to the absolute knowledge of the unconscious. (Jung 1960e) p.489 § 923.

193. Religious experience is absolute; it is not to be disputed. You can only say that you have never had such an experience, whereupon your opponent will reply: "Sorry, I have." And there your discussion will come to an end. No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses a great treasure, a thing that has become for him a source of life, meaning, and beauty, and that has given a new splendour to the world and to mankind. He has *pistis* and peace. Where is the criterion by which you could say that such a life is not legitimate, that such an experience is not valid, and that such *pistis* is mere illusion? Is there, as a matter of fact, any better truth about the ultimate things than the one that helps you to live? That is the reason that I take careful account—*religio!*—of the symbols produced by the unconscious. They are the one thing that is capable of convincing the critical mind of modern man. And they are convincing for a very old-fashioned reason: They are *overwhelming*, which is precisely what the Latin word *convincere* means. ... No one can know what the ultimate things are. We must therefore take them as we experience them. And if such experience helps to make life healthier, more beauti-

ful, more complete and more satisfactory to yourself and to those you love, you may safely say: "This is the grace of God." (Jung 1958d) pp.104-105 § 167.

194. For the practical work of dream-analysis one needs a special knack and intuitive understanding on the one hand, and a considerable knowledge of the history of symbols on the other. As in all practical work with psychology, mere intellect is not enough; one also needs feeling, because otherwise the exceedingly important feeling-values of the dream are neglected. Without these, dream-analysis is impossible. As the dream is dreamed by the whole man, it follows that anyone who tries to interpret the dream must be engaged as a whole man too. "*Ars totum requirit hominem*," says an old alchemist. Understanding and knowledge there must be, but they should not set themselves up above the heart, which in its turn must not give way to sentiment. (Jung 1954a) pp.106-107 § 198.

195. ...analytical psychology is a reaction against the exaggerated rationalization of consciousness which, seeking to control nature, isolates itself from her and so robs man of his own natural history. ...That quality of eternity which is so characteristic of the life of primitive man is entirely lacking. Hemmed round by rationalistic walls, we are cut off from the eternity of nature. Analytical psychology seeks to break through these walls by digging up again the fantasy-images of the unconscious which our rationalism has rejected. These images lie beyond the walls; they are part of the nature *in us*, which apparently lies buried in our past and against which we have barricaded ourselves behind the walls of reason. Analytical psychology tries to resolve the resultant conflict not by going "back to Nature" with Rousseau, but by holding on to the level we have successfully reached, and by enriching consciousness with a knowledge of man's psychic foundations. (Jung 1960a) pp.380-381 § 739.

196. One cannot just think up a system or truth which would give the patient what he needs in order to live, namely faith, hope, love, and understanding.

There for the highest achievements of human endeavour are so many gifts of grace, which are neither to be taught nor learned, neither given nor taken, neither withheld nor earned, since they come through experience, which is an irrational datum not subject to human will and caprice. Experiences cannot be *made*. They happen—yet fortunately their independence of man's activity is not absolute but relative. We can draw closer to them—that much lies within our human reach. There are ways which bring us nearer to living experiences, yet we should beware of calling these ways "methods." The very word has a deadening effect. The way to experience, moreover, is anything but a clever trick; it is rather a venture which requires us to commit ourselves with our whole being. (Jung 1958e) pp.331-332 § 500-501.

197. Unity and totality stand at the highest point on the scale of objective values because their symbols can no longer be distinguished from the *imago Dei*. Hence all statements about the God-image apply also to the empirical symbols of totality. ...If this insight were purely intellectual it could be achieved without much difficulty, for the world-wide pronouncements about God within us and above us, about Christ and the *corpus mysticum*, the personal and suprapersonal Atman, etc., are all formulations that can easily be mastered by the philosophic intellect. This is the common source of the illusion that one is then in possession of the thing itself. But actually one has acquired nothing more than its name, despite the age-old prejudice that the name magically represents the thing, and that it is sufficient to pronounce the name in order to posit the thing's existence. In the course of the millennia the reasoning mind has been given every opportunity to see through the futility of this conceit, though that has done nothing to prevent the intellectual mastery of a thing



from being accepted at its face value. It is precisely our experiences in psychology which demonstrates as plainly as could be wished that the intellectual “grasp” of a psychological fact produces no more than a concept of it, and that a concept is not more than a name, a *flatus vocis*... The intellect is undeniably useful in its own field, but it is a great cheat and illusionist outside of it whenever it tries to manipulate values.

...It is through the “affect” that the subject becomes involved and so comes to feel the whole weight of reality. The difference amounts roughly to that between a severe illness which one reads about in a textbook and the real illness which one has. In psychology one possesses nothing unless one has experienced it in reality. Hence a purely intellectual insight is not enough, because one knows only the words and not the substance of the thing from inside. (Jung 1959a) pp.31-33 § 60-61. 198.

198. All the old arguments against unreasonableness, self-deception, and immorality, once so potent, have lost their attraction. We are now reaping the fruit of nineteenth-century education. Throughout that period the Church preached to young people the merit of blind faith, while the universities inculcated an intellectual rationalism, with the result that today we plead in vain whether for faith or reason. Tired of the warfare of opinions, the modern man wishes to find out for himself how things are. ...It is no reckless adventure, but an effort inspired by deep spiritual distress to bring meaning once more into life on the basis of fresh and unprejudiced experience. (Jung 1958e) p.343 § 529.

199. In the East, mind is a cosmic factor, the very essence of existence; while in the West we have just begun to understand that it is the essential condition of cognition, and hence of the cognitive existence of the world. There is no conflict between religion and science in the East, because no science is there based upon the passion for facts, and no religion upon mere faith; there is religious cognition and cognitive religion. With us, man is incommensurably small and the grace of God is everything; but in the East, man is God and he redeems himself. (Jung 1958c) p.480 § 768.

200. *From the power that binds all creatures none is free  
Except the man who wins self-mastery!*

Goethe from (Jung 1953b) p.227 § 380.

201. I have found that dominion and liberty are two incompatible words; therefore, I could be master of a cottage only in ceasing to be master of myself. (Rousseau 1979) p.472.

202. Individuation cuts one off from personal conformity and hence from collectivity. That is the guilt which the individuant leaves behind him for the world, that is the guilt he must endeavour to redeem. He must offer a ransom in place of himself, that is, he must bring forth values which are an equivalent substitute for his absence in the collective personal sphere. Without this production of values, final individuation is immoral and—more than that—suicidal. The man who can not create values should sacrifice himself consciously to the spirit of collective conformity. In so doing, he is free to choose the collectivity to which he will sacrifice himself. Only to the extent that a man creates objective values can he and may he individuate. Every further step in individuation creates new guilt and necessitates new expiation. Hence individuation is possible only so long as substitute values are produced. Individuation is exclusive adaptation to inner reality and hence an allegedly “mystical” process. The expiation is adaptation to the outer world. It has to be

offered to the outer world, with the petition that the outer world accept it. (Jung 1977a) p.451 § 1095.

203. This problem cannot be solved collectively, because the masses are not changed unless the individual changes. At the same time, even the best-looking solution cannot be forced upon him, since it is a good solution only when it is combined with a natural process of development. It is therefore a hopeless undertaking to stake everything on collective recipes and procedures. The bettering of a general ill begins with the individual, and then only when he makes himself and not others responsible. This is naturally only possible in freedom, but not under a rule of force, whether this be exercised by a self-elected tyrant or by one thrown up by the mob. (Jung 1959d) p.349 § 618.

204. Although the conscious achievement of individuality is consistent with man's natural destiny, it is nevertheless not his whole aim. It cannot possibly be the object of human education to create an anarchic conglomeration of individual existences. That would be too much like the unavowed ideal of extreme individualism, which is essentially no more than a morbid reaction against an equally futile collectivism. In contrast to all this, the natural process of individuation brings to birth a consciousness of human community precisely because it makes us aware of the unconscious, which unites and is common to all mankind. Individuation is an at-one-ment with oneself and at the same time with humanity. Once the individual is thus secured in himself, there is some guarantee that the organized accumulation of individuals in the State—even in one wielding greater authority—will result in the formation no longer of an anonymous mass but of a conscious community. The indispensable condition for this is conscious freedom and self-determination or there is no true community, and, it must be said, without such community even the free and self-secured individual cannot in the long run prosper. Moreover, the common weal is best served by independent personalities. (Jung 1954k) p.108 § 227.

205. That fact that the conventions always flourish in one form or another only proves that the vast majority of mankind do not choose their own way, but convention, and consequently develop not themselves but a method and a collective mode of life at the cost of their own wholeness. (Jung 1954c) p.174 § 296.

206. This process [the unconscious is the matrix out of which the conscious grows; for the conscious does not enter the world as a finished product, but is the end-result of small beginnings] continues throughout life, but from puberty onwards it becomes slower, and fewer and fewer fragments of the unconscious are added to consciousness. The greatest and most extensive development takes place during the period between birth and the end of psychic puberty, a period that may normally extend, for a man of our climate and race, to the twenty-fifth year. In the case of a woman it usually ends when she is about nineteen or twenty. ...We reinforce this process in children by education and culture. School is in fact a means of strengthening in a purposeful way the integration of consciousness. (Jung 1954b) p.52 § 104.

207. Just as the child in embryo is practically nothing but a part of the mother's body, and wholly dependent on her, so in early infancy the psyche is to a large extent part of the maternal psyche, and will soon become parental psyche as well. The prime psychological condition is one of fusion with the psychology of the parents, an individual psychology being only potentially present. Hence it is that the nervous and psychic disorders of children right up to school age depend very largely on

disturbances in the psychic world of the parents. All parental difficulties reflect themselves without fail in the psyche of the child, sometimes with pathological results. (Jung 1954b) p.53 § 106.

208. For all lovers of theory, the essential fact behind all this is that the things which have the most powerful effect upon children do not come from the conscious state of the parents but from their unconscious background. For the ethically minded person who may be a father or mother this presents an almost frightening problem, because the things we can manipulate more or less, namely consciousness and its contents, are seen to be ineffectual in comparison with these uncontrollable effects in the background, no matter how hard we may try. (Jung 1954f) p.42 § 84.

209. In this way neurotic states are often passed on from generation to generation, like the curse of Arctus. The children are infected indirectly through the attitude they instinctively adopt towards their parents' state of mind: either they fight against it with unspoken protest (though occasionally the protest is vociferous) or else they succumb to a paralysing and compulsive imitation. In both cases they are obliged to do, to feel, and to live not as *they* want, but as their parents want. The more "impressive" the parents are, and the less they accept their own problems (mostly on the excuse of "sparing the children"), the longer the children will have to suffer from the un-lived life of their parents and the more they will be forced into fulfilling all the things that parents have repressed and kept unconscious. ...The only thing that can save the child from unnatural injury is the efforts of the parents not to shirk the psychic difficulties of life by deceitful manoeuvres or by remaining artificially unconscious, but rather to accept them as tasks, to be as honest with themselves as possible, and to shed a beam of light into the darkest corners of their souls. (Jung 1954a) p.78-79 § 154.

210. Generally speaking, all the life which the parents could have lived, but of which they thwarted themselves for artificial motives, is passed on to the children in substitute form. That is to say, the children are driven unconsciously in a direction that is intended to compensate for everything that was left unfulfilled in the lives of their parents. (Jung 1954g) p.191 § 328.

211. What usually has the strongest psychic effect on the child is the life which the parents (and ancestors too, for we are dealing here with the age-old psychological phenomenon of original sin) have not lived. This statement would be rather too perfunctory and superficial if we did not add by way of qualification: that part of their lives which *might have been* lived had not certain rather threadbare excuses prevented the parents from doing so. To put it bluntly, it is that part of life which they have always shirked, probably by means of a pious lie. That sows the most virulent germs. (Jung 1954f) p.43 § 87.

212. This [identification with parents] is an expression of primitive identity, from which the individual consciousness frees itself only gradually. In this battle for freedom the school plays a not unimportant part, as it is the first milieu the child finds outside his home. School comrades take the place of brothers and sisters; the teacher, if a man, acts as a substitute for the father, and, if a woman, for the mother. It is important that the teacher should be conscious of the role he is playing. He must not be satisfied with merely pounding the curriculum into the child; he must also influence him through his personality. This latter function is at least as important as the actual teaching, if not more so in certain cases. Though it is a misfortune for a child to have no parents, it is equally dangerous for him to be too closely bound to his family. An excessively strong attachment to the parents is a severe handicap in

his later adoption to the world, for a growing human being is not destined to remain forever the child of his parents. ...Success [as a school] does not depend on the method, any more than that it is the exclusive aim of school life to stuff the children's heads with knowledge, but rather to make them real men and women. We need not concern ourselves so much with the amount of specific information a child takes away with him from school; the thing of vital importance is that the school should succeed in freeing the young man from the unconscious identity with his family, and should make him properly conscious of himself. Without this consciousness he will never know what he really wants, but will always remain dependent and imitative, with the feeling of being misunderstood and suppressed. (Jung 1954b) p.55-56 § 107.

213. I suspect our contemporary pedagogical and psychological enthusiasm for the child of dishonourable intentions: we talk about the child but we should mean the child in the adult. For in every adult there lurks a child—an eternal child, something that is always becoming, is never completed, and calls for unceasing care, attention, and education. That is the part of the human personality which wants to develop and become whole. But the man of today is far indeed from this wholeness. (Jung 1954c) p.169 § 286.

214. The fact is that the high ideal of educating the personality is not for children: for what is usually meant by personality—a well-rounded psychic whole that is capable of resistance and abounding in energy—is an *adult ideal*. It is only in an age like ours, when the individual is unconscious of the problems of adult life, or—what is worse—when he consciously shirks them, that people could wish to foist this ideal on to childhood. (Jung 1954c) p.169 § 286.

215. Analytical psychology has given considerable thought to the methods of aiding the adult in his psychic growth, ...I must warn you again most emphatically that it would be very unsound to apply these methods directly to children. (Jung 1954b) p.58 § 111.

216. Through his historical development, the European has become so far removed from his roots that his mind was finally split into faith and knowledge, in the same way that every psychological exaggeration breaks up into its inherent opposites. He needs to return, not to Nature in the manner of Rousseau, but to his own nature. His task is to find the natural man again. Instead of this, there is nothing he likes better than systems and methods by which he can repress the natural man who is everywhere at cross purposes with him. (Jung 1958f) p.534 § 868.

217. There are, besides the gifts of the head, also those of the heart, which are no whit less important, although they may easily be overlooked because in such cases the head is often the weaker organ. And yet people of this kind sometimes contribute more to the well-being of society, and are more valuable, than those with other talents. (Jung 1954e) p.140 § 242.

218. [in reference to the 'child-god', the archetype of one who is "becoming"] The "child" is born out of the womb of the unconscious, begotten out of the depths of human nature, or rather out of living Nature herself. ...The urge and compulsion to self-realization is a law of nature and thus of invincible power, even though its effect, at the start, is insignificant and improbable. (Jung 1959c) pp.170-171 § 289.

219. It is obvious that the purpose and inmost meaning of this new psychology [Jung's analytical psychology] is educational as well as medical. Since every individual is a new and unique combination of psychic elements, the investigation of

truth must begin afresh with each case, for each “case” is individual and not derivable from any preconceived formula. Each individual is a new experiment of life in her ever-changing moods, and an attempt at a new solution or new adaptation. We miss the meaning of the individual psyche if we interpret it on the basis of any fixed theory, however fond of it we may be. (Jung 1954a) p.93 § 173.

220. For the day will inevitably come when what the educator teaches by word of mouth no longer works, but only what he is. Every educator—and I use the term in its widest sense—should constantly ask himself whether he is actually fulfilling his teachings in his own person and in his own life, to the best of his knowledge and with a clear conscience. Psychotherapy has taught us that in the final reckoning it is not knowledge, not technical skill, that has a curative effect, but the personality of the doctor. And it is the same with education: it presupposes self-education. (Jung 1954e) p.140 § 240.

221. Your analytical knowledge should serve your own attitude as an educator first of all, because it is a well-known fact that children have an almost uncanny instinct for the teacher's personal shortcomings. They know the false from the true far better than one likes to admit. Therefore the teacher should watch his own psychic condition, so that he can spot the source of the trouble when anything goes wrong with the children entrusted to his care. He himself may easily be the unconscious cause of evil. ...It is not true that the educator is always the one who educates, and the child always the one to be educated. The educator, too, is a fallible human being, and the child he educates will reflect his failings. Therefore it is wise to be as clear-sighted as possible about one's subjective views, and particularly about one's faults. (Jung 1954a) pp.119-120 § 211.

222. The humanistic psychologists disapprove of the “pathology-centered” theories, i.e., those earlier psychological lines of thought which deduced motivation and personality theories, first and foremost, from more or less “psychic sick” people. The humanistic psychologists try to create motivation and personality theories which can also be applied to “psychic healthy” people. Accordingly, they are interested in areas of investigation which have been, in the past, neglected by psychologists, such areas as creativity, love and self-actualization. (Thorsen 1983) p.20.

223. [Characteristics of the self-actualizing person]

Superior perception of reality.

Increased acceptance of self, of other and of nature.

Increased spontaneity.

Increase in problem-centering.

Increased detachment and desire for privacy.

Increased autonomy, and resistance to enculturation.

Greater freshness of appreciation, and richness of emotional reaction.

Higher frequency of peak experiences.

Increased identification with the human species.

Changed (the clinician would say, improved) interpersonal relations.

More democratic character structure.

Greatly increased creativeness.

Certain changes in the value system.

...Being rather than Becoming (Maslow 1968) p.26.

224. A peak experience is a coming into the realization that what “ought to be” is, ...It tells human beings something about themselves and about the world that is the same truth, and that becomes the pivot of value and an ordering principle for

the hierarchy of meanings. It is the merging of subject and object, involving no loss of subjectivity but what seems its infinite extension. It is individuality freed of isolation. An experience of this sort gives the idea of transcendence an empirical ground. Its typical recurrence for his self-actualizers became for Maslow scientific evidence of what may be the normal psychological or inner life of persons who are fully human. (Geiger 1993) pp.xvi-xvii.

225. The new psychology also has a philosophy of health and sickness... Namely, that sickness comes from the denial of human potential. The good life is the seeking of this potential and daily leading the life that it encourages. This approach concerns the higher possibilities of human beings.... (Maslow 1996e) pp.116-117.

226. Man demonstrates *in his own nature* a pressure toward fuller and fuller Being, more and more perfect actualization of his humanness in exactly the same naturalistic, scientific sense that an acorn may be said to be "pressing toward" being an oak tree, or that a tiger can be observed to "push toward" being tigerish, or a horse toward being equine. Man is ultimately *not* molded or shaped into humanness or taught to be human. The role of the environment is ultimately to permit him or help him to actualize *his own* potentialities, not *its* potentialities. The environment does not give him potentialities and capacities; he *has* them in inchoate or embryonic form, just exactly as he has embryonic arms and legs. And creativeness, spontaneity, selfhood, authenticity, caring for others, being able to love, yearning for truth are embryonic potentialities belonging to his species-membership just as much as are his arms and legs and brain and eyes. (Maslow 1959b) p.130.

227. We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable, theoretical, and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for, growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health or maturation, and specifically as growth toward each and all of the sub-aspects of self-actualization. That is to say, the human being has within him a pressure (among other pressures) toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good, and a lot else. That is, the human being is so constructed that he presses toward fuller and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most people would call good values, toward serenity, kindness, courage, knowledge, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness. (Maslow 1959b) pp.125-126.

228. It [the term "self-actualizing"] stresses "full-humanness," the development of the biologically based nature of man, and therefore is (empirically) normative for the whole species rather than for particular times and places, i.e., it is less culturally relative. It conforms to biological destiny, rather than to historically-arbitrary, culturally-local value-models as the terms "health" and "illness" often do. It also has empirical content and operational meaning. (Maslow 1968) p.vi.

229. The point of view that is rapidly developing now—that the highest spiritual values appear to have naturalistic sanctions and that supernatural sanctions for these values are, therefore, not necessary—raises some questions which have not been raised before in quite this form. For instance, why were supernatural sanctions for goodness, altruism, virtue, and love necessary in the first place?

... one important characteristic of the new "third" psychology is its demonstration of man's "higher nature." As we look back through the religious conceptions of human nature—and indeed we need not look back so very far because the same doctrine can be found in Freud—it becomes crystal clear that any doctrine of the

innate depravity of man or any maligning of his animal nature very easily lead to some extra-human interpretation of goodness, saintliness, virtue, self-sacrifice, altruism, etc. If they can't be explained from within human nature—and explained they must be—then they must be explained from outside of human nature. The worse man is, the poorer a thing he is considered to be, the more necessary becomes a god. It can also be understood more clearly now that one source of the decay of belief in supernatural sanctions has been increasing faith in the higher possibilities of human nature (on the basis of new knowledge). (Maslow 1994) pp.36-37.

230. [From a paper sent by Maslow to Wilson on studying healthy people instead of sick ones.] When I started to explore the psychology of health, I picked out the finest, healthiest people, the best specimens of mankind I could find, and studied them to see what they were like. They were very different, in some ways startlingly different from the average...

I learned many lessons from these people. But one in particular is our concern now. I found that these individuals tended to report having had something like mystic experiences, moments of great awe, moments of the most intense happiness, or even rapture, ecstasy or bliss...

The little that I had ever read about mystic experiences tied them in with religion, with visions of the supernatural. And, like most scientists, I had sniffed at them with disbelief and considered it all nonsense, maybe hallucinations, maybe hysteria—almost surely pathological.

But the people telling me...about these experiences were not such people—they were the healthiest people! ...And I may add that it taught me something about the limitations of the small...orthodox scientist who won't recognize as knowledge, or as reality, any information that doesn't fit into the already existent science. From (Wilson 1972) pp.15-16.

231. This ability to become "lost in the present" seems to be a *sine qua non* for creativeness of any kind. But also certain *prerequisites* of creativeness—in whatever realm—somehow have something to do with this ability to become timeless, selfless, outside of space, of society, of history.

It has begun to appear strongly that this phenomenon is a diluted, more secular, more frequent version of the mystical experience that has been described so often as to have become what Huxley called *The Perennial Philosophy*...

It is always described as a loss of self or of ego, or sometimes as a transcendence of the self. There is a fusion with the reality being observed, ...a oneness where there was a twoness, and integration of some sort of the self with the non-self. There is universally reported a seeing of formerly hidden truth, a revelation in the strict sense, a stripping away of veils, and finally almost always, the whole experience is experienced as bliss, ecstasy, rapture, exaltation. (Maslow 1993) pp.59-60.

232. Most people lose or forget the subjectively religious experience, and redefine Religion as a set of habits, behaviors, dogmas, forms, which at the extreme becomes entirely legalistic and bureaucratic, conventional, empty, and in the truest meaning of the word, anti-religious. The mystic experience, the illumination, the great awakening, along with the charismatic seer who started the whole thing, are forgotten, lost, or transformed into their opposites. Organized Religion, the churches, finally may become the major enemies of the religious experience and the religious experiencer. This is the main thesis of this book. (Maslow 1994) p.viii.

233. We are learning that complete health means being available to yourself at all levels. We can no longer call this side "evil" rather than "good," lower rather than

higher, selfish rather than unselfish, beastly rather than human. Throughout human history and especially the history of Western civilization, and more especially the history of Christianity has there tended to be this dichotomy....

Once we transcend and resolve this dichotomy, once we can put these together into the unity in which they are originally, ...then we can recognize that the dichotomizing or the splitting is itself a pathological process. And then it becomes possible for one's civil war to end. This is precisely what happens in people that I call self-actualizing. (Maslow 1993) p.88.

234. The images of harmony fuse at points in Maslow's writings with what must be called virtually monistic metaphysical metaphors. By monistic images I mean symbols and metaphors that are used to paint an image of the world whose apparently independent parts are so interrelated, interdependent, and harmonious that they are all identified with one another and identical with the divine itself. ...[I]n the nooks and crannies of his [Maslow's] thought, and especially in his descriptions of peak-experiences, monistic images crop up. Monism is characterized by the idea that the sacred is a unified, motionless, timeless, unconditional, and self-caused perfection and, furthermore, that the human self in its depth is a manifestation of the divine life itself. (Browning 1987) p.81.

235. In a certain sense I see the acceptance of the prepotency and the logical priority of experience as another version of the spirit of empiricism itself. One of the beginnings of science, one of the roots from which it grew, was the determination not to take things on faith, trust, logic, or authority but to check and to see for oneself. Experience had shown how often the logic or the a priori certainty or Aristotle's authority failed to work in fact. The lesson was easy to draw. First, before everything else comes the seeing of nature with your own eyes, that is, experiencing it yourself. (Maslow 1966) p.69.

236. Many things in life cannot be transmitted well by words, concepts, or books. Colors that we see cannot be described to man born blind. ...Perhaps it is better to say that all of life must first be known experientially. There is no substitute for experience, none at all. All the other paraphernalia of communication and of knowledge—words, labels, concepts, symbols, theories, formulas, sciences—all are useful only because people already know experientially. The basic coin in the realm of knowing is direct, intimate, experiential knowing. Everything else can be likened to banks and bankers, to accounting systems and checks and paper money, which are useless unless there is real wealth to exchange, to manipulate, to accumulate, and to order.

...Words are fine for communicating and sharing experiences with those who have already experienced.... Even more, words and concepts are absolutely necessary for organizing and ordering the welter of experiences and the ultraexperiential word of which they appraise us. (Maslow 1966) pp.45-46.

237. Practically all scientists (of the impersonal) proceed on the tacit or explicit assumption that one studies classes or groups of things, not single things. Of course you actually look at one thing at a time.... But each one is treated as a sample of a species or of a class, and therefore as interchangeable....

Any one sample is just that, a sample; it is not itself. It stands for something. It is anonymous, expendable, not unique, not sacred, not *sine qua non*; it has no proper name all its own and is not worthwhile in itself as a particular instance. It is interesting only insofar as it represents something other than itself. (Maslow 1966) pp.8-9.

238. The Holistic Approach—If I want to learn something more about you as



an individual person, then I must approach you as a unit, as a one, as a whole. The customary scientific technique of dissection and reductive analysis that has worked so well in the inorganic world and not too badly even in the intrahuman world of living organisms, is just a nuisance when I seek knowledge of a person, and it has real deficiencies even for studying people in general. (Maslow 1966) p.11.

239. ...experiential knowledge is *sine qua non* but not all, i.e., it is necessary but not sufficient. Also we avoid thereby the trap of dichotomizing experiential knowledge from and against conceptual knowledge. My thesis is that experiential knowledge is prior to verbal-conceptual knowledge but that they are hierarchically-integrated and need each other. No human being dare specialize too much in either kind of knowing. (Maslow 1966) p.46.

240. ...experiential knowledge is not enough. Self-knowledge and self-improvement are not enough. The talk of knowing the world and of being competent within it still remains, and therefore also does the task of accumulating and ordering knowledge-about, that is, spectator knowledge, knowledge of the nonhuman.

...The two kinds of knowledge are necessary to each other and under good circumstances can be and should be intimately integrated with each other. (Maslow 1966) p.48.

241. Maslow thought that contemporary American education failed because it focused on extrinsic and coping behavior rather than on expressive behavior and intrinsic learning. ...Maslow blamed behaviorists for focusing exclusively on coping behavior, which, he argued, was the least significant part of personality. Coping behavior is functional, instrumental, adaptive, and the product of the interaction of the character-structure with the world. Coping behavior is learned or acquired in order to deal with specific environmental situations, and dies out if not rewarded or continuously bombarded with stimulus. Since the extrinsic knowledge ensuing from coping behavior is forcefully implanted by operant conditioning or indoctrination, it is never an integral part of personality and thus not perceived as meaningful. ...This type of learning focuses on techniques that are interchangeable and result in automatic habits such as driving or swimming. It is useful learning, but meaningless as far as growth and actualization of the inner character structure. ...In fact, understanding is inimical to behavioral operant conditioning. When conditioning ceases or people understand that they are victims of conditioning, they rebel and dispose of the enforced learning. Earning a degree, reward for scholarly achievement, and other similar practices are by-products of extrinsic education. (De Carvalho 1991) pp.101-102.

242. What is then the correct way of teaching people to be, e.g. engineers? It is quite clear that we must teach them to be creative persons, at least in the sense of being able to confront novelty, to improvise....

...We must develop a race of improvisers, of "here-now" creators. We must define the skillful person or the trained person, or the educated person in a very different way than we used to (i.e., *not* as one who has a rich knowledge of the past so that he can profit from past experiences in a future emergency). Much that we have called learning has become useless. Any kind of learning which is the simple application of the past to the present, or the use of past techniques in the present situation has become obsolete in many areas of life. Education can no longer be considered essentially or only a learning process; it is now also a character training, a person-training process....

All this adds up to increased emphasis on psychological health and strength. It

means an increased valuing of the ability to pay the fullest attention to the here-now situation, to be able to listen well, to be able to see well in the concrete, immediate moment before us...

...Since in essence we are talking about a kind of person, a kind of philosophy, a kind of character, then the stress shifts away from stress on created products, and technological innovations and aesthetic products and innovations, etc. (Maslow 1993) pp.94-95.

243. Classroom learning often has as its unspoken goal the reward of pleasing the teacher. Children in the usual classroom learn very quickly that creativity is punished, while repeating a memorized response is rewarded, and concentrate on what the teacher wants them to say, rather than understanding the problem. (Maslow 1993) p.173.

244. The ideal, thus, was to integrate intrinsic learning with traditional extrinsic learning, such as training of professional skills or education for competence in any field. The main difference was whether this knowledge is sought out of personal need and meaning or as a response to rewarding or punishing stimuli. Knowledge gathered out of personal meaning translated into a lasting expressive behavior that is independent of reinforcing external stimuli. (De Carvalho 1991) p.104.

245. Healthy openness to the mysterious, the realistically humble recognition that we don't know much, the modest and grateful acceptance of gratuitous grace and of just plain good luck—all these can shade over into the anti-rational, the anti-empirical, the anti-scientific, the anti-verbal, the anti-conceptual. The peak-experience may then be exalted as the best or even the *only* path to knowledge, and thereby all the tests and verifications of the *validity* of the illumination may be tossed aside.

The possibility that the inner voices, the “revelations,” may be mistaken, a lesson from history that should come through loud and clear, is denied, and there is then no way of finding out whether the voices within are the voices of good or evil. .. Spontaneity (the impulses from our best self) gets confused with impulsivity and acting out (the impulses from our sick self), and there is then no way to tell the difference. (Maslow 1994) pp.ix-x.

246. The better way to perceive [art] “style” is not to analyze or dissect it but to be receptive, global, intuitive....

...the prerequisite for holistic perception of qualities of wholeness I shall call “experiential naïveté,” and I define it as a willingness and an ability to experience immediately without certain other ways of “knowing.”

So those individuals who “know” art only in the analytic, atomistic, taxonomic, or historical sense are less able to perceive and enjoy. And the possibility must be admitted that education of a merely analytic sort may actually diminish originally present intuitiveness. (Maslow 1966) pp.62-63.

247. Their [humanistic psychologists'] clinical experiences have led them to conceive of the human being as having an essence, a biological nature, membership in a species. It is very easy to interpret the “uncovering” therapies as helping the person to *discover* his “identity,” his “real self,” in a word, his own subjective biology, which he can *then* proceed to actualize, to “make himself,” to “choose.” ...it is implied, if not made explicit, by most of these writers that the organism, in the strictest sense, has *needs* which must be gratified in order to become fully human, to grow well, and to avoid sicknesses. This doctrine of a “real self” to be uncovered and actualized is also a total rejection of the *tabula rasa* notions of the behaviorists and associationists who often talk as if *anything* can be learned, *anything* can be taught, as

if the human being is a sort of passive clay to be shaped, controlled, reinforced, modified in any way that somebody arbitrarily decides.

We speak then of a self, a kind of intrinsic nature which is very subtle, which is not necessarily conscious, which has to be sought for, and which has to be uncovered and then built upon, actualized, taught, educated. The notion is that something is there but it's hidden, swamped, distorted, twisted, overlayed. The job of the psychotherapist (or the teacher) is to help a person find out what's already in him rather than to reinforce him or shape or teach him into a prearranged form, which someone else has decided upon in advance, *a priori*. (Maslow 1959a) pp.306-307.

248. Rogers and Maslow counterposed the understanding of human nature contained in the growth hypothesis to the positivistic philosophy of behaviorism, and believed that true learning is possible only when it is intrinsic, experiential, significant or meaningful. When one learns something, one is experiencing a process of discovery that is real and an integral part of the character structure. ...The essence of this type of learning is its personal intrinsic meaning. When one has a need to learn and is free to choose what to learn, the knowledge acquired becomes meaningful and a source of satisfaction. Self-initiated knowledge has the quality of personal involvement. Thus the purpose of education, according to Rogers and Maslow, was not external conditioning and enforcement of learning habits, as Skinner had argued, but rather to stimulate curiosity, the inner need to discover and explore, to facilitate personal involvement and, of course, to supply the necessary instructional resources. (De Carvalho 1991) pp.100-101.

They [Maslow and Rogers] believed that the ultimate goal of education was to facilitate the student's self-actualization and the fulfillment of their human potential. Both argued that the success of any educational system depends on its ability to involve students in the process of learning and to perceive meaning in the acquisition of knowledge. Without the student's wonder, curiosity, and personal need to learn, good teachers and well-funded schools will fail. Students are not rat-like organisms that learn technological knowledge and skills in response to rewarding stimuli. According to Maslow and Rogers, students instead learn only when they seek to actualize their human potential. The teacher should thus make an alliance with the students' natural curiosity and facilitate the process of self-discovery, so that the student may discover the vocation and skills that best suit their intrinsic abilities. Once this alliance has been made, it is also the educator's responsibility to make extrinsic knowledge available and teach specific skills. Teachers themselves should serve as role models, authentic, curious, and explorative; human beings intrigued by the wonders of their disciplines. (De Carvalho 1991) p.7.

249. Fusion-knowledge—These love relationships that can go over into the mystic experience of fusion with the world give us our end point (*beyond* knowledge through love for the object) of knowledge by fusion with the object, by becoming one with it. They can then be considered for theoretical purposes to become experiential knowledge, knowledge from within, by *being* what we are knowing. At least this is the ideal limit to which such knowledge approaches or tries to approach. (Maslow 1966) p.112.

250. In B-cognition the experience or object tends to be seen as a whole, as a complete unit, detached from relations, from possible usefulness, from expediency, and from purpose.

...We are reminded here of the absolute idealism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in which all the universe was conceived to be a unit.

When there is a B-cognition, the precept is exclusively and fully attended to. This may be called “total attention”...

This kind of perception is in sharp contrast to normal perception. Here the object is attended to simultaneously with attention to all else that is relevant. It is seen as imbedded in its relationships with everything else in the world, and as *part* of the world. ...Furthermore, in ordinary cognition, the object is seen not so much *per se* but as a member of a class, as an instance in a larger category. This kind of perception I have described as “rubricizing,” and again would point out that this is not so much a full perception, as it is a kind of taxonomy, a classifying, a ticking off into one file cabinet or another.

To a far greater extent than we ordinarily realize, cognition involves also placing on a continuum. It involves a kind of automatic comparing or judging or evaluating. It implies higher than, less than, better than, taller than, etc.

B-cognition may be called non-comparing cognition or non-evaluating or non-judging cognition. (Maslow 1968) pp.74-75.

251. That is, we most categorize, schematize, classify, and abstract in our cognitive life. We do not so much cognize the nature of the world as it actually is, as we do the organization of our own inner world outlook. Most of experience is filtered through our system of categories, constructs, and rubrics... I was led to this differentiation by my studies of self-actualizing people, *finding in them simultaneously the ability to abstract without giving up concreteness and the ability to be concrete without giving up abstractness*. (Maslow 1968) pp.88-89.

252. What we [psychotherapists] have learned is that ultimately, the best way for a person to discover what he ought to do is to find out who and what he is, because the path to ethical and value decisions, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via “isness,” via discovery of facts, truth, reality, the nature of the particular person. (Maslow 1993) pp.106-107.

253. The word and the concept “contemplation” can, then, be understood as a form of nonactive, noninterfering witnessing and savoring. That is, it can be assimilated to Taoistic, nonintruding, receptivity to experience. In such a moment the experience happens instead of being made to happen. Since this permits it to be itself, minimally distorted by the observer, it is in certain instances a path to more reliable and more veridical cognition. (Maslow 1966) p.101.

254. In general we—the intellectuals, the philosophers, the scientists—have meant by it [the concept of “meaning”] that it integrates, coordinates, classifies, and organizes the chaos, the multiple, the creation of a whole. This whole and its parts then have the meaning that the parts did not hitherto have. “Organizing experience into meaningful patterns” implies that experience itself has not meaningfulness, that the organizer creates or imposes or donates the meaning, that his giving of meaning is an active process rather than a receptive one, that it is a gift from the knower to the known.

In other words, “meaningfulness” of this kind is of the realm of classification and abstraction rather than of experience. (Maslow 1966) p.84.

255. Maslow assumes that there exists a reality independent of human beings’ consciousness (*ontological realism*). He also assumes that there is some correspondence between human beings contents of consciousness and [independent reality] (*epistemological realism*). He belongs to empiricism within epistemology whose advocates assert that the genesis of knowledge of [independent reality] is brought through sense-experience and that this knowledge of [independent reality] is justified by

sense-experience. (Thorsen 1983) p.63.

256. The described characteristics of Being are also the values of Being. These Being-values are perceived as ultimate and as further unanalyzable (and yet they can each be defined in terms of each and all of the others). They are paralleled also by the characteristics of selfhood (identity) in peak-experiences; the characteristics of ideal art; the characteristics of ideal mathematical demonstration; of ideal experiments and theories; of ideal science and knowledge; the far goals of all ideal, uncovering (Taoistic, non-interfering) psychotherapies; the far goals of the ideal humanistic education; the far goals of the expression of some kinds of religion; the characteristics of ideally good environment and of the ideally good society. (Maslow 1994) p.91

257. If we were to accept as a major education goal the awakening and fulfillment of the B-values, which is simply another aspect of self-actualization, we would have a great flowering of a new kind of civilization. People would be stronger, healthier, and would take their own lives into their hands to a greater extent. With increased personal responsibility for one's personal life, and with a rational set of values to guide one's choosing, people would begin to actively change the society in which they lived. The movement toward psychological health is also the movement toward spiritual peace and social harmony. (Maslow 1993) pp.187-188.

258. Humanists for thousands of years have attempted to construct a naturalistic, psychological value system that could be derived from man's own nature, without the necessity of recourse to authority outside the human being himself. . . .

These inadequate theories, most of them, rested on psychological assumptions of one sort or another. . . .it is my belief that developments in the science and art of psychology, in the last few decades, make it possible for us for the first time to feel confident that this age-old hope may be fulfilled if we work hard enough. . . .That is, we think that a scientific ethic may be possible, and we think we know how to go about constructing it. (Maslow 1959b) pp.119-120.

259. Just as each science was once a part of the body of organized religion but then broke away to become independent, so also it can be said that the same thing may now be happening to the problems of values, ethics, spirituality, morals. They are being taken away from the exclusive jurisdiction of the institutionalized churches and are becoming the "property," so to speak, of a new type of humanistic scientist who is vigorously denying the old claim of the established religions to be the sole arbiters of all questions of faith and morals. (Maslow 1994) p.12.

260. Healthy people seem to have clear impulse voices about matters of ethics and values, as well. Self-actualizing people have to a large extent transcended the values of their culture. They are not so much merely Americans as they are world citizens, members of the human species first and foremost. . . .If an ultimate goal of education is self-actualizing, then education ought to help people transcend the conditioning imposed upon them by their own culture and become world citizens. (Maslow 1993) p.177.

261. Summarizing what we have said, that schools should be helping the children to look within themselves, and from this self-knowledge derive a set of values. (Maslow 1993) p.178.

262. Homeostasis—Hundreds of experiments have been made that demonstrate a universal inborn ability in all sorts of animals to select a beneficial diet if enough alternatives are presented from among which they are permitted free choice. This wisdom of the body is often retained under less usual conditions, *e.g.*, adrena-

lectomized animals can keep themselves alive by readjusting their self-chosen diet, pregnant animals will nicely adjust their diets to the needs of the growing embryo, etc. {for support Maslow cites W.B. Cannon, *Wisdom of the Body*, Norton, 1932} (Maslow 1959b) p.120.

It seems quite clear that all organisms are more self-governing, self-regulating and autonomous than we thought 25 years ago. The organism deserves a good deal of trust, and we are learning steadily to rely on this internal wisdom of our babies with reference to choice of diet, time of weaning, amount of sleep, time of toilet training, need for activity, and a lot else. (Maslow 1968) pp.150-151.

263. ...[individuated, self-actualized] people, when they feel strong, if *really* free choice is possible, tend spontaneously to choose the true rather than the false, good rather than evil, beauty rather than ugliness, integration rather than dissociation, joy rather than sorrow, aliveness rather than deadness, uniqueness rather than stereotypy [sterotype?], and so on for what I have already described as the B-values.

A subsidiary hypothesis is that tendencies to choose these same B-values can be seen weakly and dimly in all or most human beings, i.e., that these may be species-wide values which are seen most clearly and unmistakably, most strongly in healthy people, and that in these healthy people these higher values are least alloyed either by defensive (anxiety-instigated) values, or by what I shall refer to below as healthy-regressive, or "coating" values.

...Another very likely hypothesis is this; what healthy people choose is on the whole what is "good for them" in biological terms certainly, but perhaps also in other senses ("good for them" here means "conducting to their and others' self-actualization").

To spell out only one implication here, these propositions affirm the existence of the highest values within human nature itself, to be discovered there. This is in sharp contradiction to the older and more customary beliefs that the highest values can come only from a supernatural God, or from some other source outside human nature itself. (Maslow 1968) pp.168-170.

264. The last few decades of clinical and experimental psychology have brought into clearer focus the logically prior need, before knowing, to be a good knower. The distorting power not only of the various psychopathologies but also of the more "normal" ungratified needs, hidden fears, characteristic defenses, i.e., of the "normal" or average personality, are far greater than mankind ever thought before this century. In my opinion we have learned from clinical and personological experience (1) that improvement of psychological health makes the person a better knower, even a better scientist, and (2) that a very good path to improved and fuller humaneness or health has been via self-knowledge, insight, and honesty with oneself. (Maslow 1966) p.48.

265. My general thesis is that many of the communication difficulties between persons are the byproduct of communication barriers *within* the person; and that communication between the person and the world, to and fro, depends largely on their isomorphism (i.e., similarity of structure and form); that the world can communicate to a person only that of which he is worthy, that which he deserves or is "up to"; that to a large extent, he can receive from the world, and give to the world, only that which he himself is...

...Of course I take communication here in the very broadest sense. I include all the processes of perception and of learning, and all the forms of art and of creation. And I include primary-process cognition (archaic, mythological, metaphorical,

poetic cognition) as well as verbal, rational, secondary-process communication.

...A main consequence of this general thesis—that difficulties with the outer parallel difficulties within the inner—is that we should expect communication with the outer world to improve along with improvement in the development of the personality, along with its integration and wholeness, and along with freedom from civil war among the various portions of the personality, i.e., perception of reality should improve. (Maslow 1993) pp.149-150.

266. The empirical fact is that self-actualizing people, our best experiencers, are also our most compassionate, our great improvers and reformers of society, our most *effective* fighters against injustice, inequality, slavery, cruelty, exploitation, (and also our best fighters *for* excellence, effectiveness, competence). And it also becomes clearer and clearer that the best “helpers” are the most fully human persons. What I may call the bodhisattvic path is an *integration* of self-improvement and social zeal, i.e., the best way to become a better “ helper” is to become a better person. (Maslow 1994) p.xii.

267. The uniqueness of Maslow’s ‘philosophy’ lies in its breadth of application. Marxism is a social philosophy that ignores the individual; existentialism is an individual philosophy that has nothing much to say about society as a whole. Koestler spoke about the fundamental irreconcilableness of the yogi and the commissar; the yogi thinks in terms of personal salvation, the commissar in terms of what is good for society as a whole; and they seem to be unable to find any common ground. Maslow, without making any undue fuss about it, has bridged the gap. ...With Maslow’s hierarchy of values, the problem vanishes. (Wilson 1972) pp.188-189.

268. Personal salvation and what is good for the person alone cannot be really understood in isolation. Social psychology is, therefore, necessary. The good of other people must be invoked, as well as the good for oneself, even though it must be demonstrated how these are—or may be—synergic. To some extent, the individual’s interests and those of his or her team or organization, culture, or society may be at odds—even though an overall principle of *synergy* may prevail. But in any case, it is quite clear that a purely intrapsychic, individualistic psychology, without reference to other people and social conditions, is not adequate. (Maslow 1996b) pp.31-32.

269. The steps and the choices are taken out of pure spontaneity, from within outward. The healthy infant or child, just Being, as *part* of his Being, is randomly, and spontaneously curious, exploratory, wondering, interested. ...*Exploring, manipulating, experiencing*, being interested, choosing, delighting, *enjoying* can all be seen as attributes of pure Being, and yet lead to Becoming, though in a serendipitous way, fortuitously, unplanned, unanticipated. (Maslow 1968) p.45.

270. So far as motivational status is concerned, healthy people has sufficiently gratified their basic needs for safety, belongingness, love, respect and self-esteem so that they are motivated primarily by trends to self-actualization. (Maslow 1968) p.25.

271. My thesis is, then: we can, in principle, have a descriptive, naturalistic science of human values; that the age-old mutually exclusive contrast between “what is” and “what ought to be” is in part a false one; that we can study the highest values or goals of human beings as we study the values of ants or horses or oak trees, or for that matter, Martians. We can discover (rather than create or invent) which values men tend toward, yearn for, struggle for, as they improve themselves, and which values they lose as they get sick. (Maslow 1968) p.167.

272. Generated by this new humanistic philosophy is also a new conception of learning, of teaching, and of education. Stated simply, such a concept holds that the

function of education, the goal of education—the human goal, the humanistic goal, the goal so far as human beings are concerned—is ultimately the “self-actualization” of a person, the becoming fully human, the development of the fullest height that the human species can stand up to or that the particular individual can come to. (Maslow 1993) p.162.

273. We know ...that the initiation of such learning [significant learning] rests not upon the teaching skill of the leader, not upon scholarly knowledge of the field, not upon curricular planning, not upon use of audiovisual aids, not upon the programmed learning used, not upon lectures and presentations, not upon an abundance of books, though each of these might at one time or another be utilized as an important resource. No, the facilitation of significant learning rests upon certain attitudinal qualities that exist in the personal *relationship* between the facilitator and the learner. (Rogers 1983) p.121.

274. It appears that the person who emerges from a theoretically optimal experience of personal growth, whether through client-centered therapy or some other experience of learning and development, is then a fully functioning person. He is able to live life fully in and with each and all of his feelings and reactions. He is making use of all his organic equipment to sense, as accurately as possible, the existential situation [living in the moment] within and without. He is using all of the data his nervous system can thus supply, using it in awareness, but recognizing that his total organism may be, and often is, wiser than his awareness. He is able to permit his total organism to function in all of its complexity in selecting, from the multitude of possibilities, that behavior which in this moment of time will be most generally and genuinely satisfying. He is able to trust his organism in this functioning, not because it is infallible, but because he can be fully open to the consequences of each of his actions and correct them if they prove to be less than satisfying.

He is able to experience all of his feelings, and is afraid of none of his feelings; he is his own sifter of evidence, but is open to evidence from all sources; he is completely engaged in the process of being and becoming himself, and thus discovers that he is soundly and realistically social; he lives completely in this moment, but learns that this is the soundest living for all times. He is a fully functioning organism, and because of the awareness of himself which flows freely in and through his experience, he is a fully functioning person. (Rogers 1983) p.290.

275. The fact can scarcely have escaped the notice of the social scientist with a feeling for the history of ideas that Sigmund Freud inherits the tradition of Augustine in his belief that man is basically and fundamentally hostile, anti-social, and carnal.

It has been less frequently recognized, apparently, by writers concerned with the theoretical aspects of counseling that Carl Rogers, in the same sense, is the successor to Rousseau. Recall that Rousseau began his classic presentation in *Emile* with the observation that every man comes from the hand of his Maker a perfect being. This pristine splendor is corrupted, said Rousseau, by an imperfect society.

In his counseling theory Carl Rogers seems to have subtly refurbished the conception of man as basically good. ...For Rogers, man is basically good in that he has within himself a drive to health and adjustment which operates more or less automatically once obstacles are removed.

...The counseling process is one in which the counselee ideally grows in the desirable direction of health, integration, and stability. A part of this process seems to be the development of an increasing ability to trust one's basic impulses:



...This trust in basic impulses is not then, we may presume, a characteristic "conditioned" into a person by another—something imposed. It is a matter of coming to recognize that one's basic nature is something to be relied upon, trusted and not feared. (Walker 1956) p.89.

276. Here then is my theoretical model of the person who emerges from therapy or from the best of education, the individual who has experienced optimal psychological growth—a person functioning freely in all the fullness of his organismic potentialities; a person who is dependable in being realistic, self-enhancing, socialized, and appropriate in his behavior; a creative person who is ever-changing, ever developing, always discovering himself and the newness in himself in each succeeding moment of time.

Let me stress, however, that what I have described is a person who does not exist. He is the theoretical goal, the end-point of personal growth. We see persons moving *in this direction* from the best of experiences in education, from the best experiences in therapy, from the best of family and group relationships. (Rogers 1983) pp. 295-296.

277. [The experience of learning to be free] is a deeply compelling phenomenon for anyone who has observed it, or who has lived it.

The experience to which I am referring is a central process or central aspect of psychotherapy. It is the experience of becoming a more autonomous, more spontaneous, more confident person. It is the experience of freedom to be one's self. ...The client begins to realize, "I am not compelled to be simply the creation of others, molded by their expectancies, shaped by their demands. I am not compelled to be a victim of unknown forces in myself. I am less and less a creature of influences in myself which operate beyond my ken in the realms of the unconscious. I am increasingly the architect of the self. I am free to will and choose. I can, through accepting my individuality, my 'isness,' become more of my uniqueness, more of my potentiality." (Rogers and Stevens 1973) pp.47-48.

278. It is such experiences in individual and group psychotherapy which lead us to believe that we have here an important dynamic for modern education. We may have here the essential core of a process by which we might facilitate the production, through our educational system, of persons who will be adaptive and creative, able to make responsible choices, open to the kaleidoscopic changes in their world, worthy citizens of a fantastically expanding universe. It seems at least a possibility that in our schools and colleges, in our professional schools and universities, individuals could learn to be free. (Rogers and Stevens 1973) p.56.

279. Humans have within themselves an organismic basis for valuing. To the extent that we can be freely in touch with this valuing process in ourselves, we will behave in ways that are self-enhancing. (Rogers 1983) p.268.

#### 280. Propositions Regarding the Outcomes of the Valuing Process

*In persons who are moving toward greater openness to their experiencing, there is an organismic commonality of value directions.*

*These common value directions are of such kinds as to enhance the development of the individual, of others in the community, and to contribute to the survival and evolution of his species.*

Let me indicate a few of these value directions, as I see them in my clients as they move in the direction of personal growth and maturity

◆ They tend to move away from façades. Pretense, defensiveness, putting up a front tend to be negatively valued.

- ◆ They tend to move away from “oughts.”
- ◆ They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of others.
- ◆ Being real is positively valued.
- ◆ Self-direction is positively valued.
- ◆ One’s self, one’s own feelings come to be positively valued.
- ◆ Being a process is positively valued.
- ◆ Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an openness to all of her inner and outer experiences.

- ◆ Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively valued.
- ◆ Finally, deep relationships are positively valued.

...A corollary of what I have been saying is that in *any* culture, given a climate of respect and freedom in which she is valued as a person, the mature individual would tend to choose and prefer these same value directions.

Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of the universality of values, but by a different route. Instead of universal values “out there,” or a universal value system imposed by some group—philosophers, rulers, or priests—we have the possibility of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing of the human organism. Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to her own organismic valuing process. The tentative conclusion is that though modern humans no longer trust religion or science or philosophy or any system of beliefs to *give* them their values, they can find an organismic valuing base deep within themselves, which, if they can learn to be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive, and social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us. (Rogers and Freiberg 1994) pp.288-291.

281. [Answering the question: What kind of person is the person who becomes?] First of all I would say that in this process the individual becomes more open to his experience. ...It seems that the person increasingly discovers that his own organism is trustworthy, that it is a suitable instrument for discovering the most satisfying behavior in each immediate situation. ...The individual increasingly comes to feel that this locus of evaluation [of choices and decisions, or evaluative judgements] lies within himself. Less and less does he look to others for approval or disapproval; for standards to live by; for decisions and choices. He recognizes that it rests within himself to choose; that the only question which matters is, “Am I living in a way which is deeply satisfying to me, and which truly expresses me?” This I think is perhaps *the* most important question for the creative individual. (Rogers 1961) pp.115-119.

282. If the purpose of teaching is to promote learning, then we need to ask what we mean by that term. Here I become passionate. I want to talk about *learning*. But *not* the lifeless, sterile, futile, quickly forgotten stuff that is crammed into the mind of the poor helpless individual tied into his seat by ironclad bonds of conformity! I am talking about LEARNING—the insatiable curiosity that drives the adolescent boy to absorb everything he can see or hear or read about gasoline engines in order to improve the efficiency and speed of his “cruiser.” I am talking about the student who says, “ I am discovering, drawing in from outside, and making that which is drawn in a real part of *me*.” (Rogers 1983) pp.18-19.

283. [Of ‘significant learning’] *It has the quality of personal involvement*—the whole person in both feeling and cognitive aspects of being *in* the learning event. It is *self-initiated*. Even when the impetus or stimulus comes from the outside, the sense of

discovery, of reaching out, of grasping and comprehending, comes from within. *It is pervasive*. It makes a difference in the behavior, the attitudes, perhaps even the personality of the learner. *It is evaluated by the learner*. She knows whether it is meeting her need, whether it leads toward what she *wants* to know, whether it illuminates the dark area of ignorance she is experiencing. The locus of evaluation, we might say, resides definitely in the learner. *Its essence is meaning*. (Rogers 1983) p.20.

284. You may be thinking that “facilitator of learning” is just a fancy name for a teacher and that nothing at all would be changed. If so, you are mistaken. There is *no* resemblance between the traditional function of teaching and the function of the facilitator of learning.

The traditional teacher—the *good* traditional teacher—asks her or himself questions of this sort: “What do I think would be good for a student to learn at this particular age and level of competence? How can I plan a proper {136} curriculum for this student? How can I inculcate motivation to learn this curriculum? How can I instruct in such a way that he or she will gain the knowledge that should be gained? How can I best set an examination to see whether this knowledge has actually been taken in?”

On the other hand, the facilitator of learning asks questions such as these, not of self, but of the *students*: “What do you want to learn? What things puzzle you? What are you curious about? What issues concern you? What problems do you wish you could solve?” When he or she has the answers to these questions, further questions follow. “Now how can I help him or her find the resources—the people, the experiences, the facilities, the books, the knowledge in myself—which will help them learn in ways that will provide answers to the things that concern them, the things they are eager to learn?” And, then later, “How can I help them evaluate their own progress and set future learning goals based on this self-evaluation?” (Rogers 1983) pp.135-136.

285. Generic modes are produced by a functional analysis of what is taken to be the underlying features necessary to the performance of a skill, task, practice or even area of work. (Bernstein 1996a) p.67

286. Carl Rogers listed mistaken assumptions he felt are imbedded in mainstream education. His second and third assumptions are ones that many holistic educators would agree are wrong, and are relevant to the present issue.

A second implicit assumption is that presentation equals learning. This is evident in every curriculum, every lesson plan. It is especially clear if one observes a faculty committee trying to decide what topics a course shall ‘cover.’ It is clear that what is presented or ‘covered’ is what is learned. Anyone who has used any method which taps the actual experience of students in a class knows that this assumption could not be further from the truth; yet it persists.

A third and very basic assumption is that the aim of education is to accumulate brick upon brick of factual knowledge. There must be a ‘foundation of knowledge.’ These clearly defined building blocks must be assimilated before the student can proceed to learn on his own. Though this assumption flies in the face of everything we know about the curve of forgetting, it remains an unquestioned assumption. (Rogers 1967).

287. Ivan Illich and John Holt were early proponents of ‘deschooling’ and their many books always advocated allowing a child’s interests to dictate learning. Any-

thing else was described as not only without meaning, but as constituting an abuse of a child's natural learning process. Their work has inspired many in holistic education to seek out and follow what is meaningful for the individual children in their care. From Holt:

Children do not need to be made to learn, told what to learn, or shown how. If we give them access to enough of the world, including our own lives and work in the world, they will see clearly what things are truly important to us and to others, and they will make for themselves a better path into that world than we could make for them.

A few good principles to keep in mind: (1) Children do not need to be 'taught' in order to learn; they will learn a great deal, and probably learn best, without being taught. (2) Children are enormously interested in our adult world and what we do there. (3) Children learn best when things are embedded in a context of real life, are part of what George Dennison, in *The Lives of Children*, called 'the continuum of experience.' (4) Children learn best when their learning is connected with an immediate and serious purpose. (Holt 1982).

288. Wexler's latest book presents an interesting discussion of the 'self' as a focus for education in the new age as a natural response away from the postmodern malaise of mainstream education.

By focusing on the self in educational change, we not only move away from the superficial rationalization of the current performance-oriented, outcome-governed corporatism. Instead, I try to understand the directions of subjectivity within the historical, macrosociocultural changes that occur in the transition from postmodernism to resacralization. (Wexler 1997) p.114-115.

The model of the dynamic context that frames my interpretation of self/educational processes is one that I am drawn to after a rejection of postmodernisms as either analytics or ethics, and one that colleagues will identify as rejecting rather than reflexively preserving modernity, in favor of a premodern, if not ancient, understanding of individual and collective transformations. (Wexler 1997) p.118.

289. Carl Rogers' influential comments on the traditional teachers' role in determining curriculum:

One of the most obvious and pervasive assumptions is that the student cannot be trusted to pursue his own learning. The attitude of most teachers and faculty members tends to be one of mistrustful guidance. They look suspiciously on the student's aims and desires and devote their energies to guiding him along the pathway he "should" follow. I believe it is extremely rare that students have the feeling that they are being set free to learn, on their own. (Rogers 1967).

290. There is also the view that students and adults are essentially 'in the same boat.' Both groups need to learn about themselves, make meaningful connections between things thought and things lived, and discover how to meet the challenges of living more deeply. While there are some differences due to background and experiences, the similarities outweigh the differences. For the most articulate proponent of this see the educational work of J. Krishnamurti (Krishnamurti 1953; Krishnamurti

1970; Krishnamurti 1974; Krishnamurti 1975; Krishnamurti 1981; Krishnamurti 1985; Krishnamurti 1993a; Krishnamurti 1993b; Krishnamurti 1994).

291. However, this idealism of competence, a celebration of what we are in contrast to what we have become, is bought at a price: that is, the price of abstracting the individual from the analysis of distributions of power and principles of control which selectively specialize modes of acquisition and realizations. Thus the announcement of competence points away from such selective specialisations and so points away from the macro blot on the micro context. (Bernstein 1996a) p.56.

292. Recognition and realization rules for legitimate texts are implicit. The emphasis is upon the realization of competences that acquirers already possess, or are thought to possess. Differences between displaces stratification of acquirers: classification is weak. (Bernstein 1996a) p. 58.

293. Recognition and realization rules for legitimate texts are explicit. Acquirers have relatively less control over selection, sequence and pace. Acquirers' texts (performances) are graded, and stratification displaces differences between acquirers. Classifications are strong. (Bernstein 1996a) pp.58-59.

294. From Roger's list of assumptions in mainstream education that is so often quoted in holistic education literature.

Another undeniable assumption, evident in all of our educational operations, is that constructive and creative citizens develop from passive learners. There seems to be a great unanimity in the verbalized aim of producing good citizens, able to act constructively, with an independence and originality adequate to the main virtue encouraged in our classrooms, at all levels, is that of passive learning material which is presented by the instructor, which in turn has been selected by some educational group as being material important for the student to learn. This is clearly the way in which we assume that an independent citizenry is developed. (Rogers 1967).

295. This issue of the regulation of pedagogical space is probably the most consistently vitriolic topic in holistic education. Possibly the most forceful of all current speakers on the topic is John Taylor Gatto, a teacher of almost thirty years in New York City, and a winner of several awards for excellence in teaching. He makes a convincing case that there are special interests which want a population that has learned to be obedient and passive. Gatto explains that as a teacher recognized for the excellence of his teaching, there were seven essential things that he (and every other excellent teacher) taught:

The first lesson I teach is confusion. Everything I teach is out of context. I teach un-relating of everything. I teach dis-connections.

The second lesson I teach is class position. I teach that students must stay in the class where they belong. I don't know who decides my kids belong there but that's not my business. The children are numbered so that if any get away they can be returned to the right class.

The third lesson I teach is indifference. I teach children not to care too much about anything, even though they want to make it appear that they do.

The fourth lesson I teach is emotional dependence. By stars and red checks, smiles and frowns, prizes, honors, and disgraces, I teach kids to surrender their will to the predestined chain of command. Rights may be granted or withheld by any authority without appeal, because rights do not

exist inside a school—not even the right of free speech, as the Supreme Court has ruled—unless school authorities say they do.

The fifth lesson I teach is intellectual dependency. Good students wait for a teacher to tell them what to do. It is the most important lesson, that we must wait for other people, better trained than ourselves, to make the meanings of our lives.

The sixth lesson I teach is provisional self-esteem. If you've ever tried to wrestle into line kids whose parents have convinced them to believe they'll be loved in spite of anything, you know how impossible it is to make self-confident spirits conform.

The seventh lesson I teach is that one can't hide. I teach students that they are always watched, that each is under constant surveillance by myself and my colleagues. (Gatto 1992) pp.2-11.

296. Most holistic educators would feel that, once again, Carl Rogers speaks for them in his sixth assumption he feels is imbedded in mainstream education.

One final and very pervasive assumption, especially in American education, is that evaluation is education and education is evaluation. Taking examinations and preparing for the next set of exams is a way of life for students. There is little or no thought of intrinsic goals, since the extrinsic have become all-important. Rarely does the student ask himself, "What aspect of this particular subject or this book interests me?" of "How could I find out about this particular aspect of life?" The sole question is, "What do you suppose will be asked on the examination?" It has gradually come to be assumed by teachers, by students, and by their parents, that report cards and grades constitute education. When a faculty member asked a student what he got out of a certain course, the student's response was what one would expect in this system: "I got a B." (Rogers 1967).

297. ...regulative discourse criteria (criteria of conduct and manner, and relation) are likely to be more explicit [in competence based pedagogy than performance based pedagogy]. (Bernstein 1996a) p. 60.

298. Possibly the greatest impact has been made by a Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University who wrote a book called *An Aristocracy of Everyone* after developing a program for citizenship started in 1988. His program received recognition from President Clinton and praise from many states which subsequently built on his work. Many holistic educators welcomed his book and his program as legitimising what they had been saying for years, but which had been criticised as unrealistic.

...the crucial democratic relationship between rights and responsibilities, which have too often been divorced in our society, can only be made visible in a setting of experiential learning where academic discussion is linked to practical activity. In other words, learning about the relationship between civic responsibility and civic rights means exercising the rights and duties of membership in an actual community, whether that community is a classroom, a group project or community service team, and or the university/college at large. (Barber 1992) p.254.

299. ...focus on procedural commonalities shared within a group. In the cases we have analysed the group is children but the procedural commonalities may well

be shared with other categories, e.g., ethnic communities, social class groups. From this point of view competence models are predicated on fundamental 'similar to' relations. Differences between acquirers are not subject to stratification but can be viewed as complementary to the actualization of a common potential. (Bernstein 1996a) p.64.

300. From Ron Miller, generally considered the best historian of holistic education:

A basic premise of holistic education is the belief that our lives have a meaning and purpose greater than the mechanistic laws described by science, and greater than the "consensus consciousness" of any one culture. This transcendent purpose is a creative, self-guiding energy which we ought not attempt to suppress....

...two quite different languages have been used to describe this spiritual attitude. One is primarily religious and theistic, and describes the transcendent in terms such as "God," "divine" and "soul" ...The other is a more empirical, down-to-earth language, taken from twentieth century psychology, which uses terms such as "archetype" and "individuation" and "self-actualization". There are significant and interesting differences between these two conceptions. For example, religious approaches tend to seek the transcendent through various *disciplines*, and holistic education methods developed in these traditions (such as Waldorf, Montessori, and schools affiliated with religious sects) are often quite highly structured and disciplined. On the other hand, empirical psychological approaches are more interested in the *spontaneity* of creative expression, and educators who draw upon this point of view (Neef, Ferrer, Neil, Goodman, Holt, etc.) are the "child-centered" libertarians in holistic tradition. (Miller 1992) pp.154-155.

301. Foresight! Foresight, which takes us ceaselessly beyond ourselves and often places us where we shall never arrive. This is the true source of all our miseries. What madness for a fleeting being like man always to look far into a future which comes so rarely and to neglect the present of which he is sure. It is a madness all the more destructive since it increases continuously with age; and old men, always distrustful, full of foresight, and miserly, prefer to deny themselves what is necessary today so as not to lack it a hundred years from now. Thus, we are attached to everything, we cling to everything—times, places, men, things; everything which is, everything which will be, is important to each of us. Our individual persons are now only the least part of ourselves. Each one extends himself, so to speak, over the whole earth and becomes sensitive over this entire large surface. Is it surprising that our ills are multiplied by all the points where we can be wounded? How many princes grieve over the loss of a country they have never seen? How many merchants are there whom it suffices to touch in India in order to make them scream in Paris? (Rousseau 1979) pp.82-83.

302. Conscious and unconscious do not make a whole when one of them is suppressed and injured by the other. If they must contend, let it at least be a fair fight with equal rights on both sides. Both are aspects of life. Consciousness should defend its reason and protect itself, and the chaotic life of the unconscious should be given that chance of having its way too—as much of it as we can stand. This

means open conflict and open collaboration at one. That, evidently, is the way human life should be....

This, roughly, is what I mean by the individuation process. (Jung 1959b) p.288 § 522-523.

303. ...the mystical (or experiential) also has its traps which I have not stressed sufficiently. As the more Apollonian type can veer toward the extreme of being reduced to the merely behavioral, so does the mystical type run the risk of being reduced to the merely experiential. Out of the joy and wonder of his ecstasies and peak-experiences he may be tempted to *seek* them, *ad hoc*, and to value them exclusively, as the only or at least the highest goods of life, giving up other criteria of right and wrong. Focused on these wonderful subjective experiences, he may run the danger of turning away from the world and from other people in his search for triggers to peak-experiences, *any* triggers. (Maslow 1994) p. viii.

304. It is the overstress on the conscious and the rational and the underestimation of the wisdom of our total reacting organism that prevent us from living as unified, whole human beings.

Yet I can testify from personal experience that it is not easy for people whose lives have been dichotomized for decades to achieve this unity. (Rogers 1990a) p.369.

305. ...the school and instruction are to lead the boy to the threefold, yet in itself one, knowledge—to the knowledge of himself in all his relations, and thus to the knowledge of man as such; to the knowledge of God, the eternal condition, cause and source of his being, and of the being of all things; and to the knowledge of nature and the outer world as proceeding from the Eternal Spirit and depending thereupon. (Froebel 1890) p.137.

306. ...there is no longer the illusion that we can gain *certain* knowledge. Instead, by a variety of means and methods, we can gain new knowledge and this new knowledge has a degree of truth value that depends on the methods and circumstances of the particular research study. It is refreshing to find that we need to use our judgment to discriminate between those findings and conclusions that have a high degree of validity and those that have a lesser degree of validity. There is a full recognition that we will never have certain knowledge. (Rogers 1990c) p.284.

307. The Christian West considers man to be wholly dependent upon the grace of God, or at least upon the Church as the exclusive and divinely sanctioned earthly instrument of man's redemption. The East, however, insists that man is the sole cause of his higher development, for it believes in "self-liberation."

In spite of everything, the West is thoroughly Christian as far as its psychology is concerned. ...Grace comes from elsewhere; at all events from outside. Every other point of view is sheer heresy. Hence it is quite understandable why the human psyche is suffering from undervaluation. Anyone who dares to establish a connection between the psyche and the idea of God is immediately accused of "psychologism" or suspected of morbid "mysticism." (Jung 1958c) pp.481-482 § 770-771.

308. It follows, therefore, that, in order to incline a young man to humanity, far from making him admire the brilliant lot of others, one must show him the sad sides of that lot, one must make him fear it. Then, by an evident inference, he ought to cut out his own road to happiness, following in no one else's tracks. (Rousseau 1979) p.223.



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## *About the Author*

Scott H. Forbes is an American who has lived in Europe off and on since he was a boy, and has spent most of his life there. He has worked for more than 30 years in the field of holistic education. For 20 years he worked at the Brockwood Park Krishnamurti Educational Centre in England where he was principal for ten years. During those years he lectured widely in Europe, the Far East, and in many countries formerly under the Soviet Union. Dr. Forbes earned his doctorate from the University of Oxford for his work establishing an intellectual basis for holistic education. He has been involved with founding holistic schools, doing educational research in holistic education, and conducting teacher development programs to help teachers of any school make their practice more holistic. Dr. Forbes is currently founding a holistic school in Portland, Oregon, as well as a center for other activities to further holistic education. Dr. Forbes and the various activities he is involved with can be reached at [www.holistic-education.net](http://www.holistic-education.net).

# **HOLISTIC EDUCATION**

## **An Analysis of Its Ideas and Nature**

Scott H. Forbes

In this landmark study of the history, philosophy, and practices of holistic education, Scott Forbes examines the intellectual precedents of holistic education by looking at the work of six "Authors" who are generally considered to have laid the foundation for its ideas: Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Jung, Maslow, and Rogers. Dr. Forbes also explains how these ideas find expression in action, using tools of the sociology of education as propounded by Basil Bernstein. Through this analysis, the author describes the meaning of the rich variety and seemingly diverse practices in holistic education.

This book shows that, while distinct from conventional educational approaches, holistic education is a coherent, complex body of pedagogic ideas and activities. It helps explain why holistic education has persisted for so long, despite being marginalized, and is growing in popularity around the world. And it will help the reader more fully understand the roots of holistic education. Dr. Forbes' background as a teacher and head of an internationally recognized holistic school makes him uniquely qualified to write this book.


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